Social Barriers to Entry: Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals in the US from 2000 to 2013 by Srikant, Chethan D
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
6-13-2016 12:00 AM 
Social Barriers to Entry: Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals in 
the US from 2000 to 2013 
Chethan D. Srikant 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Prof. Jean-Philippe Vergne 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Business 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Chethan D. Srikant 2016 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business and Corporate 
Communications Commons, Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, and the Strategic 
Management Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Srikant, Chethan D., "Social Barriers to Entry: Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals in the US from 2000 
to 2013" (2016). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 3793. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3793 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
  
i 
 
Abstract 
Management scholars recognize the uncertainties and challenges during the market entry 
process that can impede operational startup. However, very little empirical research exists 
to fully understand these challenges and explain firm responses. Even less attention has 
been paid to the threats from non-market actors and the countering strategies employed 
by firms. Hence, this thesis explores firm reactions to community contestation, as a form 
of social barrier to entry that can prevent the firm from exploiting market opportunities. 
Specifically, I consider the strategic implications of firms’ rhetorical responses to 
community contestation during the market entry process. 
For this thesis, U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry (2000–2013) is an appropriate 
context because only 26 out of the 59 proposed LNG import terminals could even get to 
the regulatory approval stage. Regulatory success, defined as the gain of regulatory 
approval in a relatively short amount of time compared to other competing proposals, was 
a necessary precursor for achieving operational startup and implementing the market 
entry strategy. The regulatory success of many proposals was threatened by extensive 
negative media attention due to sustained community contestation, forcing the Federal 
regulatory agencies to carry out an extensive and time-consuming evaluation in order to 
project an image of fairness. Firms had to employ rhetorical strategies to publicly counter 
the community contestation but were not equally successful. 
Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), I identify four rhetorical 
strategies associated with the regulatory success. I find that a demonstrable community 
need enables an avoidance rhetorical strategy whereby firms try to sail through the 
regulatory process without catching public attention, especially when the design 
disadvantages of their proposals risk being exposed. When community need is not 
demonstrable but contestation levels are high, firms implement counterattack rhetorical 
strategies to undermine any community contestation, at times directly targeting the firm’s 
detractors, and not just the issues they raised. By conceiving of community contestation 
 ii 
 
as a social barrier to entry and showing how it can be mitigated using rhetorical 
strategies, my study contributes to the literatures on rhetoric, firm entry, and non-market 
strategies at the community level. 
Keywords 
Community Contestation; Rhetoric; Non-Market Strategies; Firm Entry; Regulatory 
Success; fsQCA; Social Barriers to Entry; Liquefied Natural Gas 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1 Introduction 
Before 2000, there was just one operational liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal 
in the United States mainland. Renewed interests in early 2000s led to the emergence of 
proposals for new terminals. By the end of 2013, there were 59 different proposals but 
only 26 (less than half) of these proposed terminals could even get regulatory approval 
for start of construction. Many of these terminals faced sustained community opposition 
that created impediments for the firms during the regulatory approval process and thus 
became a form of social barrier to entry. Community contestation, as a form of social 
barrier to entry, highlights the difficulties firms face between market entry decisions and 
operational startup (Sine, R. J. David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007). However, much of the 
strategy literature has focused on entry decisions in terms of timing and mode, and 
empirical research has largely ignored the market entry process (Zachary, Gianiodis, 
Payne, & Markman, 2015). 
Communities become relevant in the market entry process because oftentimes firms enter 
a market by establishing a foothold (Upson, Ketchen, Connelly, & Ranft, 2012) that is 
often geographically determined (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005). A great deal of due 
diligence is undertaken in order to ascertain the economic viability of the particular 
location, especially when it is an energy facility such as an LNG terminal. However, as 
Oliver (1997: 697) notes, “a firm’s sustainable advantage depends on its ability to 
manage the institutional context of its resource decisions,”. When the resource decision is 
the selection of a location the surrounding community becomes an important proximal 
institutional context. Such communities become even more salient when community 
members publicly oppose a proposed facility in their community (Yue, Rao, & Ingram, 
2013). The success of a market strategy then becomes contingent on non-market tactics 
(Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), which are intended to influence social actors beyond 
economic exchanges (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012). 
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Extant literature on community opposition toward a firm’s entry has focused on the 
community and its ability to organize opposition in the form of collective action 
(McAdam & Boudet, 2012; Wright & Boudet, 2012) or in the form of a new venture 
emerging from within the community (Greve, Pozner, & Rao, 2006; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007). Very little is known about what the firm can do except exit at the first 
sign of trouble (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010). On the other hand, substantial evidence from 
research on social contestation in more macro settings, such as industry, national, and 
transnational contexts, indicates the potential utility of a firm’s rhetorical strategy (Desai, 
2011; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015; McDonnell & King, 
2013; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). Social contestation involves 
“multiple social actors competing for influence over the rules, institutions, norms, and 
policies that structure markets and economic relations” (Levy & Egan, 2003: 824), and so 
a firm’s effective use of rhetoric becomes necessary to further its own agenda and limit 
the negative influence of others. 
Moral, ethical, and environmental issues, and societal appropriateness often shape 
contestation in such macro-level social settings (Galvin, Ventresca, & Hudson, 2004; 
Hoffman, 1999). Apart from these macro issues, opposition at a local community level is 
typically rooted in daily existential issues, often described as NIMBY (not-in-my-
backyard) issues (Schively, 2007). At the community level, firms have an opportunity to 
promote the visible and tangible benefits of entry, such as job creation and economic 
development. By addressing the economic interests of the community, the firm might 
even succeed in avoiding a polarizing debate that is framed as the firm’s economic 
interests versus the community’s environmental interests (Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999). 
The implication is that firms can potentially implement rhetorical strategies to address 
community contestation (social contestation at a community level). However, the kind of 
impact these rhetorical strategies have on entry outcomes or the very presence of a direct 
impact is not clearly established in extant literature. Hence, this dissertation seeks to 
primarily answer the research question: How do firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to 
community-level market entry conditions, and how do these strategies affect entry 
outcomes? 
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Building on extant literature, I examine the types of rhetoric available to firms facing 
social contestation. Firms can use either a persuasive rhetoric to focus attention toward 
the positive attributes of the firm (McDonnell & King, 2013) or a dissuasive rhetoric that 
directly addresses the source of the contestation by providing counterarguments to the 
issues (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Countering issues is a necessity to dissuade the social 
contestation from coalescing but need not be the only form of dissuasion. Often, those 
deemed as having “a voice in determining institutional norms” (emphasis added) become 
the sole participants in the evaluation process (Hoffman, 1999: 364). Further, schisms 
between the proponents and opponents of a particular issue may be so large that they 
might start “talking past each other” (Hoffman, 2011: 9) and “demonizing” each other 
(page 3). This opens up the possibility for a second type of dissuasive rhetoric, largely 
undertheorized in prior research, which, instead of countering the issue, targets the 
detractors who are raising their voices. For instance, Uber founder and CEO, Travis 
Kalanick, claimed that the California Public Utilities Commission “doesn’t like 
technology, environmental progress, or anything that might make California a better 
place to live”1. Even though Uber was seeking market entry into California, it still 
questioned whether the CPUC was a “legitimate judge” in the evaluation process 
(Lamont 2012: 205) 
These three types of rhetoric comprise a repertoire of responses. Firms can also combine 
responses from the repertoire to design a rhetorical strategy in response to social 
contestation at the community level (community contestation), with the hope that it will 
favorably affect their entry outcomes. In order to investigate the combination of 
rhetorical types in a firm’s rhetorical strategy, I rely on the analytical capabilities of 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method has been recently 
introduced to the field of management to enable the exploration of complex relationships 
wherein variables do not produce their effects in isolation, but in combination with other 
                                                 
 
1
 http://www.pcworld.com/article/2682972/california-regulators-say-uber-lyft-and-sidecars-carpool-
services-are-illegal.html 
 4 
 
variables (Fiss, 2011; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Ragin, 2008a). Unlike traditional 
econometric methods that can at best produce a three-way interaction while trying to 
control for other factors, fsQCA allows the researcher to identify configurations of 
multiple variables that jointly produce particular outcomes. In this thesis, fsQCA enables 
me to combine the ensemble of rhetorical types that firms choose as their rhetorical 
strategies and the contextual factors related to the sponsoring firms, the project and the 
community. 
I look at the impact of these rhetorical strategies on one crucial entry outcome, namely, 
the regulatory success of firms’ proposals, defined as the gain of regulatory approval in a 
relatively shorter duration as compared to competing proposals. The findings of this 
study, obtained from both qualitative and quantitative data of all LNG proposals that 
applied for U.S. regulatory approval between 2000 and 2013, show that distinct 
community, project, and firm characteristics are associated with different rhetorical 
strategies. I identify four main rhetorical strategies, two of which rely on combinations of 
dissuasive rhetorical tactics targeting the issue or the detractor. By contrast, persuasive 
rhetoric emphasizing positive attributes has very little utility in gaining regulatory 
success. Taken together, these results provide an integrative framework that explains 
which rhetorical strategies help firms deal with the social barrier to entry represented by 
community contestation as firms seek to establish a foothold in a new market. This 
integrative orientation of the thesis is reflected in my treatment of the research context, 
literature streams, methods, and findings.  
Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the LNG import terminal context that 
includes the physical attributes of the material (LNG), industry trends, regulatory aspects, 
and community contestation dynamics. Chapter 3, Literature Review, lays out the 
multiple research streams that form the basis of my integrative theorizing, including 
market entry (Markman & Waldron, 2014; Zachary et al., 2015); non-market strategies 
aimed at regulators during market entry (Henisz & Zelner, 2012; Hiatt & Park, 2012); 
social contestation (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Hoffman, 1999); community contestation 
(Wright & Boudet, 2012; Yue et al., 2013); and firms’ rhetorical responses to 
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contestation (Desai, 2011; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Chapter 4 highlights the essence of 
fsQCA as a methodological orientation geared toward theoretical integration. 
The Findings (Chapter 5) demonstrate the utility of this integrative orientation in the 
treatment of context, theory, and methods. While scholars are increasingly trying to 
establish the link between rhetoric and reality (Zbaracki, 1998) by considering specific 
tangible consequences of rhetoric (for example, Durand & Vergne, 2015), I am unaware 
of any other study that focuses on the utility of a firm’s rhetorical strategy in gaining 
regulatory success during a market entry process. Further, I situate these rhetorical 
strategies within an intersection of contextual conditions that integrate the firm’s 
market/non-market abilities, technical aspects of the project, and the community’s 
perspective. My findings raise questions regarding the utility of persuasive rhetoric, 
which ironically is pervasive in extant literature as well as within the LNG import 
terminal context. I also provide theoretical foundations and extensive empirical evidence 
regarding the role of dissuasive rhetoric targeting a firm’s detractor—a tactic that 
research has, thus far, only alluded to (see Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998; James & 
Wooten, 2006). 
In Chapter 7, I extend this integrative research orientation by situating rhetoric within a 
broader typology of firm responses. This helps me extend my primary research question 
of this thesis (how firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to community-level market entry 
conditions, and how do these strategies affect entry outcomes?) to a more general 
research question that I consider as a guide post for my future work – how do firms try to 
overcome community contestation in their efforts to succeed in their market entry 
process?. I conclude this thesis in Chapter 8 with an assessment of the insights I have 
gained so far and with excitement for the sights I will behold in the future. 
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Chapter 2 - U.S. LNG Import Terminals, 2000–2013 
2 U.S. LNG Import Terminals, 2000–2013 
The context for this study is the set of 59 LNG import terminals proposals that emerged 
between 2000 and 2013 in the U.S. After the hesitant initial interest in LNG import 
terminals in the 1970s (when fewer than 10 terminals were proposed), not a single 
terminal was built nor was any new terminal proposed in the U.S. mainland after 1978. 
Of the four terminals built in the 1970s, three were mothballed by 1983, and the only 
remaining terminal received the occasional shipment once every year or two (Foss, 
2007). Multiple factors contributed to the sudden decline of the industry but the most 
crucial factor was the 1978 passing of the Natural Gas Policy Act that lifted controls on 
all natural gas discovered in the U.S. after 1977. This policy decision, as well as pricing 
disagreements with Algeria—the sole supplier at that time—led to the sudden dearth of 
interest (Pelletreau, 1987). By early 2000, the situation had dramatically changed in the 
global LNG markets and in the U.S. (Jensen, 2003). LNG began to emerge as a solution 
to multiple problems that the U.S. energy sector was facing. 
2.1 Liquefied Natural Gas 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a supercooled state (–260°F, or –162.2°C) of natural gas, 
which mainly contains methane along with small proportions of ethane, propane, and 
other heavier gases. It is a colorless, odorless, and non-toxic but flammable liquid. LNG’s 
history can be traced back to Michael Faraday’s attempts to liquefy various gases, and the 
first LNG plant dates back to 1912 at West Virginia.  
LNG became important in the world energy stage because it occupies just 1/600th the 
volume of natural gas and hence is the preferred state for storage and container 
transportation of natural gas. A typical LNG value chain involves multiple stages: the 
extraction of natural gas from sources below earth’s surface; the movement of this gas 
through pipeline to a liquefaction facility; the liquefaction of natural gas to LNG; the 
loading of LNG onto specialized shipping vessels at export terminals (normally built 
alongside the liquefaction facility); the shipping of LNG to the destination port; the 
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unloading of LNG at the destination import terminal; the regasification of LNG back to 
its natural state (the regasification facility is normally built as a part of the import 
terminal); and finally, the movement of the natural gas through the pipeline network at 
the destination (Foss, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: LNG Import Terminal 
Source: U.S Department of Transportation, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration, https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/LNG.htm 
After natural gas enters the destination pipeline network, LNG can still be used in a 
peakshaving facility.2 The flammable aspect of LNG became apparent in 1944 at a 
peakshaving facility in Cleveland, Ohio. Substandard construction quality, because of the 
redirection of stainless steel alloys toward war efforts, was attributed as the primary cause 
that led to the death of 128 people, including nearby residents. Since then, the technology 
to store and process LNG has continually improved, leading to a surge of interest in its 
use across the globe.  
                                                 
 
2
 Peakshaving is a process where natural gas is stored in LNG form or in naturally occurring underground 
salt caverns. The reason for such a storage is to effectively meet local demands during peak demand 
periods. 
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2.2 Global Trends in the LNG Industry 
One of the first successful LNG shipments occurred in 1959, when a converted World 
War II freighter, aptly called The Methane Pioneer, transported LNG from Lake Charles, 
Louisiana, USA, to Canvey Island, UK. Based on this success, the British Gas Council 
had planned to import LNG from Venezuela but changed its plans before the contracts 
were finalized because of natural gas discoveries in Libya and Algeria. An LNG 
shipment from Algeria to UK in 1964 was the first global commercial trade in LNG. 
After 1969, when Japan first began importing LNG, Asia began to dominate LNG 
imports. In 1990, Japan accounted for nearly 66% of the world imports (Energy 
Information Administration, 2003; Foss, 2007).  
Because of the need to liquefy the natural gas, LNG trade is dependent on the economics 
of liquefaction projects and specialized transportation vessels (LNG tankers). Hence, 
LNG trade “shows very little family resemblance” to world oil markets or onshore 
natural gas markets (the exchange of natural gas over pipeline networks) (Jensen, 2004: 
1). Countries that did not have significant domestic natural gas reserves typically 
imported from nearby producer countries. The supply contracts were long term because 
they provided the future cash-flow basis for financing the highly capital-intensive 
liquefaction projects, with very little use of derivatives for financing. Even the LNG 
tankers were built and operated with long-term contracts, or the exporters (and sometimes 
importers) directly owned the vessels. This need for long-term contracting or direct 
ownership of LNG vessels is driven mainly by the shipping costs that can be nearly 30% 
of the total operating costs as compared to 10% for oil (Energy Information 
Administration [EIA], 2003). 
By early 2000, global LNG markets had undergone dramatic changes (Jensen, 
2003). New liquefaction projects were underway across the globe, including in the 
Pacific Rim and Atlantic Rim countries, to make use of cheaper and more efficient 
technologies (EIA, 2003). LNG trade was becoming much more fluid with fewer long-
term contracts with locked-up supply and pricing clauses (Jensen, 2004). New LNG 
tankers were being commissioned and were available through third parties not linked to 
the liquefying companies (Mazighi, 2003; World Gas Intelligence, 2006), which meant 
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that the global LNG market was heading toward greater liquidity and was no longer 
tightly linked to the Asian markets. It also meant that LNG terminals were no longer just 
an upstream integration. Many new players entered the field just to set up terminals with 
the hopes of using them as a sort of tolling gate (charging a fixed percentage fee for the 
regasification, converting the liquid to gas in order to send the gas through the pipeline 
network). Even traditional players with downstream gas reserves entered the market not 
knowing whether their liquefaction projects would be online in time. New ways of 
financing regasification projects (turning LNG back to natural gas in import terminals) 
were being implemented, allowing private investors and entrepreneurs to enter into the 
game (International Energy Agency, 2004). Multiple technological advancements were 
made for the safe transport, storage, and regasification of LNG (Greaker & Lund Sagen, 
2008).  
2.3 Re-emergence of LNG in the U.S. 
LNG was meant to solve multiple problems that were starting to assume crisis mode in 
the United States during the early part of the 2000s. Following the Kyoto Protocol, even 
the non-signatory countries, such as the United States, were pressured to reduce their 
greenhouse-gas emissions (EIA, 1998), prompting power companies to move from coal 
to natural gas. However, the natural gas supply and pricing were very unstable, and the 
unreliable supply was seen as a major factor leading to the multiple blackouts in the 
California area (Gopal et al., 2003). In the Northeastern United States, harsh winters were 
increasing commercial and household heating needs and thereby driving up the price for 
natural gas (Pirog, 2004). While many industries relied on natural gas as a source of 
power, U.S. domestic production of natural gas was dwindling, and restrictions restrained 
the exploitation of new sources of natural gas, such as the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
(Humphries, 2005).  
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Figure 2: Natural Gas Prices in the United States, 1999–2005 (in U.S. dollars per 
thousand cubic feet) 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas Prices,” accessed April 19, 
2014, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_a_epg0_pg1_dmcf_m.htm. 
This assessment is reflected in the very first paragraph of the testimony of Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
U.S. House of Representatives (June 10, 2003)3: 
In recent months, in response to very tight supplies, prices of natural 
gas have increased sharply. Working gas in storage is currently at very 
low levels relative to its seasonal norm because of a colder than 
average winter and a seeming inability of increased gas well drilling to 
significantly augment net marketed production. Canada, our major 
source of imported natural gas, has had little room to expand shipments 
to the United States, and our limited capacity to import liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) effectively restricts our access to the world's 
abundant supplies of gas. 
                                                 
 
3
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/testimony/2003/20030610/ 
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He goes on to conclude: 
Creating a price-pressure safety valve through larger import capacity of 
LNG need not unduly expose us to potentially unstable sources of 
imports. There are still numerous unexploited sources of gas production 
in the United States. We have been struggling to reach an agreeable 
tradeoff between environmental and energy concerns for decades. I do 
not doubt we will continue to fine-tune our areas of consensus. But it is 
essential that our policies be consistent. For example, we cannot, on the 
one hand, encourage the use of environmentally desirable natural gas in 
this country while being conflicted on larger imports of LNG. Such 
contradictions are resolved only by debilitating spikes in price. 
In this concluding remark, he hints at the increasing social contestation that LNG 
enterprises were facing. The re-emergence of the LNG industry faced multiple obstacles. 
In spite of the initial surge of interest in LNG imports in the 1970s, no new import 
terminals were proposed or built after 1978 for more than two decades, and only one 
terminal was operational after 1983, receiving the occasional shipment. In early 2000, 
new firms were entering an industry that had to discover how to align with vastly 
different global LNG market dynamics; how to regulate the industry; the social and 
environmental impacts of LNG terminals, especially in the light of the 9/11 events; and 
the economic impacts following sharply rising demands in the northeast and the 
California energy crisis. The industry faced not only uncertainties related to the factor 
markets (the supply side), the product markets (the demand side), and regulatory and 
policy arenas but also social and environmental uncertainties because of the social 
contestation. 
2.4 Regulatory Process 
Between the 1970s and 2000s, changes had occurred on the regulatory front as well. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had replaced the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) in 1978. The FERC differed from the FPC in its structure and 
mandate, with the FERC having the mandate to deregulate the natural gas market, leading 
to such innovations as the energy bank. So much had changed from a regulatory 
perspective since the 1970s that when the first new terminal was approved in 2003, it 
became a citation in itself, being referred to as the “Hackberry decision” in subsequent 
FERC decisions, various government publications, trade journals, and in legal 
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documents. The following are some excerpts from the FERC press release accompanying 
the Hackberry decision: 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission today signaled it will set a 
different policy in regulating new liquified natural gas (LNG) projects 
where markets are competitive and other criteria are met. The approach 
is expected to remove economic and regulatory barriers to the 
development of onshore LNG import terminals.… 
The Commission agreed to a fresh approach for new LNG terminal 
services proposed by Hackberry, which requested authority to construct 
and operate its project under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. Viewing 
the proposed plant as similar to a production facility, the Commission 
noted that sales of the natural gas from the LNG plant would be made 
in competition with other sales of natural gas in the Gulf Coast region 
in a deregulated competitive commodity market. 
“The public interest is served through encouraging gas-on-gas 
competition by introducing new imported supplies of natural gas which 
will be accessible to all willing purchasers,” the Commission noted in 
its order. 
This press release clearly sets out the FERC’s agenda to remove barriers and increase 
completion in the deregulated natural gas markets. While the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Authority (FERC) assumed charge of the LNG import terminal proposals, the de facto 
assumption of jurisdiction began to be challenged. The deepwater LNG terminals came 
under the purview of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) based on the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002. The Maritime approval process allowed the 
Governor of the proximate state to have veto powers over the process. Further, multiple 
states (including California and the New England states), and the federal senators and 
representatives from those states, challenged the de facto jurisdiction of the FERC. In the 
instance of the Sound Energy Solutions (SES) LNG terminal project in Long Beach, 
California, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) wanted to gain 
jurisdiction over the project. The FERC fought the legal battle with the CPUC but also 
clarified this issue and asserted its jurisdiction through a press release that said: “We 
acknowledge the legitimate concerns of the CPUC regarding matters of safety and 
security and give our assurance that the evaluation of the proposed project will include 
thorough and rigorous review of these issues.”  
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It became apparent that the FERC and the MARAD (the two federal regulators) had to 
ensure that the evaluation process was perceived by the communities as rigorous and fair 
to prevent any further threats to their jurisdiction. The following figure illustrates the 
complexities involved in this process. It was necessary for the federal agencies to be 
continually perceived as being fair to all stakeholders throughout the process so that their 
own legitimacy would not be threatened. For instance, when the FERC made a site visit 
for the proposed Quoddy Bay LNG terminal, Linda Godfrey, a community activist, 
commented: “My impression is that FERC is primarily interested in representing the 
developers and the industry, and the role that citizens have in this process is 
unconscionable in a democracy. There needs to be a group of people at the highest level 
at FERC that from ‘day one’ is asking what [these projects] mean to local people. We 
need a consumer advocate at the federal level. It is just not a level playing field.” 
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Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, www.ferc.gov 
 
 
Figure 3: Regulatory Process 
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2.5 Contesting Communities 
Anticipating the issues that would be raised was not easy. Many communities in the 
northeastern part of the U.S. opposed the terminals on the basis of mortal fear—that LNG 
terminals could become terrorist targets, following the events of 9/11. However, in the 
Gulf of Mexico, the primary concern was the impact on the fishery industry because of 
the seawater intake by the LNG terminals. Gumbo Alliance in the Gulf of Mexico started 
by responding to a report by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) on the potential impact on fish eggs and larvae as a result of open-rack 
technology (the use of seawater to heat LNG). Gumbo Alliance soon became a powerful 
multi-organization coalition, including recreational and commercial fisheries, charter boat 
associations, and powerful nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Sierra 
Club and Mobile Baykeeper. For terminals proposed at an upstream location in a river, 
other issues took on prominence because of LNG tanker movement, such as the dredging 
of the riverbed and the impact on recreational boating. In other cases, the toxic emissions 
of both the terminals and the LNG tankers became an issue. In Maine, community 
opposition became intertwined with Native American rights. In many communities, the 
contesting community members—from Hollywood actor Pierce Brosnan to regular 
Joes—expressed their safety concerns because of the LNG terminal in their neighborhood 
and were often characterized as NIMBY protestors. 
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Figure 4: Anti-LNG Protest Rally 
Source: Sierra Club, Oregon Chapter, http://oregon2.sierraclub.org/chapter/stop-lng 
 
 17 
 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
3 Literature Review 
3.1 Market Entry 
Firms can become accustomed to existing strategies and capabilities within a particular 
market that can become detrimental when the market conditions change (Siggelkow, 
2001). So the ability to successfully enter new markets has important implications for a 
firm’s growth and survival (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). On the other hand, firms cannot 
indiscriminately enter every new market without due diligence because of the 
uncertainties and costs associated. It is then not surprising that much of the empirical 
strategy research has focused on the specifics of entry timing and entry mode into new 
markets (Zachary et al., 2015). While entry timing and mode decisions are critical, they 
do not help in understanding the risks that firms need to manage between entry decision 
and operational startup (Sine et al., 2007). Firms might calculate their entry timing and 
entry mode to perfection but cannot fully predict the subsequent reactions from other 
market and non-market actors. Research on foothold-moves considers one such risk, in 
the form of threats from competing firms (Upson et al., 2012). Beyond competition from 
other market actors, very little is known about the threats posed by non-market actors that 
can potentially derail the firm’s market entry strategy. 
3.1.1 Favorable Non-Market Actors 
While the threats posed by non-market actors are still not fully understood, the 
opportunities provided by non-market actors during the entry process have been given 
considerable attention by organizational and management scholars in the recent past. One 
category of non-market actors that is extensively studied is social movement activists. 
Activists can enable an entire new form of organizing to emerge as illustrated by the 
influence of the Grange anti-corporate movement in the U.S. that led to emergence of 
cooperatives and mutuals (Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008). Activists can also create an 
entirely new market for economic exchange such as grass-fed meat and dairy products 
(Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008), or a new industry such as for-profit waste recycling 
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can be created by recycling social movement (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003), or 
an influx of new firms into a nascent industry such as wind energy (Sine & B. Lee, 2009). 
The second category of non-market actors that has received extensive scholarly attention 
is the media. The media’s role is not seen as creating a new organizational form or new 
markets or new industries but as being more of an influencer that can encourage the 
influx. For instance, Lee and Paruchuri (2008) show that firms enter emergent and 
uncertain markets based on the volume, tenor, source, and generalizability of media’s 
associative rhetoric, which links easily comprehensible concepts with those relevant to 
the new market. In other cases, the media helps in “market sensemaking” (Kennedy, 
2008: 272) that increases the comprehensibility of audiences such as customers to 
evaluate the firms that have already dared to enter an emerging market.  
In this thesis, I consider the flip side of these favorable non-market conditions. I explore 
how firms deal with media’s attention to activist contestation so as to contain any 
negative repercussions on the regulatory process.  
3.2 Regulatory Process 
In some instances, governmental and quasi-governmental institutions can become a direct 
source of non-market threats preventing firm entry (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Even when 
direct threats are not evident at first sight, oftentimes the regulatory process involves 
multiple stakeholders weighing in, leading to an arduous process for firms (Hiatt & Park, 
2012). As the regulatory process progresses, the firm is involved in sharing information, 
conducting studies, and engaging with local community audiences. Throughout this 
process, the firm is forced to invest time and money, and to apply its social skills—“the 
ability to induce cooperation in others” (Fligstein, 2001: 105). These requirements can 
delay the firm’s efforts to establish a foothold or thwart them altogether. In fact, in my 
setting, of the 59 proposals examined, 18 did not start the regulatory process, and only 26 
eventually received approval, though at different speeds.  
The threat (and cost) of failure is more pronounced for firms that face sustained social 
contestation. Convincing the regulator does not require simply filing the application and 
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following the rules. Although regulators often act under pressures from competing 
interest groups, their mission is to work in the public interest and improve social welfare 
(Laffont & Tirole, 1991). Hence, in contentious settings, firms must first establish public 
validity for their arguments so that they can then potentially utilize “institutional actors to 
put pressure on the regulators to rule in their favor” (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015: 1710). In the 
longer term, as Sine et al. (2007) indicate in their study of startups in the independent 
power sector, regulatory certification can confer benefits beyond a legal endorsement by 
introducing a legitimating effect beneficial to the broader sector. The case of the 
ridesharing app Uber, which sometimes operates in contested terrain, shows that the 
firm’s failure to mitigate contestation can prevent market entry (e.g., in Vancouver, 
Munich, or Las Vegas). So the eventual outcome and speed of the regulatory process is 
potentially influenced by the firm’s response to community contestation (social 
contestation at the community level).  
3.3 Social Contestation 
Social contestation (Galvin et al., 2004) is defined as the publicly visible negative 
evaluations of the impact of an enterprise’s practices on the broader society and the 
natural environment. Social contestation at macro-levels occurs when a broader set of 
actors, typically referred to as stakeholders or audiences, become involved in the 
evaluation of the “societal appropriateness” (Galvin et al., 2004: 57) of the industry and 
the participating firms. The very nature of the industry—the day-to-day functions and 
core operations of the firms in the industry—is evaluated against larger social values 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). In this sense, enterprises in socially contested industries are 
neither deviant nor exhibiting misconduct per se but are carrying out regular business 
operations that are being assessed in terms of their social worthiness (Patriotta, Gond, & 
Schultz, 2011). It also means that firms face this contestation not because of the specific 
characteristics of the firms themselves but because of their participation in the industry, 
and because of the intended and unintended consequences of their participation. 
Scholars have considered various aspects of socially contested industries but mostly in 
mature industries, which are typically characterized by a large stable population of 
enterprises that have existed for a long period of time. Social contestation often involves 
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multiple issues but in mature industries while new issues emerge; they also get to 
converge over a long period of time. Emergence and convergence occur because 
stakeholders gain a better understanding of the socio-cultural impacts of certain practices 
such as use of sweatshops (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012); repeated events become the 
realization of worst-case scenarios and fears that can help focus stakeholder attention 
(e.g., railway accidents considered by Desai, 2011); deeply embedded moral and cultural 
evaluations of products and services that can translate into the stigmatization of all the 
firms in the industry (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012); and changing societal 
concerns such as environmental issues that shape the re-evaluation of firms in certain 
industries (Elsbach, 1994; Hoffman, 1999). 
These perspectives have not considered contexts where contestation need not occur 
merely because various groups find inspiration from different existing institutions or 
“home domains” (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1830); contestation can also occur because of 
basic human needs and aspirations. As the LNG context of this thesis demonstrates, 
community contestation can be based on themes such as mortal fear (e.g., the threat of a 
terrorist attack on an LNG facility), living standards and aesthetics (often referred to, in 
pejorative sense, as NIMBY), recreation (LNG vessels interfering with recreational 
boating), and food sources (fish larvae being sucked into the regasification system). 
3.4 Community Lens 
My thesis highlights a critical departure from studies considering social contestation at 
more macro settings because of some unique characteristics of firm–community 
interactions. While the term community can refer to any form of social grouping, I use 
this term to specifically refer to residential communities—“geographically bounded 
social systems” (Freeman & Audia, 2006: 158). This duality of spatial and social 
dimensions of a residential community distinguishes it from other forms of social 
groupings and has important implications for organizational studies. Even well-
understood organizational dynamics can be cast in a different light when studied in 
relation to a community (Greve & Rao, 2014; Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013). Previous 
research has demonstrated how memories, experiences, and cultural resources that evolve 
over generations of community members can change our understanding of collective 
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identity (Howard-Grenville, Metzger, & Meyer, 2012), and affect strategic decisions such 
as downsizing (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010) and firm founding (Greve & Rao, 
2012).  
Much of the organizational and management research on firm–community interactions 
can be categorized as the embedded perspective, where the firm is already a part of the 
community (spatially or socially, or both). I will first review this embedded perspective, 
and then introduce the NIMBY literature from sociology and urban studies where, prior 
to the entry, the firm is neither socially nor spatially part of the community. 
3.4.1 Embedded Perspective 
The “embedded” perspective seeks to answer the broader question “How does 
organizations’ embeddedness in social and cultural communities influence their 
behavior?” (Marquis, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011: ix). This perspective has been 
extended for a wide range of phenomena. Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007: 925) 
theorize about the “isomorphic pressures” of the metropolitan areas surrounding a 
headquarters of a firm that influence its corporate social actions—“behaviors and 
practices that extend beyond immediate profit maximization goals and are intended to 
increase social benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies external to the 
firm.” The puzzle of selective contagion of “bank runs” is explained by Greve and Kim 
(2014) as occurring because of the surrounding community’s cohesion and 
communication. Lee and Lounsbury (2015) extend institutional logics theory to explain 
that the local community logics can amplify or dampen the influence of broader field-
level logics and so facilities in proenvironmental communities faced greater pressures to 
reduce toxic waste emissions than facilities in other communities.  
This embedded perspective is not something new; if anything, it is a renewal of the core 
aspect of old institutionalism. In their summarization of the differences between “the old 
and new institutionalism,” DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 13) proposed that organizations 
were embedded in “local community” when it came to old institutionalism but were 
embedded in “field, sector, or society” when considered from new institutionalism 
perspective. Selznick’s (1949) classic on the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which 
 22 
 
was considered the rock bed of old institutionalism, was all about the community 
embeddedness perspective. The theoretical insights from the relationship between the 
TVA and its surrounding community were summarized as: “Authority’s grass-roots 
policy as doctrine and as action … resulted in commitments which had restrictive 
consequences for the policy and behavior of the Authority itself” (p. 12). So, according to 
Selznick, the TVA’s “democratic planning” process that involved the active participation 
of the local community actually became a constraining factor for the TVA.  
However, such “embedded” perspectives are premised on the firm already being a part of 
a community and do not shed light on how new industrial activities may be considered by 
the community as “the initial stage of an invasion” (McKenzie, 1924: 295) and hence can 
lead to social contestation from the community. 
3.4.2 Community Contestation—NIMBY 
One stream that has considered community opposition to new industrial activities is the 
so-called “NIMBY” research (not-in-my-backyard; see Schively, 2007). This stream of 
research, mainly in sociology, energy research, and urban studies, tries to explain why 
certain industrial activities are opposed by communities. Boudet and colleagues 
(McAdam & Boudet, 2012; Boudet, 2011; Wright & Boudet, 2012) have explored a 
subset of the LNG import terminals to advance our understanding of the socio-economic 
attributes of the communities that make some more inclined than others to mobilize 
opposition to these terminals. While Boudet and colleagues have explored how specific 
collective action events against LNG terminals emerge within the community, I 
complement their work by considering sustained community contestation over a longer 
period, which allows me to incorporate a firm’s rhetorical reactions to the sustained 
contestation and the impact of these rhetorical reactions on the regulatory success. Thus 
their end point—community contestation—becomes the starting point for my thesis.  
Others have considered the role that project-related factors, such as facility design, play 
in inciting opposition (Devine-Wright, 2013; Grant, Trautner, Downey, & Thiebaud, 
2010). Vasi, Walker, Johnson, and Tan (2015) consider the role played by the 
documentary Gasland in influencing anti-fracking mobilization by changing the nature of 
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public rhetoric. This research stream is dominated by research from the community’s 
perspective but rarely considers possible firm reactions and their impact. 
Even in instances where firm reactions are considered, they are essentially cast as inter-
firm contestation where the entry of large corporations into a community can create a 
counter-movement of community members starting their own new ventures (Greve et al., 
2006; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Greve et al. (2006: 802) investigate how “low-power 
FM (LPFM) radio stations arose in response to the domination of radio by corporate 
chains”. Marquis and Lounsbury (2007: 799) consider how “national banks’ efforts to 
introduce a banking logic emphasizing efficiencies of geographic diversification 
triggered new forms of professional entrepreneurialism intended to preserve a community 
logic of banking” and thus led to founding of many new community banks.  
To the best of my knowledge, the only research to consider firm responses to community 
contestation after firms propose entry into a community are studies by Ingram, Rao, and 
Yue in the retail industry (Ingram & Rao, 2004; Ingram et al., 2010; Yue et al., 2013). 
Ingram and Rao (2004) explore the contestation surrounding anti-chain-store legislations 
across various states in the U.S. where national chains competed against local 
independent stores in shaping the landscape; however, various other interest groups at 
both the local and national levels were also involved. Yue et al. (2013) consider the 
impact of protests against Walmart (as the first entrant) on the entry decision of Target 
(as the second entrant). Ingram et al. (2010) theorize that Walmart uses proposals for new 
stores as low-cost probes whereby it can assess community acceptability based on the 
resulting contestation. The subsequent firm reaction to the community contestation is the 
entry–exit decision, with Walmart exiting in most instances, except when demonstrable 
profit is probable. They also find that if Walmart does decide to open a store in spite of 
the protests, it is likely to accompany the store-opening announcement with charitable 
donations made with the purposes of restoring its image. This situation hints at, but does 
not explicitly consider, the potential for usage of persuasive tactics even before the store 
opens. 
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The entry–exit decision may be the primary consideration in industry settings such as 
radio stations (Greve et al., 2006), banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), and big-box 
retail stores (Ingram et al., 2010). However, clashes between firms and communities are 
more sustained when firms are location-constrained—that is, when firms propose new 
projects with no (or very few) alternative locations, due to the required complementarities 
between the project and specific geographical features (e.g., the need for a coastal 
location next to a river and an industrial harbor). While high regulatory costs with 
increased contestation may lead firms to seek alternative locations in industries such as 
retail (Ingram et al., 2010), this option rarely exists for energy and infrastructure projects 
because of various location constraints. By considering the LNG import terminal context, 
the present study seeks to complement these recent efforts by shifting the focus from the 
community’s response (to firm entry) to the firm’s response (to community contestation) 
and from community entry decision points to community entry processes. Thus, I extend 
this research stream by focusing on firms’ rhetorical responses to sustained community 
contestation, and how they affect regulatory success, a crucial outcome in the entry 
process. 
3.5 Rhetoric 
The extensive examination of rhetoric in organizational studies has earned such monikers 
as the “rhetorical turn” (Green Jr. & Li, 2011: 1670) and “linguistic turn” (Kennedy, 
2008: 270). Scholars have studied a wide range of phenomena related to rhetoric, 
including “changes in the discourse of globalization” (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005: 29); 
jurisdictional struggles involved in the emergence of new organizational forms (Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005); the interaction of rhetoric and reality in practice adoption, leading 
to distortions of both the original rhetoric and the emerging reality (Zbaracki, 1998); and 
third parties’ responses to the diffusion of controversial practices (Briscoe & Murphy, 
2012). My focus in this thesis is a particular organizational phenomenon—a firm’s 
rhetorical responses to community contestation (social contestation at the community 
level). These rhetorical responses are used by a firm in an effort to mitigate perceived or 
real threats to its social acceptance, stemming from public opposition by non-market 
actors in the community to the firm’s activities. 
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3.5.1 Rhetorical Responses to Social Contestation 
Rhetorical responses to social contestation can be broadly classified as persuasive or 
dissuasive responses. Persuasive responses are meant to persuade stakeholder attention 
away from the contestation and toward the positive attributes of the firm and its activities 
(Zavyalova et al., 2012). Unlike persuasive rhetorical responses, dissuasive rhetorical 
responses are meant to dissuade the persistence of social contestation by countering the 
contestation head-on. Much of extant literature has focused on dissuasive rhetorical 
responses that counter the issues embedded within the contestation (Desai, 2011; 
Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012) but very little attention has been paid to 
countering the detractors directly by pointing out the detractor’s negative attributes. I 
refer to the former as negative topical claims (i.e., claims directly targeting the issue) and 
to the latter as negative personal claims (i.e., claims directly targeting the detractor). 
Hereafter, for the sake of conciseness, I also use the term positive claims to encapsulate 
the essence of these persuasive responses. 
See Appendix A for a summary of past research on these various types of rhetorical 
responses to social contestation. Out of the 14 works explored in Appendix A, 13 have 
considered negative topical claims, 11 have explored positive claims and only 3 have 
hinted at negative personal claims. The findings of these works relate to social 
contestation at higher levels (and not community contestation) and they do not directly 
address regulatory success, but by linking this stream of extant literature with community 
contestation and regulatory success (as a critical market entry outcome), I am able to 
develop novel theoretical insights.  
3.5.1.1 Positive claims 
Firms entering novel social settings often overcome the critical challenge of establishing 
legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) through an rhetorical construction of socio-cultural 
acceptance (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009; Weber et al., 2008). In such contexts, to ensure a widespread socio-cultural 
acceptance, firms tend to highlight positive attributes and paint an optimistic picture of 
the future (Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014). Further, firms also use positive claims when 
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faced with contestation. For instance, Zavyalova et al. (2012) show that firms can deflect 
media attention by highlighting positive dimensions, even when doing so is merely a 
ceremonial gesture. In their study of reactions to consumer boycotts, McDonnell and 
King (2013) demonstrate how firms employ prosocial claims to emphasize the broader 
societal benefits of their activities. They argue that firms use prosocial claims with the 
belief that doing so will offset the negative attention of consumer boycotts, by 
emphasizing “the company’s positive features without giving credence to the boycotters’ 
grievances” (McDonnell & King, 2013: 391). Hence, for firms facing both a novel social 
setting and social contestation, positive claims can be used as a persuasive response to 
the contestation, thereby highlighting the positive attributes of the firm and its proposal to 
deflect attention from the claims of the opposition. 
For instance, when BHP Billiton first proposed the Cabrillo LNG Terminal in 2003, 
Stephen Billiot, vice president of BHP Billiton LNG International, stated: 
We understand California’s concern for its coastline and its communities 
[…] BHP Billiton’s Cabrillo Port provides a unique and environmentally 
friendly alternative to meeting the energy and environmental demands of 
California. Natural gas is a more efficient and cleaner burning fuel than 
coal or oil.  
However, local opposition started mounting in the nearby Oxnard and Malibu areas. As a 
result of local residents’ widespread discontent, the city councils passed a resolution 
opposing the facility in 2005 but BHP’s CEO Chip Goodyear reiterated the positives:  
We are in the leadership position in regard to the approval process and in 
an environment like that you are going to get the first round of flak. If you 
could open up another supply source into that market of clean energy, a 
natural gas supply source, that would do wonderful things for their energy 
diversity and price. California’s leaders recognize that and bringing in an 
alternative supply from a safe place like Australia is hard to beat. 
3.5.1.2 Negative topical claims 
Firms can also dissuade the persistence of social contestation by directly countering the 
issues underpinning the contestation. Hoffman (1999) provided compelling evidence 
from the chemicals industry to show how issues can act as a powerful attractor in 
configuring the interaction of firms and stakeholders. Specifically, issues can become the 
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backbone of social contestation by providing an impetus for a more sustained conflict 
between firms and communities. When there is sustained contestation, mass media 
attention increasingly focuses on the negative aspects of firms’ core operations. The 
media play an important role in what Kennedy (2008) describes as “market 
sensemaking,” a process by which the products and services become increasingly 
coherent as part of a shared understanding between the producers and the audiences. 
However, when media stories focus more on the negative aspects, then these negative 
elements become embedded in the shared understanding—a “collective vocabulary” of 
sorts (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005: 30)—and firms may then wish to change these perceptions by 
countering the damaging claims. In this context, using negative topical claims becomes 
an appealing tactic (Desai, 2011; Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012).  
Contestation against a firm’s new proposal can occur on the basis of any issue, ranging 
from quality of life (e.g., potential visual pollution), to broader societal concerns (e.g., 
potential environmental pollution), or even mortal fear (e.g., potential terrorist attacks). 
For instance, the Weaver’s Cove LNG terminal faced public and visible opposition from 
the city of Fall River, Massachusetts. In a public forum held in 2003, more than 200 
people turned up to express their opposition. Among the issues raised were “potential 
safety risks, increased traffic, and a scarred coastline”. As Alfred Lima, one of the local 
residents, put it: “In the aftermath of 9/11, it is not enough to say that LNG has a good 
track record.” A few months later, Fall River’s mayor sent a letter to Gordon Shearer, the 
CEO of the sponsoring firm, asking him to “recognize and acknowledge the significant 
community opposition to this project” and noting that they “are not wanted in this 
community at that site.” The letter providing specific details of the issues, such as “the 
spot, just north of the Brightman Street Bridge, is in a congested, urban, residential 
neighborhood where the majority of citizens are opposed to the project” and accused that 
the “the company is going behind the city’s back to speed up the permitting process.” In 
response to these issues and accusations, Shearer stated: 
Weaver’s Cove respectfully declines your suggestion that we withdraw 
our application for authority to construct and operate an LNG facility now 
pending before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). … 
The company is following the normal schedule set down by FERC for the 
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review and approval of similar projects.… the 73-acre plot that Weaver’s 
Cove has optioned is in an industrially zoned area that is reserved for 
marine industrial use. Previously, the site served as a storage terminal for 
petroleum products far more flammable than LNG that were trucked 
throughout the region. In addition, prior contamination of the site restricts 
future uses of the land. 
3.5.1.3 Negative personal claims  
As the attacks from local residents, elected officials, and the mayor of Fall River 
intensified, the responses from Weaver’s Cove began to include elements directly 
attacking the detractor, such as: “the mayor seeks an emotionally charged climate of fear . 
. . rather than a rational analysis based on sound technical and scientific principles and 
evidence.” This response illustrates that redirecting attention only toward the positives 
(positive claims) or countering only the issues (negative topical claims) are not the sole 
tactics available to mitigate community contestation.  
In novel social settings, future issues cannot be fully anticipated, and the eligible 
participants in the contestation arena are not fully known ex ante. So an indiscriminate 
use of negative topical claims might even backfire as the firm’s proposal becomes more 
transparent and hence susceptible to further negative evaluation by new detractors 
(Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). Firms can then attempt to directly curtail the source of 
contestation by disqualifying specific external constituents from the contestation arena.  
The theoretical possibility of negative personal claims was raised by Oliver (1991: 146) 
in her “typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures”, where she considers 
attacks to be a form of defiance whereby organizations could “assault, belittle, or 
vehemently denounce institutionalized values and the external constituents that express 
them” (p. 157; emphasis added). However, subsequent empirical works have given little 
attention to this aspect, with two notable exceptions. Elsbach et al. (1998) considered 
intimidation as one of the two tactics aimed at preventing the escalation of patients’ 
initial requests for an audit of hospital billing practices. And in a more recent study, 
James and Wooten (2006) examined plaintiff retaliation as one of two tactics used at a 
particular stage in the resolution of a discrimination lawsuit.  
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While these studies begin to flesh out Oliver’s (1991) theoretical insight, they do not shed 
light on how negative personal claims, alone or in conjunction with other types of 
rhetoric, can affect organizational outcomes for firms dealing with social contestation. 
Besides, negative personal claims need not take the extreme form of intimidation or 
public defamation that these works have considered, but could also involve questioning 
the motives, capability, and role of certain community actors within the evaluation 
process. Such questioning could be used to undermine the community actors’ position, 
belittle them, or downplay their importance within the process by accusing them of 
wrongdoing or creating misinformation. All these forms of negatively oriented claims 
that directly target community members are intended to either dissuade them from further 
participating in the contestation, or discredit them so that others will devalue their 
opinion and claims. Put simply, these claims “delimit the population of those entitled to 
take part in the struggle” (Bourdieu, 1993: 40). 
In most social settings, who can and cannot participate in the contestation is mainly a 
reflection of “who has a voice in determining institutional norms” (Hoffman, 1999: 354). 
When these institutional norms are well understood, it is relatively easy to determine who 
can legitimately participate in the contestation (Patriotta et al., 2011). However, when 
firms enter a novel social setting, the institutional norms have not yet been negotiated or 
commonly accepted, making it unclear who the legitimate participants are. In this 
context, negative personal claims will take on strategic importance since they can 
influence who is considered to be part of the institutional arena. 
3.5.2 Repertoire of Rhetorical Responses 
Commenting on sustainable development (SD) in a globalized setting, Scherer, Palazzo 
and Seidl (2013:261) argue that “in the face of increasingly complex and heterogeneous 
SD-related demands, corporations that employ a paradox approach, enabling them to 
switch between or to employ simultaneously the three different legitimacy strategies, are 
likely to be most successful in preserving their legitimacy.” This dilemma is also 
encountered by firms facing social contestation. While not necessarily paradoxical, firms 
still need to balance competing possibilities in deciding the rhetorical types to adopt in 
the face of social contestation. 
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When a firm counters the issues embedded within the contestation, it can potentially take 
the focus away from the benefits promoted by the firm and can give greater salience to 
the issues raised by hostile stakeholders. For example, Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) find 
that issues in the chemical industry escalated when the industry insiders (rather than 
outsiders) paid greater attention to certain critical events. Other events that had the 
potential for becoming a major source of contestation did not escalate when only industry 
outsiders paid attention. Countering potential issues that lack empirical credibility, 
because they have not yet occurred, can thus be counter-productive for the firm. On the 
other hand, not reacting to an intensifying contestation can draw attention of other critical 
entities such as venture capital firms, potential suppliers, and potential customers. 
Negative personal claims in such contexts becomes a proactive option that demonstrates 
the nascent enterprise’s strategic intent as opposed to passive conformity (Oliver, 1991).  
In the following, I explore how firms combine elements from the rhetorical repertoire 
described above (consisting of positive claims, negative topical claims, and negative 
personal claims) to implement rhetorical strategies in response to community 
contestation. Importantly, I also examine the impact of these rhetorical strategies on a 
proposal’s regulatory success—a crucial outcome when attempting to establish a foothold 
in a new market. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Methodological Orientation 
In this study, I seek to integrate a disparate body of extant knowledge and at the same 
time exploit the richness of the empirical context to produce novel theoretical insights. 
More specifically, I seek to understand the complementarities between three components 
of firms’ rhetorical repertoire, and how various configurations of these components affect 
regulatory success. To “combine the empirical richness of the traditional case-study 
approach with the inferential possibilities of large-N statistical studies” (McAdam & 
Boudet, 2012: 25), and leverage both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the 
data, I opted for the fsQCA methodology (Ragin, 2008a). In spite of its recent advent into 
management and organizational scholarship, fsQCA has already resulted in rich 
theoretical insights (see, for example, Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2013; Crilly, Zollo, 
& Hansen, 2012; Fiss, 2011; Garcia-Castro & Francoeur, 2014; Greckhamer, 2015; 
Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). Appendix B provides details of articles published using 
QCA in the management journals Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Strategic 
Management Journal (SMJ), and Journal of Management Studies (JMS), and in the top 
sociological journals (American Sociological Review [ASR] and American Journal of 
Sociology [AJS]), where QCA has been much more prevalent.  
FsQCA, as a form of a set-theoretical approach that allows for a systematic, comparative 
analysis of multiple cases, helps to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
specific outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012)—in this study, regulatory success. A 
crucial motivation for using fsQCA is to investigate situations characterized by 
“conjunctural causation,”—that is, “where single conditions do not display their effect of 
their own, but only together with other conditions” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 6). 
While necessary conditions are rarely found in the social sciences (a single cause is 
almost never sufficient to explain complex social phenomena), fsQCA often identifies 
sufficient conditions that illustrate empirically the notion of equifinality—the idea that 
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multiple, alternative paths can lead to the same outcome. In fsQCA, each such path is 
described as a configuration of conditions that must be present (or not) to obtain the 
outcome.  
I use the term condition to avoid potential confusion but other scholars have used terms 
such as measures (Fiss, 2011), attributes (Greckhamer, 2015; Misangyi & Acharya, 
2014), and causal conditions (Crilly et al., 2012; Ragin, 2008a). This varied usage often 
reflects the specific utility of fsQCA in these studies, with some scholars using it for 
hypothesis testing as an alternative to traditional regression-based methods, and others 
using it as a complementary post-hoc analysis subsequent to hypothesis testing using 
traditional regression. However, most of the research using fsQCA tends to use it as a 
quantitative evolution of a multi-case qualitative method. As such, even the notion of 
“causality” is very different from econometric methods and so the term causal condition 
has a very different meaning in fsQCA. 
4.1.1 Distinguishing fsQCA from Econometric Methods 
For my thesis, fsQCA is well suited because of the three reasons that I highlight in the 
beginning of this section: a) the integration of a disparate body of literature; b) the 
complementarities among the three rhetoric types; and c) the ability to leverage both 
qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Subsequently, I also introduced the notion of 
conjectural causation and equifinality. Beyond these well-established reasoning for using 
fsQCA there are other less evident advantages. As Hodson and Roscigno (2004: 689) 
note, “QCA considers all observed combinations of causal factors and, with its 
comparative algorithmic logic, eliminates redundant and superfluous information.” In a 
sense, fsQCA helps establish order in an otherwise chaotic research context that social 
scientists often face. The LNG import terminal context provides a qualitatively rich 
environment to explore multiple potential theoretical implications but the flip side is that 
reality is complex and messy.  
Messy reality doesn’t fit well with the notion of causality that is at the heart of 
econometric methods, which forces researchers attempt to find scenarios that 
approximate the randomization of trials. Alternatively, researchers try to mitigate or 
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eliminate what may be seen as problematic aspects of research, such as omitted variables, 
selecting on the dependent variable, confounds, the omission of fixed effects, 
simultaneity, etc. (for a detailed treatment, see Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 
2010). Instead of trying to control or locate instrument variables, fsQCA embraces many 
of the aspects that are scorned by econometric research. Ragin’s (2008a: 6) vision for an 
alternate approach is one that “seeks a path that is not a compromise between quantitative 
and qualitative, but one that transcends many of their respective limitations.” He further 
lays out the four contrasting positions between fsQCA and econometric methods: “set-
theoretic versus correlational connections, calibration versus measurement, 
configurations of conditions versus ‘independent’ variables, and the analysis of causal 
complexity versus the analysis of net effects” (p. 6). 
As an illustration, consider a bakery that bakes cakes and the outcome of interest is “good 
cakes.” Now consider the extent of charring of the cake and sugar levels as the two 
conditions under consideration. Using this as a hypothetical example I next elaborate the 
three of the key differences mentioned above. I elaborate the calibration versus 
measurement in a subsequent subsection on Calibration of Conditions (4.3). 
Set-theoretic versus correlational connections: “Charring” is a sufficient condition to 
determine a bad cake but low levels of charring do not imply good cakes. Correlational 
statistics will consider good cakes and bad cakes as two ends of the spectrum, and a 
significant negative correlation can potentially occur between charring and good cakes. 
So the prescription would then be to keep charring as low as possible. However, set-
theoretical relationships are asymmetrical. All charred cakes are a subset of all bad cakes. 
How low or high the charring is determines only how bad the cake is. On the other hand, 
a complete absence of charring becomes a necessary condition for good cakes. In terms 
of a set-relationship, the set of cakes without any charring exactly overlaps with the set of 
good cakes. Alternatively, consider sugar levels and assume that higher sugar levels make 
the cake better but also increase the risk of charring the cake. If we consider the 
correlation between good cakes and sugar levels, we may find a low correlation because 
sugar levels might also be associated with charred cakes. However, if we consider a set-
theoretic relationship, high sugar levels might well be a necessary condition for a good 
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cake but good cakes are only a subset of cakes with high sugar levels because even 
charred cakes can be a subset of high sugar levels. Thus, set-theoretical methods such as 
fsQCA consider the positives (good cakes) and negatives (bad cakes) as asymmetrical 
and treat them separately. Further, each case (a particular cake in my example) is treated 
as a member of a set related to a particular condition (good cake, sugar content, and 
charring). The relationship established is not one of correlation between these sets but a 
set-subset relationship. Thus good cakes and bad cakes can both be subsets of cakes with 
high sugar content, and charred cakes can be subsets of bad cakes. Notice that the 
outcome interest is good cake (or bad cake) but the relationship with the two causal 
conditions (sugar content and charring) is different. 
Calibration versus measurement: As the above discussion illustrates, correlational 
statistics might misrepresent certain relationships (a high negative correlation between 
charring and good cakes) and hide others when they are relevant (no correlation between 
sugar level and good cakes). Hence, fsQCA employs a process of calibration that can 
incorporate a simple measurement but goes beyond just measurement. This process is 
discussed further in a subsequent sub-section on calibration (4.3). 
Configurations of conditions versus ‘independent’ variables: Charring and sugar levels 
also demonstrate another difference in causal relationships between correlational 
statistics and set theory. Strictly speaking, sugar levels and charring are not independent 
so we cannot run a simple regression model where the goodness of the cake is the 
dependent variable and the extent of charring and sugar levels are independent variables. 
This is not a problem for set-theoretic relationships because it aims to capture a 
configuration of conditions that act upon each other to determine the outcome. In this 
illustration, when the outcome is a good cake, the complete absence of charring and 
higher levels of sugar combine to determine the outcome. This reflects a qualitative 
research mindset and, as Ragin (2008a: 147) notes, “The search for causally relevant 
commonalities shared by a set of cases with the same outcome is often the very first 
analytic move in case-oriented inquiry, despite the fact that this practice of ‘selecting on 
the dependent variable’ is almost universally condemned by quantitative researchers who 
think only in terms of correlations.” However, it is by selecting on the dependent 
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variable, in this illustration a good cake, we find the combination of factors that makes it 
good. Selecting on the dependent is considered an absolute sin in econometric methods. 
Analysis of causal complexity versus the analysis of net effects: Further, this 
configurational approach illustrates the utility of set-theoretic methods such as fsQCA, 
where the aim is to understand the causal complexity based on configurations 
(AbsenceOfCharring*HighSugarLevels). FsQCA is “intended not to isolate the net, 
independent effects of single explanatory factors on a particular outcome, but rather to 
identify the combinations of factors that bring about the particular outcome” (Bell et al., 
2014: 303). In this illustration, the aim is not to determine the impact of one additional 
spoonful of sugar on the degree of goodness of the cake but to determine what makes a 
good cake. 
4.2 Data Sources 
I compiled a list of proposed LNG import terminals from Reuters News’ list of proposed 
North American terminals, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, Oil & Gas 
Journal’s “Construction Updates,” “Gas-to-Liquid News,” and publications of federal 
regulatory agencies.4 My search identified a total of 59 LNG import terminal proposals 
for the period 2000 to 2013. Importantly, this list is exhaustive; that is, I have data on the 
entire U.S. LNG industry over the entire period. 
For each of the 59 proposals, I compiled a list of attributes from various sources, 
including the LNG terminal’s websites, regulatory agencies, media reports, trade 
journals, and related websites, and websites of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
that track energy projects.5 I also collated an extensive collection of news reports and 
                                                 
 
4
 Namely, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or the FERC, and the U.S. Maritimes 
Administration. I cross-verified this list with websites dedicated to tracking such proposals—Project No 
Project, Energy Justice Map, and Sutherland LNG Law Blog. 
5
 When a website was defunct, I used Wayback Machine’s Internet archives. 
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press releases using a combination of searches in ProQuest, Factiva, and LexisNexis. 
Data were primarily collected from media reports, as they are known to play a critical 
role in determining firms’ responses (Desai, 2011; King, 2008; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; 
Zavyalova et al., 2012).6 Press releases by firms were also considered because these are 
available for public consumption in a manner similar to news articles and they also 
present a channel for the firm to promote its agenda in case the news media doesn’t 
consider its response as publication-worthy. To capture as many media articles as 
possible, I used search terms that were a combination of terminal names and their 
variants, sponsoring firms’ names, location (i.e., the name of the community), and the 
terms LNG or liquefied natural gas. As I reviewed the media reports, I further refined the 
search terms based on my in-depth qualitative knowledge of the proposals.7  
During the initial search, no media outlet was excluded, so the same news item was often 
duplicated across media outlets and across the source databases (i.e., ProQuest, Factiva, 
and LexisNexis). I converted the articles to simple text files and eliminated both 
duplicates and similar articles using the plagiarism detection software WCopyfind. This 
process yielded a database of 16,201 media news reports. I manually analyzed the content 
of each report to derive three categories of data: a) data indicating social contestation; b) 
statements issued by representatives of the proposing firms; and c) any other information 
deemed relevant to the particular proposal. 
                                                 
 
6
 To ensure accuracy and comprehensiveness, I supplemented these data with local newspaper articles and 
NGO blogs. 
7
 A sample search query (for Factiva): ((ChevronTexaco OR Chevron) near10 Pascagoula near10 (LNG 
OR “liquefied natural gas”)) OR ((“Bayou Casotte Energy” OR “Casotte Landing”) AND (LNG OR 
“liquefied natural gas”)) 
Terminal names (alternatives): “Bayou Casotte Energy” OR “Casotte Landing” 
Sponsoring Firm (alternatives): ChevronTexaco OR Chevron 
Location: Pascagoula 
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I also consulted other data sources, including the various agencies of the U.S. 
government;8 for company-specific information, I accessed Capital IQ, Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS), PrivCo, and Mergent Online. I collected additional 
county-level data through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR) County Characteristics database for 2000–2007, and the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database for NGO and charitable donations data. 
Following previous research on communities (Boone & Ozcan, 2014; Greve & Kim, 
2014; Lee & Lounsbury, 2015), I used county borders to define communities because of 
the socio-economic dynamics that coalesce at the county level and the extensive data 
availability at that level. Other more specific data sources are listed below in the 
discussion on variables. 
4.2.1 Case Selection 
I restricted my analyses to the 41 (out of 59) proposals whose sponsors applied for 
regulatory approval. As a robustness check, I looked for any systematic differences 
between the 18 proposals with no application and the 41 with an application. Eight 
proposals out of the 18 faced contestation at levels comparable or lower than the 
proposals with an application, indicating that the sponsors of these 18 proposals did not 
self-select out of the regulatory approval process due to heightened community 
contestation and a fear of failing. In fact, the major reasons for not submitting an 
application appear to be either an involvement by the sponsoring firms in other proposals, 
or the lack of sufficient financial resources. 
Appendix C summarizes the 41 cases of LNG proposals used in the fsQCA analysis in 
three different forms: a table of some key data related to each case, a map of the U.S. 
indicating the geographical location of the proposals, and a brief descriptive narrative of 
                                                 
 
8
 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); the Maritimes Administration; the U.S. 
Government Printing Office (GPO); the Energy Information Agency (EIA); the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA); the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
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each of these cases. As these descriptive narratives indicate, each individual case has 
many different factors that can potential combine in different and complex ways to 
determine regulatory success (and failure). This is exactly the kind of circumstance where 
fsQCA is most useful as it combines the best of both the qualitative and quantitative 
worlds. Traditional comparative case qualitative research relies on the researcher’s ability 
to select the most theoretically relevant case studies for comparison. The utility of fsQCA 
is that it algorithmically partials out the cases that are related to the causal combinations 
of interest, from all other cases, which can probably be explained by other causal 
combinations but are not related to the current theoretical focus. Hence, the number of 
cases that finally make it to the causal recipes in the Findings section is much fewer than 
the universe described in Appendix C. However, by considering the entire set of 41 cases, 
fsQCA explicitly incorporates the possibilities for other solution pathways and thus 
provides an equivalent of the control logic of econometric method but at the entire case 
level (bundle of all attributes) and not for individual variables. 
4.3 Calibration of Conditions 
“Fuzzy sets resonate with both the measurement concerns of qualitative researchers, 
where the goal often is to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation (that is, to 
interpret variation), and with the measurement concerns of quantitative researchers, 
where the goal is the precise placement of cases relative to each other” (Ragin, 2008b: 
72). This occurs through the process of calibration where the qualitative mid-point 
distinguishes relevant from irrelevant variations, and then a scoring mechanism is 
employed to precisely place the cases relative to each other. 
For each proposal, I determined the extent of set membership in each condition and in the 
outcome (scored in the interval [0,1]) using an analytical process called “calibration” 
(Ragin, 2008b), which takes into account both qualitative and quantitative information. I 
constructed the conditions using combinations of measures so I could capture in a rich 
way the multiple dimensions of the constructs, and thereby improve the validity of the 
models. In fsQCA, calibrated scores above (below) the 0.5 qualitative anchor indicate 
that a case is more inside (outside) than outside (inside) a given set. For instance, when 
calibrating performance, firms generating net earnings would have scores between 0.5 
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and 1 (indicating membership in the set of “successful firms”), whereas firms generating 
a net loss would have scores between 0 and 0.5 (indicating being more outside the set of 
“successful firms” than inside). I then followed best practices and used a combination of 
theoretical and empirical knowledge to determine the location of the 0.5 anchor (Fiss, 
2011). Once the midpoint was determined, the cases indicating presence in the set were 
scored in the interval [0.6, 1.0], and the cases indicating absence were scored in the 
interval [0.0, 0.4] using quantitative normalization and scaling. The specifics of the 
calibration procedures are listed below for each condition.  
4.4 Outcome: Regulatory Success 
For a firm trying to establish a foothold in a new market, it is crucial to stay ahead of 
competition during the regulatory process. When a firm is trying to gain approval for an 
LNG terminal, delays in the regulatory process can lead to significant impacts in terms of 
construction costs and gaining supplier and customer contracts. In this thesis, I chose to 
not only consider the eventual success in gaining the approval but also focus on how 
quickly the firms progressed through the regulatory process. To determine these two 
aspects of the process (final approval and speed of the process), I considered major 
milestones in the regulatory process. Based on the information provided by the two main 
federal regulators (the FERC and the MARAD), and the significance attached to 
regulatory events in firms’ press releases and trade journals, I identified the following 
milestones: Filing of application, Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and Approval (Certification) of the terminal 
proposal. I classified the proposals based on the number of milestones achieved. I used 
the 0.5 qualitative anchor for the calibration to distinguish between approved and non-
approved proposals.  
Specifically, all 26 approved proposals (i.e., those that passed all four milestones) were 
calibrated in the interval [0.60, 1.0]. I used the average number of days elapsed between 
milestones to calibrate these projects within this interval, with the projects that 
progressed most quickly receiving a score of 1 and the slowest projects scoring 0.60. 
Non-accepted projects were also calibrated using average duration with the following 
intervals: for the four proposals that gained FEIS but not the final approval (three 
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milestones), the interval is [0.30, 0.40]; for the four proposals that reached only the DEIS 
milestone (two milestones), the interval is [0.20, 0.29]; for the seven proposals that 
achieved only the first milestone, the interval is [0.10 to 0.19].9 Within each milestone 
category a normalized score was calculated for every project using the following formula. 
(𝑋 − 𝜇 )
𝜎
 
Where X is the days between milestones for that particular project, 𝜇 is the average 
across all projects within the milestone category as the project under consideration, and 𝜎 
is the standard deviation across all projects within the same milestone category. The 
rescaling of the normalized scores was achieved using the following formula. 
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The main part of this formula simply changes the scale from 1 to 0, when the values are 
ordered from low to high (for an example, see Table 2 below). For values ordered from 
high to low, the formula changes by interchanging MIN and MAX. Multiplying by 0.4 
rescales the [0,1] interval to the [0, 0.4] interval. This would be the lower interval of 
calibration for fsQCA analysis that relates to absence of outcome and follows the typical 
convention of having an upper bound of 0.4. Since [0.6, 1] is the upper interval of 
calibration by convention, the addition of 0.6 in the above formula shifts this scale to the 
upper interval. In Table 2 below, for example, the above formula was used for all 
proposals that gained regulatory approval (number of milestones – 4). The MAX value of 
                                                 
 
9
 Only three proposals, which didn’t receive approval, were still ongoing when our data collection ended. 
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normalized score was 2.41, which corresponded to Bienvelle as it took longer than other 
approved projects. MIN value was for GulfGateway as it took the least amount of time 
for approval.  
This process of determining the calibrated score for each of the projects captures the 
qualitative and quantitative differences between the projects. The qualitative differences 
are captured in two ways: a) projects that achieved four regulatory milestones (obtained 
the final approval) are considered as success and scored above 0.5; b) among those 
projects that didn’t attain final approval, a distinction is made on the basis of the number 
of milestones they managed to obtain before exiting from the regulatory process. 
Quantitative differences within each milestone category are based on average milestones 
days and calculated using the two formulas shown above. These considerations ensure 
that the context-based subjectivity in the calibration process is restricted to a choice of 
categorizing the projects (based on milestones achieved) but the fine-grained calibration 
between projects within a given category is achieved through numerical differentiation. 
The following table lists the projects and the corresponding score assigned. 
Table 1: Calibration of Regulatory Success 
PROJECT NUMBER OF 
MILESTONES 
DAYS BETWEEN 
MILESTONES 
NORMALIZED 
SCORE 
CALIBERATED 
SCORE 
GULFGATEWAY 4 98.00 –1.53 1.00 
INGLESIDE 4 134.50 –1.17 0.96 
CREOLETRAIL 4 142.25 –1.10 0.96 
GULFLANDING 4 160.00 –0.92 0.94 
VISTADELSOL 4 172.75 –0.80 0.93 
GOLDENPASS 4 186.00 –0.67 0.91 
NEPTUNE 4 192.50 –0.61 0.91 
CORPUSCHRISTI 4 193.00 –0.60 0.91 
CAMERON 4 197.50 –0.56 0.90 
PORTARTHUR 4 197.50 –0.56 0.90 
CASOTTELANDING 4 205.00 –0.48 0.89 
LNGCLEANENERGY 4 212.00 –0.42 0.89 
CROWNLANDING 4 232.50 –0.22 0.87 
NORTHEASTGATEWAY 4 244.50 –0.10 0.85 
PORTPELICAN 4 245.00 –0.09 0.85 
CALHOUN 4 257.25 0.03 0.84 
SPARROWS 4 274.25 0.19 0.83 
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PROJECT NUMBER OF 
MILESTONES 
DAYS BETWEEN 
MILESTONES 
NORMALIZED 
SCORE 
CALIBERATED 
SCORE 
SABINEPASS 4 276.25 0.21 0.82 
PORTDOLPHIN 4 278.25 0.23 0.82 
WEAVERS 4 294.25 0.39 0.81 
BROADWATER 4 306.75 0.51 0.79 
MAINPASS 4 323.50 0.67 0.78 
BRADWOOD 4 325.75 0.70 0.77 
FREEPORT 4 481.50 2.22 0.62 
JORDANCOVE 4 485.50 2.26 0.62 
BIENVILLE 4 501.50 2.41 0.60 
BEACON 3 217.67 –1.03 0.40 
COMPASS 3 248.67 –0.66 0.39 
CALYPSO 3 314.67 0.12 0.36 
CABRILLO 3 436.33 1.57 0.30 
PEARLCROSSING 2 164.00 –1.47 0.29 
PORTAMBROSE 2 404.50 –0.25 0.26 
SES 2 547.00 0.47 0.23 
DOWNEASTLNG 2 702.00 1.25 0.20 
OCEANWAY 1 212.00 –1.15 0.19 
CLEARWATER 1 316.00 –0.92 0.19 
SAFEHARBOR 1 427.00 –0.66 0.18 
OREGONLNG 1 646.00 –0.16 0.17 
LIBERTY 1 902.00 0.42 0.15 
QUODDYBAY 1 931.00 0.49 0.15 
CALAIS 1 1591.00 1.99 0.10 
 
4.5  Main Conditions: Firms’ Rhetorical Responses 
I used my database of media reports to capture firm rhetoric. To measure positive claims, 
negative topical claims, and negative personal claims, I aggregated media statements 
around comparable “claim segments,” using the shorter of the following two time 
windows: a) from the first reported date of the particular rhetorical response explicitly 
identified in the media report until the next incident of contestation or b) from the first 
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reported date of response to the fifth day of response.10 Since the dataset of 41 proposals 
also has counterfactual cases with low or no contestation, I considered instances of usage 
of these three rhetoric types without any related contestation event. There were only a 
few rare instances where negative claims (personal and topical) were used proactively but 
there were many more instances of positive claims without a related contestation event. 
Such claims were often issued as a part of press release.  
I identified a total of 1,627 claim segments and manually coded each claim segment for 
the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of any of the three rhetorical tactics: positive 
claims, negative topical claims, and negative personal claims. The categorization of 
rhetoric into the three types (positive claims, negative topical claims, negative personal 
claims) based on the stream of literature summarized in Appendix A also aided me in 
coming up with an initial coding scheme for analyzing the rhetorical segments in the 
data. Further refinements to the coding scheme occurred as I built into it the nuances of 
the LNG context. The detailed coding protocol and examples of coded text can be found 
in Appendix D. Since a negative personal claim is relatively understudied within the 
literature on firm rhetoric, I also carried out an inductive categorization of the various 
sub-types, which is detailed in Appendix E. 
To assess the extent to which a particular rhetorical tactic was used consistently over time 
by a firm, I looked at a combination of the following measures: the total count of rhetoric 
use; the ratio between the use of a rhetorical tactic and the use of all three tactics; the 
number of years during which a particular tactic was used; and the ratio between the 
number of years of use and the total number of years the proposal was in vogue. Each of 
these measures was first calibrated in the interval [0, 1], and aggregated for every 
proposal. For the two dissuasive rhetorical tactics (negative topical claims and personal 
                                                 
 
10
 The choice of using five days as the maximum window reflects findings by Lamin and Zaheer (2012) 
that media attention becomes insignificant after day five. 
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claims), the proposals that showed no use were coded 0, and the other proposals were 
calibrated in the interval [0.6, 1.0].  
Since positive claims were present in all cases, I graphed the distribution of values for the 
four above measures to see whether any inflexion points represented “qualitative” 
differences (see graphs below). Since the distributions were fairly monotonic, I decided 
to use average values to identify the 0.5 qualitative anchor, and used deviation scores 
from that anchor to create the proposals’ scores.  
 
Figure 5: Graph of Positive Claims Total Count 
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Figure 6: Ratio of Positive Claims to All Rhetoric 
 
Figure 7: Years of Positive Claims Usage 
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Figure 8: Ratio of Positive Claims Usage Years to Proposal Years 
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community level and the firm level. When I interpreted the results, these conditions 
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their likely consequences. 
4.6.1 Community Level  
Sustained community contestation captures the presence of long and intense episodes of 
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when contestation existed (the closer to 1, the longer and more intense the contestation), 
and coded as 0 when no contestation occurred.  
Community need for the proposed terminal captures aspects that make the proposal 
appealing to the community in terms of economic benefits. The expectation is that 
community need would decrease the appeal for the sponsoring firm of using rhetorical 
strategies, given the favorable bargaining situation created as a result of a strong 
community need. I used measures of the county’s unemployment rate, per capita income, 
and the state’s natural gas prices to create the community need condition (for details, see 
Table 2 below). 
Table 2: Condition - Community Need for Project 
Variable Description Values/Scaling logic 
Unemployment 
rate 
County-level unemployment 
rate. 2000 used as the year 
for calibration. The higher 
the unemployment rate, the 
greater the community’s 
need for the project. 
Average was used for mid-point 
based on graphical examination 
of the data. 
Per capita 
income 
The lower the per capita 
income, greater the need for 
the project. 
Average was used for mid-point 
based on graphical examination 
of the data. 
Natural gas 
prices 
Natural gas prices affect the 
local heating, electricity, 
and industrial costs. 
Average costs for 2000–
2013 were used. 
An average value of natural gas 
prices across the U.S. was used 
because the pipeline 
infrastructure is interconnected. 
Anything below the U.S. average 
price indicates that sufficient 
supply already exists for local 
needs. 
 
 48 
 
4.6.2 Firm Level  
Resources and capabilities capture the firm’s ability to deliver on the claims related to its 
proposal. To construct this measure, I used the indicators shown in Table 3.11 The 
proposals situated above the midpoint (0.5) had sponsoring firms with above-average 
capabilities to manage media and public perceptions (measures used: Harris reputation 
rankings and whether the firm was publicly listed), related industry capabilities (firms in 
the oil and gas sector), and financial resources (revenues). 
Table 3: Condition - Resource and Capabilities 
Variable Description Values/Scaling logic 
Public Publicly listed firms have the 
appropriate infrastructure and 
experience for managing 
public opinion. 
For every sponsoring firm, this value 
was coded as a binary. For a given 
project, the value could vary between 1 
and 0 because of the time-based 
weightage. Purely private projects were 
calibrated to 0. All other projects were 
calibrated above the midpoint [1, 0.60]. 
Oil and 
gas firms 
Firms directly involved in the 
oil and gas sector will likely 
have the expertise and 
connections needed for a 
successful project. 
Same logic as above. 
Harris 
reputation 
rank 
Firms appearing in Harris 
reputation rank are likely to 
have the capability to manage 
expectations. 
The reputation rank was weighted by 
time for every sponsoring firm. All 
projects without firms in the rankings 
were coded zero. The rest were 
calibrated above the midpoint [1, 0.60]. 
Revenue 
in the year 
For every firm involved in the 
project, its financial ability 
was estimated on the basis of 
Revenue values were graphed. The 
difference between the average and 
inflexion point in the graph was just 
                                                 
 
11
 When there was more than one sponsor firm, I used a weighted average based on the ratio of time period 
for which each of those firms was involved in the project to the total time period for the project in the 
proposal stage. 
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Variable Description Values/Scaling logic 
of entry revenue during the year of 
entry. 
five projects, so the average was used 
as mid-point. 
Project design advantages capture a proposal’s design aspects that are community 
friendly. This reflects findings in previous NIMBY research that characteristics of 
facilities can significantly influence the nature of firm-community interactions (Grant et 
al., 2010). I relied on my deep understanding of the context and perusal of the regulatory 
application documents to construct this condition. For this condition, the proposals 
calibrated above the 0.5 qualitative threshold have design advantages that are clearly 
aimed at being friendlier to the community (and those calibrated below can potentially 
harm the community). For instance, Neptune was an offshore proposal, and, as Tractebel 
LNG CEO Rick Grant put it, “the general location for the port does not require any 
precious coastal land and limits aesthetic impacts.” To ensure that the facility was “well-
designed, safely constructed and expertly operated,” they used closed-loop technology 
(which had the least environmental impact) and constructed the facility at a size lower 
than the average offshore LNG terminal. Table 4 below summarizes the indicators used 
to capture project design advantages.  
Table 4: Condition - Project Design Advantages 
Variable Description Values/Scaling logic 
Onshore LNG terminals can be onshore or offshore. 
Onshore LNG terminals are constructed 
immediately adjacent to the coastline and 
offshore LNG terminals are constructed in a 
deepwater port on the high seas (e.g., an oil 
rig). Onshore LNG terminals are cheaper to 
build but are more likely to invoke a 
NIMBY-type contestation. Firms proposing 
offshore terminals explicitly promoted them 
as a safer alternative to onshore terminals. 
A binary variable: 
offshore coded as 1; 
onshore coded as 0. 
If onshore, 
distance to 
the most 
proximate 
For onshore facilities only, the distance was 
calculated to the most proximate city or 
town, using visual analysis data provided by 
the firm and by energyjustice.net. A 
combination of UPS rural zip codes and a 
The distance values 
were graphed. Two 
projects were outliers, 
but the others followed 
a smooth curve, so the 
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city population cut-off of 5,000 were used to 
determine the nearest city or town. Only 
onshore facilities were considered because 
offshore terminals are located tens of miles 
into the ocean. For offshore terminals, the 
proximity to a city or town is less of a design 
concern than the impact on ocean-based 
activities. 
average was used as 
mid-point. 
If 
offshore, 
technology 
used 
The technology used for regasification of 
LNG to natural gas in offshore facilities has 
an impact on fisheries in the surrounding 
ocean. Closed-loop facilities have the least 
impact but are more expensive because some 
of the converted natural gas is used to reheat 
the LNG. The open-rack system uses the 
relative warmth of the seawater for 
regasification. In the heat exchange, the 
seawater cools and has the potential to kill 
the fish larvae. Between these two extremes 
is the HiLoad technology, which greatly 
minimizes the impact on fish larvae. 
Open rack was coded 
as 0, HiLoad as 0.5, 
and closed loop as 1. 
As this coding is added 
to other variables I 
didn’t change the 0.5 
mid-point of HiLoad. 
Facility 
size 
Facility size indicates the maximum amount 
of natural gas in terms of billions of cubic 
feet per day that can be processed by the 
facility on any given day after the LNG is 
regasified. 
Because of design 
differences, the values 
were scaled separately 
for onshore and 
offshore terminals.  
4.7 Analysis 
I used the fsQCA 2.5 software (Ragin & Davey, 2014) to conduct my analyses using a 
fuzzy truth table algorithm (for a mathematical interpretation of the algorithm, see 
Mendel & Korjani, 2013).The first step is to assess necessary conditions, which indicates 
whether a particular condition occurs for all cases that enjoy regulatory success. 
Following best practice, I used a 0.90 consistency cutoff to determine whether the factor 
was a necessary condition. I then looked for sufficient conditions, which occur as 
combinations of conditions (or “configurations”), using the software’s fuzzy truth table 
algorithm and the commonly accepted cutoff values of 0.80 for raw consistency and 0.75 
for proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). 
 
 51 
 
Chapter 5 –Findings 
5 Findings 
5.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
I did not find any necessary conditions that were above the 0.90 consistency cutoff—
which is not uncommon in fsQCA and simply means that regulatory success is not 
explained solely by any single factor, but rather by multiple “paths” (and each “path” is a 
sufficient configuration of conditions). The sufficiency analyses yielded robust solutions 
for explaining the regulatory success among the 26 proposals that were approved, but the 
analysis did not yield solutions for explaining the regulatory failure of the other 15 
proposals (i.e., I did not find a solution with an acceptable raw consistency and 
proportional reduction in inconsistency [PRI] score). Hence, I discuss only the 
configurations sufficient for regulatory success. Of the six configurations that resulted 
from this sufficiency analysis, two configurations had very low unique coverage (less 
than 0.05) and were each represented by only one case (i.e., one proposal). For the sake 
of conciseness, I show only the four main configurations. 
5.2 FsQCA Solutions: Configurations of Conditions 
The results table below should be read column wise. The symbol ● represents the 
presence of a condition, and the symbol ○ represents its absence. If neither is indicated, 
that particular condition is not relevant for the causal pathway considered in that solution. 
Each column presents a solution (configuration of conditions) that was algorithmically 
derived by fsQCA software utilizing the cases provided (for a mathematical elaboration 
of the algorithm, see Mendel & Korjani, 2013). 
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Table 5: Configurations Sufficient for Regulatory Success12 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
Response strategies Avoidance rhetorical 
strategies 
Counterattack rhetorical 
strategies 
Dissuasive rhetorical 
responses 
    
Negative personal claim ○ ○ ● ○ 
Negative topical claim  ○ ● ● 
Persuasive rhetorical 
response 
    
Positive claim  ○  ○ 
Contextual conditions 
(community) 
    
Sustained community 
contestation 
●  ● ● 
Community need ● ● ○  
Contextual conditions (firm)     
Resources and 
capabilities 
● ● ● ● 
Project design 
advantages 
○ ○ ○ ● 
Raw coverage 0.30 0.31 0.23 0.22 
Unique coverage 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.05 
                                                 
 
12
 Coverage indicates the proportion of outcomes explained by a given solution (e.g., a coverage score of 1 
would mean the solution explains all the cases). Consistency indicates the extent to which proposals with 
high membership in a given solution have similar properties (i.e., it captures a solution’s internal validity). 
Both coverage and consistency are scaled between 0 and 1. 
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 S1 S2 S3 S4 
Consistency 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.93 
Number of cases 6 6 6 3 
Solution coverage 0.65 
Solution consistency 0.92 
 
As Grant et al. (2010: 487) note, fsQCA treats “cases as combinations of attributes 
[conditions] and use[s] Boolean algebra to derive simplified expressions of combinations 
associated with an outcome.” For instance, solution S1 can be expressed as: 
~NegativePersonalClaim*SustainedCommunityContestation*CommunityNeed* 
Resources&Capabilities*~ProjectDesignAdvantages 
The ~ (tilde) symbol is used in this representation to explicitly indicate the absence of a 
condition (equivalent to the symbol ○ in the table above), and the * indicates the 
combination of the conditions. This combination doesn’t have the conditions 
NegativeTopicalClaims and PositiveClaims because across the cases associated with 
solution S1 were instances where some projects used PositiveClaims and others didn’t. In 
set-theory language, there were some cases with membership in the set representing the 
presence of PositiveClaims and others had membership in the absence of PositiveClaims. 
So the influence of PositiveClaims on the outcome in solution S1 was ambiguous and 
hence was dropped from the solution configuration. The extent of membership in the 
presence and absence sets will also have a bearing on whether the fsQCA algorithm 
keeps or removes PositiveClaims from the configuration (the same would happen with 
NegativeTopicalClaims).  
The Boolean logic can be explained as follows. Consider an outcome Y and three 
conditions A, B, and C that can potentially determine this outcome. The corresponding 
absence is indicated by ~Y, ~A, ~B, and ~C respectively. Suppose I have two cases: one 
where outcome Y occurs under the combination of conditions A*B*~C and another 
where Y occurs under the combination A*~B*~C. Combining the two cases in Boolean 
algebra would yield: A*B*~C + A*~B*~C. The + (plus) sign denotes an OR in Boolean 
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algebra and in QCA it simply means there are two alternative pathways for Y to occur. 
This Boolean expression can be further reduced as follows: 
A*B*~C + A*~B*~C => A*~C*(B + ~B) => A*~C*(1) -> A*~C 
This reduction of the expression can be performed in an unambiguous manner for crisp 
sets, where a case is either a member (score of 1) or not a member (score of 0) of a 
particular condition’s set. In fuzzy set, it is a bit more complicated because a calibrated 
range of values is used to indicate presence [0.6, 1] and absence [0, 0.4]. So the 
simplification of (B + ~B) need not always yield a 1. If one case has a membership score 
of 0.95 in the set for B and another has a score of 0.05, then the situation is quite close to 
having scores of 1 and 0, indicating clear presence (B) and absence (~B). However, if the 
second case has a score of 0.4, then it is slightly below the 0.5 threshold and indicates 
that it is barely absent (~B). In that circumstance the expression (B + ~B) is more 
inclined toward indicating presence (B). The final reduced expression in that instance 
will be A*B*~C and not A*~C. 
In the results shown above, using all the 41 cases fed into the software, fsQCA 
algorithmically determined that the four solutions (the configuration of conditions) are 
best justified by the empirical data provided. From the fsQCA algorithm’s perspective, a 
condition related to a firm’s rhetoric is no different from a community need. However, 
based on my empirical and theoretical knowledge, I can separate the combination of 
conditions related to rhetoric as a firm’s rhetorical strategy and the rest as the contextual 
conditions that form the backdrop for the usage of these strategies. For instance, when 
solution S3 is expressed as a raw combination, I have: 
NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim*SustainedCommContestation* 
~CommunityNeed*Resources&Capabilities*~ProjectDesignAdvantages 
However this can also be expressed as 
(NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim) * 
(SustainedCommunityContestation*~CommunityNeed*Resources&Capabilities*
~ProjectDesignAdvantages) 
Where (NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim) denotes a rhetorical strategy 
employed when facing the contextual conditions denoted by: 
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(SustainedCommunityContestation*~CommunityNeed*Resources&Capabilities*~Projec
tDesignAdvantages).  
Thus I have four different rhetorical strategies: 
S1: ~NegativePersonalClaim 
S2: ~NegativePersonalClaim*~NegativeTopicalClaim*~PositiveClaims 
S3: NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim 
S4: ~NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim*~PositiveClaims 
 
Again, the ~ (tilde) symbol explicitly indicates absence and the * indicates the 
combination of the conditions employed in the presence of four different contextual 
conditions in order to gain regulatory success. The solutions are named after the four 
rhetorical strategies but it is also necessary to keep in mind that they are only employed 
when faced with four different combinations of contextual conditions. Solutions S1 and 
S2 can be described as containing “avoidance” rhetorical strategies, wherein firms avoid 
drawing additional attention by making public statements. S2 contains an extreme form 
of avoidance strategy, wherein all three rhetorical tactics are absent. Interestingly, 
proposals in both configurations are also characterized by a clear community need, 
suggesting that firms may avoid rhetoric when they believe that the community need for 
the proposal may be sufficient for regulatory success. Further qualitative analysis of the 
cases associated with S1 reveals that they experienced relatively lower levels of 
contestation, while cases associated with S2 were a mix of low or no contestation. Taken 
together, S1 and S2 indicate that overly assertive rhetorical strategies are not required to 
influence the regulatory outcome when community need is high and contestation 
intensity is low. 
By contrast, solutions S3 and S4 contain within them clear “counterattack” rhetorical 
strategies implemented in response to community contestation and characterized by no 
clear community need for the proposal. S3 contains an extreme form of counterattack 
strategy, wherein both issues and detractors are targeted, in situations where the proposal 
lacks design advantages. In S4, when the proposal has design advantages, issues are 
countered using only negative topical claims. This response suggests that firms do not 
feel the need to deflect attention (toward positive attributes) or attack their detractors 
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amidst community contestation when their proposal’s design offers clear benefits to the 
community.  
5.3 Variations in Rhetorical Strategies  
I conducted further qualitative analyses of the cases associated with these four solutions 
to shed light on the impact of contextual conditions on the choice of a particular 
rhetorical strategy.13 At this stage, note that the only commonality among all solutions is 
the positive role played by firm resources and capabilities. While I would expect firms 
with the relevant capability and resources to use positive claims to manage perceptions, I 
find, quite surprisingly, that positive claims are avoided in two solutions (S2 and S4), and 
seem to be irrelevant in the other two (S1 and S3) in terms of explaining regulatory 
success. This finding indicates that firms with a solid resource and capability base do not 
feel the need to promote these advantages to the community in response to contestation.  
5.3.1 S1: Mild Avoidance Strategy  
S1 indicates a mild form of avoidance strategy. This strategy calls for an explicit absence 
of negative personal claims, irrespective of the presence or absence of the other two 
rhetoric types. A closer examination of the proposals associated with this strategy 
indicates that they were all present in the Gulf of Mexico, which was perceived as LNG-
friendly, and in communities that needed the proposals for economic reasons. So the 
firms probably expected little resistance, and may have chosen to simply wait out the low 
levels of contestation for the larger economic reasons to prevail. In such cases, negative 
personal claims may be perceived as being unnecessary. 
                                                 
 
13
 As a part of this analysis, I checked whether the cases associated with the solutions were different in 
terms media attention levels. I randomly selected incidents of contestation along with firm responses for 
each of these cases and counted media mentions using ProQuest, Factiva, and Lexis-Nexis. I did not find 
any consistent pattern of excessive media attention for these cases (i.e., the same incident reported several 
times by multiple media sources). 
 57 
 
5.3.2 S2: Extreme Avoidance Strategy  
S2 indicates an extreme form of avoidance strategy, wherein the firms maintain radio 
silence and rarely use any of the three rhetorical types. Theoretically, I can draw parallels 
to concepts such as the “opacity” that firms employ when facing potential scrutiny by 
interest groups (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012) or going “under the radar” to avoid potential 
risks emanating from disclosure of private information to regulators (Desai, 2015). Such 
strategies may be employed by firms that feel the need to hide something, which, in this 
study, may represent the inherent disadvantages of the terminal design. A comparison of 
S1-S2 with S3 also reveals that community need distinguishes whether the firm 
undertakes avoidance or attack. While previous research has indicated the high risk in 
disclosing unnecessary information (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Desai, 2015), this 
comparison reveals that the non-disclosure can also be driven by low gain. If the proposal 
already has the potential for community acceptance because of the community need for 
the terminal, then the gains achieved by over-selling the project are minimal.  
5.3.3 S3: Extreme Counterattack Strategy  
The polar opposite to extreme avoidance (S2) is an extreme counterattack strategy (S3), 
wherein the firms not only counter issues with negative topical claims but also directly 
counter the detractors using negative personal claims. Even though these proposals are 
backed by capable firms, community need and design advantages are distinctly absent. 
The firms cannot simply counter the issues using rhetoric without the empirical validity 
provided by community need and design advantages. On the other hand, firms cannot 
simply counter the detractors because even if the detractors can be dismissed and 
dissuaded, others will see the validity of their arguments. Thus, a dual-pronged rhetorical 
strategy helps the firm create doubts that the regulator can use as a basis for not 
dismissing the project. 
5.3.4 S4: Mild Counterattack Strategy  
S4 points to a mild counterattack strategy, wherein firms counter the issues using 
negative topical claims, but avoid using negative personal claims and positive claims. 
The cases associated with this configuration also enjoyed relatively lower levels of 
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contestation, in line with S1 cases. Whereas firms in S1 adopted a mild avoidance 
strategy, expecting the community need to prevail and avoiding further emphasis on 
design disadvantages, firms in S4 are in a more comfortable position due to design 
advantages. Consequently, firms in S4 can counter the issues to ensure that the regulator 
has no doubt about the design advantages. At the same time, these firms exercise caution 
and avoid employing the entire repertoire of claims, perhaps for fear of unnecessarily 
fueling contestation, currently at a relatively low level. 
5.4 Summary of Findings 
Tracking the impact of words in a macro social setting is a difficult endeavor because of 
the multitude of factors that can intervene between expression of these words and the 
impression they create. My research design has two advantages in this respect. Firstly, 
since the terminals are only proposed and not yet built, there have been no material 
interactions between the communities and the terminals. This setting enables actors to 
undergo “interpretive processes whereby choices are imagined, evaluated, and 
contingently reconstructed by actors in ongoing dialogue with unfolding situations” 
(emphasis added, Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 966). When the terminal is only proposed, 
the rhetoric becomes central in both shaping the imagination of what the terminal means 
and engaging with the “unfolding situation.” Secondly, fsQCA allows me to focus on the 
particular conditions that are of theoretical importance and allows the cases, as bundles of 
these conditions, to become “controls” for each other instead of having to resort to a long 
list of control variables. However, having an advantageous research setting doesn’t 
completely explain the surprising aspect of these findings that the use (or avoidance) of 
any kind of publicly visible firm rhetoric should matter at all to the regulatory success. 
This seemingly surprising impact of rhetoric on regulatory success can be best 
understood in terms of threats to the regulatory process and the combination of contextual 
conditions.  
5.4.1 Threats to the Regulatory Process 
As shared in the Regulatory Process subsection of Chapter 2, Linda Godfrey (a 
community activist) commented: “My impression is that FERC is primarily interested in 
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representing the developers and the industry, and the role that citizens have in this 
process is unconscionable in a democracy.” This anecdotal evidence suggests that 
community contestation that remains unchecked can become a threat not only to the 
specific proposal under consideration but to the entire federal regulatory process. While 
such comments were not prevalent in every contested proposal, even a sporadic utterance 
in a couple of proposals would create the potential for being perceived as unfair across 
proposals handled by the same federal regulatory agency. With this potential in the 
background, the firm’s usage of dissuasive rhetoric (a counterattack strategy) offsets and 
creates ambiguity around the voice of the detractors in the public discourse space. Since 
this is a novel social setting, these detractors haven’t yet established that they really have 
“a voice in determining institutional norms” (emphasis added, Hoffman, 1999: 364), and 
a counterattack strategy from the firm prevents them from firmly establishing this de 
facto voice. Assuming the guise of fairness in the regulatory process then becomes much 
more palatable as and when the firm gains regulatory success. 
5.4.2 Combination of Contextual Conditions 
The second element to be considered when examining the impact of firm rhetoric on 
regulatory success is that the success is not arbitrary but is discriminating of the various 
combinations of the contextual conditions. Any one condition doesn’t necessarily ensure 
that regulatory success is achieved because it is the specific combination of conditions 
that enables a particular rhetorical strategy to enable regulatory success. This aspect can 
only be discerned using configurational approaches such as fsQCA and cannot be 
effectively achieved using traditional econometric methods. Traditional econometric 
methods can at best consider a three-way interaction and do not consider the asymmetry 
in the variables. For instance, the three solutions with sustained contestation can be 
reversed, and the conclusion would be that lack of sustained contestation would actually 
lead to regulatory failure. However, with fsQCA, regulatory success and failure are 
treated asymmetrically and so is the sustained (or lack of) contestation. The reversal of 
one specific condition (e.g., a sustained condition) in isolation doesn’t necessarily reverse 
the outcome. Thus, a specific rhetorical strategy impacts regulatory success only when 
there is a corresponding combination of presence (or absence) of contextual conditions.  
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Chapter 6  - Discussion 
6 Discussion 
This thesis aims to understand how firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to community-
level market entry conditions, and how do these strategies affect entry outcomes? I 
defined success in terms of the regulatory process and focused on the rhetorical strategies 
the firms implement to counter contestation in order to achieve regulatory success. Based 
on extant literature I identified three distinct types of rhetoric: positive claims, negative 
topical claims, and negative personal claims. Firstly, my findings indicate that firms 
counter contestation using four configurations of these rhetorical types—two avoidance 
strategies and two counterattack strategies. Secondly, these findings demonstrate that any 
of these four strategies can be sufficient conditions for regulatory success in combination 
with certain characteristics of the proposal, the sponsoring firm, and the community. 
6.1 Tangible Consequences of Rhetoric During Social 
Contestation 
A common criticism of firm rhetoric is that it amounts to lip service, and has little impact 
on tangible strategic outcomes (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). This study extends recent 
research showing that seeks to demonstrate tangible impact of rhetoric. To date, 
researchers have considered the impact of rhetoric amid social contestation in the form of 
interactions between three main types of actors: proponents (e.g., firms), opponents (e.g., 
contesting communities), and infomediaries (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009). Scholars 
have provided evidence that the rhetoric of opponents can inflict a serious impact on 
proponents, such as destabilizing an entire industry (Hoffman, 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009). Often, the mass media play the role of an infomediary by amplifying the 
opponent’s rhetoric, which can lead to specific firm actions, such as deliberately hiding 
controversial practices (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). The media can also play the role of an 
opponent by deliberately adopting a negative tenor toward certain industries, sometimes 
pushing firms to divest assets from these contested sectors (Durand & Vergne, 2015). 
Consequently, firms often adopt rhetorical strategies aimed at managing media coverage, 
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especially in the aftermath of a wrongdoing or an accident (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al., 
2012).  
So, while scholars have some understanding of the impact of opponents’ rhetoric on 
firms—including through the lens of the media—and of the direct impact of media 
rhetoric on firm strategy, little is known about the impact of firms’ own rhetoric on 
tangible strategic outcomes. My study begins to fill this gap by showing which rhetorical 
strategies can lead to regulatory success when firms seek to establish a foothold in a new 
market characterized by community contestation. 
6.2 Non-market Strategies Leading to Regulatory Success 
Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) hint at potential ways in which rhetoric can 
be used as a non-market strategy for utilities seeking regulatory approval for their 
proposed rate change. They demonstrate that oppositional interest groups, such as unions 
or environmental activists, can mobilize the media to negatively affect a utility’s 
regulatory success—not unlike community contestation in the context of this thesis. They 
speculate that some firms may have developed a capability to deal effectively with policy 
makers, but do not elaborate on the nature of that capability. This study gives substance 
to that capability by providing evidence that firms can successfully implement rhetorical 
strategies that contribute to regulatory success.  
In a more recent work, Gurses and Ozcan (2015) consider a different type of contestation 
in the broadcasting industry—between incumbent firms and new entrants (pay TV 
services). They find that to be successful in influencing the regulator, the firm needs to 
create a “window of opportunity to grow” by “aligning their product or service with the 
interests of incumbents and the dominant frame of the regulators” (p. 1710). Once firms 
have grown and established a widespread positive public opinion, it will be too late for 
the incumbents to influence the regulators. The avoidance strategies highlighted in my 
findings are similar, to the extent that they address eschewing direct confrontation. 
However, unlike industry incumbents, communities do not always feel threatened by new 
entrants, and the NIMBY effect does not always prevail.  
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As my findings demonstrate, when a clear community need exists for the proposals, what 
matters to firms is not so much hoodwinking the community and the regulator through 
carefully crafted rhetoric as it is avoiding unnecessary attention by shunning certain types 
of rhetoric. Thus, this study provides an interesting counterpoint to prior research, which 
often “assume[s] that firms always benefit from a highly publicized response, provided 
that they are portrayed in a positive light and that audiences lend credibility to managers’ 
commitments” (Durand & Vergne, 2015: 1218). My findings paint a very different 
picture, with none of the four successful rhetorical strategies requiring the presence of 
positive claims (see Table 2 above). This finding indicates the need for scholars to shift 
their focus of rhetoric research from positive to negative claims, given that the latter 
appear to be more consequential in market entry situations. 
6.3 Rhetorical Responses to Social Barriers to Entry  
Market entry decisions such as entry timing (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015) are 
meant to address the barriers to entry posed by industry structures (Porter, 1981) and 
incumbents (Fligstein, 1996) but scholars are increasingly recognizing the roles played by 
regulatory mechanisms (Dean & Brown, 1995; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), 
political environments (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008), and communities (Vasi et al., 2015) 
in terms of creating impediments to entry. To capture this notion, I introduce the term 
social barriers to entry, defined as the set of impediments imposed by non-market actors 
that firms need to overcome to establish a foothold in an industry. Scholars have 
previously considered other forms of social barriers. For instance, Hoffman and Henn, 
(2008: 404) explore barriers at multiple levels including “how barriers to green 
construction can be perpetuated by rules, norms, and beliefs at the institutional level”. In 
their integration of market and non-market strategies in utilities industry, Holburn and 
Vanden Bergh (2014: 451) point out how “incumbents to seek support for legal or 
regulatory barriers that prevent competitive entry”. Similarly, Flammer (2015: 1471) 
argues that “by stepping up their social and environmental initiatives, companies can 
differentiate themselves and establish a ‘soft’ trade barrier disadvantaging their foreign 
competitors”. In this thesis, I consider community contestation as a form of social barrier 
to entry because of its potential to derail the regulatory process during the entry process. 
 63 
 
Empirical work on community contestation has considered industries such as radio 
stations (Greve et al., 2006), banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), and big-box retail 
stores (Ingram et al., 2010). Clashes between firms and communities should be expected 
to be even more intense when firms are location-constrained—that is, when firms 
propose new projects with no (or very few) alternative locations, due to the required 
complementarities between the project and specific geographical features (e.g., the need 
for a coastal location next to a river and an industrial harbor). Because firms entering the 
LNG imports industry were trying to establish a foothold in a specific geographic 
location chosen for its economic advantages, they couldn’t simply exit from the 
contestation (Ingram et al., 2010) and were forced to design strategies to overcome them. 
Rhetoric becomes a powerful tool in this endeavor because of its visibility to other non-
market entities (e.g., the federal regulator) and to such market actors as investors, 
suppliers, and customers—thereby potentially eliciting further support by providing a 
rationale in defense of the firm.  
6.4 Prevalence of Negative Personal Claims 
To demonstrate the empirical prevalence of negative personal claims, in this subsection I 
share a few examples outside the LNG context of this thesis. 
Electronic cigarettes faced intense contestation over their classification as a type of 
cigarette (along with its harmful effects) or as a type of cigarette alternative such as 
nicotine patch. The online retailer www.ecigaretteschoice.com issued a series of press 
releases in 2010 directly attacking the stakeholders contesting the industry claims. An 
excerpt from one such press release is given below: 
So why are e-cigarettes in the bull’s-eye of politicians when public 
health organizations are declaring them lifesavers? Either the 
politicians don’t understand the ramifications of the legislation they 
seek to pass or they have a total disregard for the health of the 
American people. Allowing cancer causing tobacco cigarettes to remain 
on the market while opposing and or banning e-cigarette sales as a 
viable alternative is the equivalent to Genocide. Smoking touches 
almost every family in this country. Playing political games with 
millions of lives will play out in the court of public opinion and surely 
unseat some shady politicians in November. (2010) 
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In 2010, Raphael Pirker’s video of the Statue of Liberty taken from a drone went viral, 
giving him the idea to start the company TBA Avionics, which manufactures and sells 
commercial drones for taking aerial videos and pictures. However, in 2011, the U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) fined him $10,000 for flying too close to 
buildings in shooting a promotional video for the University of Virginia. Instead of 
paying this relatively small amount, Pirker chose to disapprove of the FAA. He argued 
that FAA had no legal authority to regulate the drone because it is a model and not an 
actual aircraft with a person inside. He further challenged the legitimacy of FAA by 
pointing out that it relied “on internal orders and its 2007 Policy Statement, rather than on 
any validly issued regulations” (MacPherson, 2014). Similarly, in the early years of 
Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) or Internet telephony, Vonage CEO and founder, 
Jeffrey Citron, publicly started challenging attempts to control his company’s growth, 
which he described it as “regulatory alarmist … jumping the gun a little bit” and wanted 
market forces to play out (2003). When it was rumored that the state of California was 
considering an appeal of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) order 
exempting VoIP from state public utility regulations, Citron stated, “If California should 
proceed with litigation, I would fight that. How many victories do I need before people 
know this is the way it’s going to be?? (2004). 
Recent waves of contestation by taxi companies and regulators in Europe, Canada, and 
the United States against app-based ridesharing services such as Uber, Lyft, and 
Sidecar represent an interesting example since they were met by the type of disapproval 
examined in this dissertation. Instead of trying to appease hostile stakeholders, Uber’s 
CEO has publicly called the taxi industry “a protectionist scheme,” declared the 
California government “unaccountable,” and said his “opponent [was] an a--hole named 
taxi.”14 
                                                 
 
14
 http://pando.com/2012/10/24/travis-shrugged ; http://www.ibtimes.com/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-
declares-war-taxi-industry-interview-video-1592433  
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All the major theories in organizational and management scholarship, such as 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory (RDT), stakeholder theory, and 
categories research, have considered the positive consequences of positive evaluations of 
firms and have mostly assumed that because of the negative consequences of negative 
evaluations, firms will try to avoid or prevent them as best as they can. However, an ever-
increasing scholarship focusing on the impacts of stigmatization and other forms of 
negative evaluations of firms has demonstrated the theoretical utility of considering 
negative evaluations as a concept distinct from positive evaluations, and not merely a 
different end of the continuous scale (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Vergne, 2012). The prevalence of negative personal claims in many real-life 
situations indicates that research on negative evaluations should be extended into 
domains where the firm becomes the evaluator, instead of being just a passive target of 
evaluation. I consider this dissertation as a small step in that direction. 
6.5 Research Limitations 
While the LNG industry context includes specificities that may limit the generalizability 
of my findings—such as geographical constraints and the particular nature of the U.S. 
regulatory process—it provides a rather “clean” setting for observing a rich variety of 
rhetorical strategies and assessing their impact. I see exciting opportunities for future 
research to examine rhetorical strategies in different industry settings, in combination 
with entry mode and entry timing tactics, so as to provide a fuller picture of entry strategy 
in the presence of social barriers. 
Another limitation of the current work is the broad rhetorical categories used in the 
fsQCA analysis. Although the actual coding of the data was done at a more fine-grained 
level, this broad categorization was required both for providing theoretical integration 
and because of some limitations of fsQCA. Since fsQCA uses Boolean algebra, the 
number of cases needed for generating results increases with the number of conditions 
utilized. For example, consider two conditions A and B that are used in analysis of the 
outcome variable X (the absence is denoted by the lowercase letters a, b, and x). All 
possible combinations of A and B would be AB, Ab, aB, and ab. So ideally 4 (or in 
binary terms, 22 ) cases would be needed to represent each of these configurations. 
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However, in social sciences, it is not always possible to find cases that represent all 
possible combinations, which leads to the problem of logical remainders called limited 
diversity—“the set of all logically possible combinations of conditions for which either 
no or not enough empirical evidence is at hand” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 151). 
The Quine-McClusky algorithm in the fsQCA software greatly reduces this problem 
(Mendel & Korjani, 2013) by utilizing the observable cases to the fullest extent possible 
but it is still desirable to keep the number of conditions to as few as possible; hence, the 
need for the aggregation of data. 
Another potential limitation of this research design is that it considers rhetoric but not the 
traditional non-market strategies and corporate political activities such as lobbying, 
astroturfing, and campaign contributions. Fortunately, fsQCA does not work on the basis 
of the control logic of correlational statistics; “unlike variable based methods that are 
founded on the notion of unifinality and seek to estimate a single recipe for all cases 
under examination, QCA methods explicitly take the idea of equifinality into account, 
allowing different subsets of cases to produce the same outcome” (Grant et al., 2010: 
487). Thus, the inclusion of other types of non-market strategies will likely create other 
potential paths to achieve the same outcome but doesn’t negate the existence of the 
configurations that are considered without those other non-market strategies. However, to 
provide a more holistic picture of firm responses to community contestation, I develop a 
broader theoretical typology of possible firm actions in the next section. 
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Chapter 7 – Situating Rhetoric within a Broader Typology of 
Firm Responses 
7 Situating Rhetoric within a Broader Typology of Firm 
Responses 
In this section, I address one of the research limitations highlighted in the previous 
section, the other potential responses to social contestation available within the firm’s 
repertoire of actions. The main thrust of this thesis is to analyze the impact of the various 
rhetorical contests between the opponents and proponents of the proposed LNG terminals 
because the terminal is not yet built and words have considerable impact. Specifically, 
the impact of these rhetorical contests on the regulatory approval process was 
demonstrated by the findings of the fsQCA and theoretically elaborated in the Discussion 
section (Chapter 6). A focus on rhetorical contest is necessary to understand the long-
term dynamics of a sustained contestation, and the structured pattern of results generated 
by the fsQCA helped me in providing a focused theoretical elaboration. However, my 
investment in understanding the narrative related to each case (see Appendix C) also 
helped me recognize that firms often undertake other types of actions in an attempt to 
deal with the institutional complexities of social contestation. By institutional 
complexities, I refer to the concurrent pressures exerted due to the presence of 
“multilevel, polycentric systems” (Ostrom 2010: 2), which suggests that “institutions 
originate from multiple (poly) rule-setting centers such as governments, associations, and 
communities” (Batjargal, Hitt, Texas, Jiao, & Webb, 2013: 1025). Hence, to provide a 
holistic understanding, in this section, I develop a broader theoretical typology of the firm 
actions on the basis of qualitative analysis of all the 59 LNG terminal projects. Such a 
typology helps link the rhetoric to a broader set of options available to the firm and hence 
can become the basis for future research to uncover other aspects of how firms try to 
overcome community opposition in their efforts to succeed in their market entry process. 
Thus, this section serves two purposes: a) to situate rhetoric within a broader typology of 
firm reactions and b) to create a template to guide my future research endeavors. Hence, I 
start this section with extant literature to guide the creation of this typology and I end 
with a discussion of my future research directions based on this typology. 
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7.1 Theoretical Basis  
When firms enter a novel setting, they face the uphill task of building credibility and 
widespread social acceptance, so they employ a variety of legitimation strategies (Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994). Examples of such strategies include building collective identities, 
employing symbolic/cultural narratives, painting an optimistic future, establishing 
connections with other areas, and obtaining third-party endorsements (Garud et al., 2014; 
Perretti, Negro, & Lomi, 2008; Ruef, 2000; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Sine, Robert J. 
David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007). Some of these legitimation processes are more covert than 
overt, in the sense that firms actively avoid drawing attention toward themselves or their 
established identity. For instance, firms can avoid direct attention until the legitimacy of a 
new category of economic activity is firmly established by using such strategies as 
directing attention toward the collective (Navis & Glynn, 2010) or using pseudonyms to 
avoid recognition by potential detractors (Phillips & Kim, 2008). Similarly, firms can 
also adopt overt or covert legitimation strategies when they face social contestation. For 
instance, they can swerve from direct conflict through asset divestment (Durand & 
Vergne, 2015), which is a more covert legitimation strategy than making public claims 
about the societal benefits the firm brings (Elsbach, 1994).  
In contrast to legitimation strategies, delegitimation strategies seek to eliminate specific 
external constituents from the social evaluation process (Bourdieu, 1993; Lamont, 2012) 
by covertly or overtly undermining them. Publicly visible rhetoric that directly attacks the 
specific external constituent (Oliver, 1991) is a very overt delegitimation strategy. Overt 
delegitimation strategies are meant to dissuade certain external constituents from 
continued participation in the evaluation process, whereas covert delegitimation strategies 
undermine multiple external constituents by not including them in the evaluation process 
altogether or by undermining them in ways that are not easily discernible. Firms can 
employ a covert delegitimation strategy by using various political activities such as 
lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving doors in an attempt to influence policy 
decisions behind closed doors. These strategies have been extensively studied within the 
research stream of corporate political activity (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). 
Empirical work in this area has focused on highlighting the resultant benefits (e.g.,  
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Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), the role of corporate elites in facilitating some of 
the strategies ( e.g., Mizruchi, 1989), and specific political environments that enable 
certain strategies ( e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2003). 
In combination, these literature streams provide the basis for developing the typology 
along two dimensions—covert/overt and legitimation/delegitimation. The details of the 
mappings between specific firm actions and this typology follow. 
7.2 Data and Analysis  
The extensive database of qualitative and quantitative information I collated for each of 
the 59 LNG terminals provides multiple types of actions from the sponsoring firms. I 
studied each of these 59 cases to develop a narrative of how the projects proceeded from 
announcement to the construction/exit stage. Within each of these projects, I located 
specific actions by the firms. Many of the overt actions became evident because of the 
associated firm rhetoric or the community reaction to the action, or both.  
Some of the cases in my database also hinted toward many covert actions that were not 
easily evident in the public rhetoric. I used other data sources to unearth some of the 
more covert actions undertaken by the firms. I obtained details about campaign financing 
from the Sunrise Foundation, which collates data from the U.S. Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) and other local agencies. It also provides additional data types such 
as lobbying and participation in U.S. federal committees. In one specific instance, data 
from NorthernStar Natural Gas Inc.’s bankruptcy filing provided evidence of other types 
of covert actions. 
I extended the inter-case comparison of qualitative research analytical paradigm by 
conducting a qualitative comparison of the actions to determine the extent of 
covertness/overtness and legitimation/delegitimation inherent in these actions. Similar to 
Fiss (2011: 395), I followed Doty and Glick's (1994: 232) definition of typologies as 
“conceptually derived interrelated sets of ideal types [that] identify multiple ideal types, 
each of which represents a unique combination of the organizational attributes that are 
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believed to determine the relevant outcome(s)”. While Fiss (2011) sought to classify 
organizations into a typology, my aim is to classify organizational actions.  
I utilized the rhetorical actions of the firms as ideal type actions for each of the four 
categories: covert legitimation, overt legitimation, covert delegitimation, and overt 
delegitimation. Rhetoric as an ideal type provides a good starting point for categorizing 
other actions for many reasons: a) rhetoric often accompanies many firm actions and at 
times the non-accompaniment of rhetoric along with a particular action is interesting in 
itself; b) the understanding gained from the analysis of rhetorical data, as a part of the 
fsQCA, helps in comparing rhetoric with other actions; and c) using rhetoric as an ideal 
type for comparison is also in line with the explicit goal of this section - situating rhetoric 
within a broader typology of firm responses. 
7.3 Extended Typology of Firm Responses 
Based on the qualitative analysis of firm responses and the theoretical framework 
discussed above, I categorized the various firm responses into a typology that had two 
dimensions: overtness/covertness and legitimation/delegitimation. The table below shows 
the various firm responses under the four resultant categories. 
Table 6: Typology of Firm Responses 
Overt Legitimation 
• Positive claims rhetoric 
• Experiential interactions: 
presentation; simulations 
• Monetary incentives: remediation 
and mitigation funding; community 
funding 
• Community benefits agreements 
Covert Legitimation 
• Extreme rhetoric avoidance 
strategy 
• Location choice 
• Push polling 
• Astroturfing 
Overt Delegitimation 
• Negative personal claims rhetoric 
• Legal action and appeals 
• Third-party attacks 
Covert Delegitimation 
• Negative topical claims rhetoric 
• Lobbying 
• Political linkages: campaign 
financing; revolving doors 
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7.3.1 Overt Legitimation 
Much of organizational and management literature has sought to understand how firms 
overtly seek legitimation for their economic endeavors. Legitimation requires firms to 
gain widespread social acceptance, and overtness requires that it be expressed publicly to 
gain acceptance from a broad set of stakeholders. Hence, overt legitimation tactics can be 
defined as those actions that are intentionally public in an effort to gain the widest 
possible social acceptance for the firm and its activities. A burgeoning area of inquiry 
into overt legitimation has been the use of positive claims rhetoric both in novel social 
settings (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009; Weber et al., 2008) and in the face of contestation (Elsbach et al., 1998; Zavyalova 
et al., 2012). I use positive claims rhetoric as an ideal type overt legitimation tactic for 
the purpose of analytical comparison and categorization of other actions. 
I previously defined positive claims rhetoric as a persuasive response to the contestation, 
which highlights the positive attributes of the firm and its proposal to deflect attention 
from the claims of the opposition. The persuasive aspect of the positive claims indicates 
that these actions are intended to completely minimize any form of adverse blowback 
because they are not countering, either the issues or the stakeholders themselves, but are 
clearly seeking to gain a widespread endorsement without antagonizing anyone. Positive 
claims rhetoric is also overt, as the rhetoric is made publicly and without any guise 
around its intention—to seek widespread acceptance. The other types of overt 
legitimation tactics are unambiguously publicly visible with the clear intention of 
persuading a wider audience to support the firm and its activities. However, some of 
these tactics, such as monetary incentives, may have a greater potential for adverse 
reaction than a positive claims rhetoric. 
7.3.1.1 Experiential Interactions 
Presentation and simulations are helpful in settings such as the LNG industry where the 
physical characteristics of the substance become a contestation theme. For example, the 
LNG Clean Energy project that was proposed in Pascagoula, Mississippi, brought a 
canister of LNG to their presentation and they demonstrated how the vapors catch fire 
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and burn instead of explode. Computer simulations are also useful alternatives when such 
physical presentations are not possible or are cost-prohibitive. For example, the 
Downeast LNG project in Maine enlisted the help of Eastport pilots to demonstrate on a 
computer how they could guide the LNG vessels safely into Passamaquoddy Bay, which 
was along the way to the proposed location for the terminal.  
These tactics can be considered as utilizing epistemic objects or boundary objects. An 
epistemic object can be considered to be a representation of the current knowledge but 
also lends itself as an “object of enquiry” and “these objects are not things with fixed 
qualities but rather are open-ended projections oriented to something that does not yet 
exist” (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005: 438). Since the LNG terminal doesn’t yet exist, the 
demonstration of the burning properties of LNG and the simulation of LNG vessel 
navigation become epistemic objects that can potentially be “generators of new 
conceptions and solutions and can be regarded as a central source of innovation and 
reorientation in societal practices” (p. 428). In this sense, these tactics can also be 
considered as employing boundary objects that can potentially transcend the divide 
between business and society. Carlile (2002: 442) defines boundary objects as “a means 
of representing, learning about, and transforming knowledge to resolve the consequences 
that exist at a given boundary.” However, the way these boundary objects are employed 
can determine whether these objects are used “to establish, expand, reinforce, or 
undermine boundaries” (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010: 194). Tactics such as 
demonstrations, presentations, and simulations provide an opportunity for interactions 
based on boundary objects that trigger visual and experiential stimuli rather than just 
verbal stimuli. Hence, firms can potentially use boundary objects in such arenas to 
“establish a shared context” (Carlile, 2002: 442) that can break down the boundaries 
between the firm and community, and increase the prospects for legitimation. 
7.3.1.2 Monetary Incentives 
In the context of LNG terminals, where the facility may have a physical environmental 
impact, monetary incentives can often include some form of an anticipatory funding for 
potential future environmental harm (remediation and mitigation funding) or funding can 
be directed toward boosting the community around the facility (community funding). 
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These two types of monetary incentives can be considered as covering two ends of the 
spectrum—community costs and community benefits—which may be accrued in the 
future, due to the firm’s activities in the community.  
Remediation and mitigation funds were set up by some LNG terminal projects to 
explicitly assuage any potential negative fallouts such as accidents from the proposed 
LNG terminals. Funds were also set up to provide extra equipment and personnel for the 
local fire departments. Some terminals proposed mitigation funds for the potential 
environmental impact because of the day-to-day operations of the terminal. For example, 
the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal in Oregon pledged $59 million toward the 
protection of salmon habitats that would be affected by the navigation of LNG vessels 
along the Columbia River. 
Community funding was set up by some terminals to fund community infrastructure such 
as local schools, ferry terminals, or cell towers that were neither necessary for the 
functioning of the LNG terminal nor faced any threats from the LNG terminal. Other 
LNG terminals agreed to forgo any tax benefits or exemptions so that the local 
governments could explicitly use the tax revenue to fund various community needs. 
Monetary incentives, such as remediation and mitigation funds, and community funding, 
can become double-edge swords. They are overt legitimation tactics because of the public 
visibility of these actions and their persuasive nature in terms of the expressed intent to 
gain widespread acceptance. However, unlike positive claims rhetoric, monetary 
incentives carry a risk of blowback. For instance, the Broadwater LNG terminal project 
set up a $15 million community fund that was to be distributed between the Town of 
Riverhead ($2.5 million), Suffolk County ($2.5 million), and Riverhead school district 
($10 million). Philip Cardinale, the town supervisor for Riverhead, described it as a “hush 
money and that it was a “payment in lieu of safety.” He further emphasized the point by 
stating, “the safety of our residents is not for sale.” 
Zelizer (1989), in her study of usage of money by married women in the U.S. from 1870 
to 1930, expounded the social meaning attributed to money and argued for moving 
beyond a mere utilitarian or rational interpretation of money. In a similar vein, Belk and 
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Wallendorf (1990: 35) note that “the interpretation of money as either sacred or profane 
depends on its sources and uses and that traversing the boundaries between the sacred and 
the profane is possible only with attention to proper context and ritual.” Utilizing a more 
micro and psychological perspective, Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) argue that whether 
money is seen as an incentive (as a motivator to do better for oneself) or as a disincentive 
(“undermining interpersonal harmony,” p. 1154), it is based on the “same underlying 
process: Money makes people feel self-sufficient and behave accordingly.” This double-
edged nature of money becomes apparent, whether we take a macro perspective (sacred 
vs. profane) or a micro perspective (incentive vs. disincentive). So monetary incentives 
proposed by firms can work if they lead the entire community to feelings of self-
sufficiency but can become a source for conflict among the community members even if 
just a few view the monetary incentives as profane. 
7.3.1.3 Community Benefits Agreements 
Oregon LNG signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the local government 
detailing commitments related to the environment. They also made commitments with 
local construction unions for hiring local workers. These explicit agreements with 
communities that commit a firm toward achieving common good such as “economic 
(employment, financial), social (mandated hiring of certain groups, affordable housing) 
or environmental (air quality, open space, and conservation)” have been described as 
community benefits agreements (CBAs) by urban planning scholars (Baxamusa, 2008: 
263). These scholars also point out that the effectiveness of these CBAs is often 
dependent on how broad a coalition of community interest groups is built to support the 
CBA. CBAs can thus potentially become a chicken and egg problem, whereby the CBA 
might be needed to build a broad coalition of support, but without a CBA, a broad 
coalition may not be possible.  
The need for such a broad coalition becomes apparent in the in-depth case study by Saito 
and Truong (2015) of the L.A. Live sports and entertainment district, which in 2001 had 
one of the first comprehensive CBAs in the U.S. The coalition built around this CBA had 
“five unions (all nonbuilding trade unions), 21 community organizations, and over 300 
residents” (p. 272). The authors trace the coalescing of multiple groups to factors such as 
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“the growing influence of unions, community organizations, and the Latino population”; 
“the community organizational infrastructure with the legal and technical expertise 
necessary to negotiate a CBA”; and “community organizations that had extensive 
experience with housing and job training and hiring programs.” (p. 283) Thus, the CBA 
came to fruition because of a social structure that favored job creation, and an existing 
community infrastructure and capability that could be leveraged for job creation and 
housing (two critical components of the CBA). Such a favorable intersection of 
conditions may not always exist, and firms may need to work toward constructing some 
of them. 
Parts of the CBA, such as vocational support, can sometimes be implemented without a 
formal governing agreement. For instance, Clearwater Port LLC, sponsor of the 
Clearwater LNG project, along with the California Maritime Academy of Vallejo, CA 
created a continuing education program. This program was meant to improve the training 
of personnel in the transportation and handling of LNG. The Clearwater LNG terminal 
was proposed very close to the academy’s location. However, given the complexities 
involved in structuring a comprehensive CBA, firms may be tempted to implement 
elements of CBA independently and may miss an opportunity to build a broader coalition 
of support. While CBAs appear to be a sort of golden standard for overt legitimation, 
their rarity suggests that it is either not easy to build the coalition necessary for the CBA 
or firms might get tempted to opt for run-down versions without achieving much out of 
them. 
7.3.2 Covert Legitimation 
Unlike the overt tactics discussed above that firms use to publicly seek widespread 
acceptance, covert tactics are mean to avoid any form of controversy or social 
contestation. The extreme avoidance strategy that was discussed in the fsQCA findings 
section (Chapter 5) is one such form of covert legitimation. The assumption from the 
firm’s perspective is that there is already a widespread community acceptance or it can 
choose a community where the likelihood for widespread acceptance is greater, and then 
the tactic is to ensure that the presumed acceptance is not jeopardized. Extreme avoidance 
strategy, discussed in the fsQCA findings section (5.3.2), is a passive tactic in the sense 
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that the firm is opting out of the possibility for publicly sharing information related to the 
firm’s activities. However, other forms of covert legitimation tactics are more active in 
the sense that firms are opting in to carry them out. Some of the covert legitimation 
tactics came to light because of leaks to media outlets or investigation by opposing 
stakeholders. These revelations led to further blowback and highlights the dangers of 
employing covert tactics. Covertness can be considered a form of deception. 
Firms may be motivated to deceive external audiences for multiple reasons. Phillips and 
Kim (2008), in their study of early jazz markets, consider pseudonyms as deceptions by 
firms that were already established before the advent of jazz to overcome two types of 
identity threats: “(1) their association with profitable, but illegitimate products and (2) 
actions of newer entrants that blurred the incumbent firms’ identity” (p. 481). The 
profitable but illegitimate product in their case was the so-called lowbrow jazz, “typified 
by African-American and Creole musicians in smaller improvisational groups” (p. 482). 
Thus, works of “Louis Armstrong and His Savoy Ballroom Five” was sold under the 
pseudonym of “Eddie Gordon’s Band”!  
Selling Louis Armstrong’s works under a pseudonym may not be unethical but Kilduff, 
Galinksy, Gallo, and Reade (2015) in their experimental design considered deception as a 
form of unethical behavior when it came to extreme rivalry among competitors. In their 
experiments (study 2), the “dependent measure involved a choice between telling the 
truth and telling a lie for purposes of self-gain” (p. 24). For Crilly, Hansen, and Zollo 
(2016) in their study of corporate sustainability, deception is a form of decoupling 
between actions and statements. Through their analysis of language structures, they 
sought to answer the question “Can firms deceive their stakeholders, by failing to deliver 
on their commitments to undertake sustainability practices without being detected?” (p. 
705). A faithful implementation is indicated by “exclusive language (a category of words 
consisting mainly of conjunctions, prepositions, and negations, such as ‘versus,’ ‘but,’ 
‘only,’ ‘not,’ ‘if,’),” and deception is indicated by inclusive language (a second category 
of words, mainly conjunctions, prepositions, and some adverbs, including “and,” 
“additionally”) (p. 711). 
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Thus, covertness and the intentional deception associated with it can span the entire 
spectrum from ethical (selling Louis Armstrong recordings) to unethical (outright lying). 
To capture this range of covertness and its associated deception, I next present each of the 
firm covert legitimation tactics (location choice, push polling, and astroturfing) in order 
of an increasing scale of “questionable tactics.” 
7.3.2.1 Location Choice 
Location choice in the form of explicitly choosing certain locations with the expectations 
that the local community will not contest the project is an active strategy but can be 
demonstrated with varying degrees of covertness. In some instances, firms openly 
acknowledge that this choice of location was a part of a deliberate decision-making. For 
instance, speaking at an industry conference in Houston in 2005, Steve Lawless, manager 
of LNG stakeholder relations and permitting for ConocoPhillips, said that, “a site should 
be as invisible as possible.” He went on to describe the Freeport LNG terminal, in which 
Conoco had obtained capacity, in the following manner: “The area has a small population 
and is heavily industrialised. Introducing a new LNG terminal in that environment caused 
little cultural disruption to a community already accustomed to chemical plants.”  
In my dataset, while there were some instances of such open admissions and some 
instances of industry experts speculating avoidance of community contestation as a 
reason for location, this tactic was often covert because firms did not publicly proclaim 
that the choice of location was based on a calculation of zero contestation. In certain 
cases, the regulatory filings by the project contained sections where alternative terminal 
locations were discussed and it became apparent that the chosen location was expected to 
pose little community contestation. In other instances, the need to avoid community 
contestation became apparent when taking into consideration the location’s lower 
economic viability and competitive dynamics (other more advanced LNG terminal 
proposals in the proximity).  
So it is possible that firms can combine social aspects with economic aspects when 
making resource decisions such as location choices (Oliver, 1997). The tricky part though 
is that not all firms are capable of managing the social aspects as well as they manage the 
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economic aspects. For instance, Bradwood Landing LNG terminal in Oregon explicitly 
chose a site because of its remoteness. As Gary Coppedge, vice president of permitting 
and development for Northern Star, explained during the announcement of the project: 
“We were looking for a site that was very remote and that had easy access to the market, 
but our primary concern was the safety.” In spite of a careful location choice, the firm 
faced unanticipated high levels of sustained contestation. This incomprehensibility and 
unpredictability of community contestation is also evident in the study of Walmart store 
proposals by Ingram et al. (2010). One would expect that a firm with the kind of 
experience and capability that Walmart has would have been better prepared to predict 
community contestation. However, Ingram et al. (2010) find that Walmart uses store 
proposals as a probe to assess whether the community would actually protest a store 
opening. 
Location choice can be a good avoidance strategy provided that the firm has the 
capability to comprehend and predict future community reactions. However, for location-
constrained industries such as LNG import terminals, the number of locations to choose 
from is often limited. The firm will also likely be making a trade-off between future cash 
flows and a smoother entry without community contestation. So location choice based on 
more favorable social conditions at the cost of less favorable economic conditions may 
not always be perceived as the most viable strategy. 
7.3.2.2 Push Polling 
Push polling is a tactic whereby the firm employs an external agency to conduct a 
disguised survey with leading questions that makes the LNG terminal look beneficial. 
These covert tactics often go undiscovered but when they are discovered, as in the case of 
the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal, the community can feel betrayed and this tactic 
might lead to the opposite effect of what it was intended for. NorthernStar Natural Gas, 
the sponsoring firm of the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal, employed Portland-based 
polling company RDD Field Services to elicit opinions from local residents who were 
planning to participate in a referendum for approving the pipeline route to the proposed 
terminal. An investigation by the local newspaper, The Daily Astorian, brought forth 
some of the “push polling” aspects of this telephonic survey: 
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Several county residents who told pollsters they planned to vote “no” 
on the measure were given a list of reasons to support LNG: increased 
tax revenue, job creation, cheaper natural gas and salmon population 
enhancement. Then they were asked if they would change their vote on 
the ballot measure. 
Coughlin and others [local residents] who took the poll said the 
statements detailed many specific benefits of the Bradwood project, 
including the number of construction and permanent jobs the facility 
would require and the amount of tax revenue the project would 
generate in the county. The poll included a few less specific statements 
attributed to project opponents about the gas from the LNG terminal in 
Oregon going to California and the potential safety hazards of LNG. 
On one hand, push polling can be considered as an exercise in informational brokerage 
where the polling company is transferring information of the benefits of the projects from 
the firm to the community. However, as Burt (2007: 119) noted “secondhand 
brokerage—moving information between people to whom one is only connected 
indirectly—often has little or no value.” The risky aspect of such tactics is that it can 
quickly become perceived as a deception, as was the case with Bradwood Landing’s 
illustration above. 
7.3.2.3 Astroturfing 
The bankruptcy filing of NorthernStar Natural Gas Inc. indicated that it owed $76,000 to 
Energy Action Northwest, which was a pro-LNG NGO that openly supported 
NorthernStar’s Bradwood Landing LNG project. While the support of Energy Action was 
overt, its linkage with NorthernStar was covert and came to light only because of the 
bankruptcy filings. Scholars have used different terms to describe such firm tactics, 
including astroturfing (Kraemer, Whiteman, & Banerjee, 2013), corporate-sponsored 
social activism (McDonnell, 2015), countermovements (Ingram & Rao, 2004), and 
grassroots lobbying (Walker, 2012). These terms are not perfectly interchangeable as 
there are some differences in the way the firms actually implement these tactics. For 
instance, Rao, Morrill, and Zald (2000) distinguish between countermovements and 
astroturfing, by characterizing countermovements as a form of identity theft that 
“emulate[s] organizations founded by its opponents” and astroturfing as a more covert 
form “in which environmental ‘grass-roots’ organizations are funded by corporations as a 
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strategy to inject more moderate environmental ‘concerns’ into a political process” (p. 
266). While the degree of covertness may vary between these tactics, the ultimate goal is 
to mirror the activists opposing the firm and to demonstrate that other citizens at the 
grassroots level do not share the opinions of the firm’s opponents. Most of the times, 
such a groundswell of community support for the firm is just an orchestrated myth 
because it is an “artificially induced grassroots activism” (Etzion, 2007: 654). 
7.3.3 Overt Delegitimation  
In this thesis, I introduced the notion of negative personal claims rhetoric that is used to 
dissuade or counter stakeholders directly by pointing toward their negative attributes. See 
the detailed discussion of the negative personal claims in previous sections—3.5.1.3 for 
clues provided by extant literature, and 6.4 for anecdotal evidence from other contexts 
outside the LNG industry. Negative personal claims rhetoric is very high on the overtness 
dimension as it is a publicly visible and unambiguous expression of the firm’s sentiment 
towards its detractors. Using negative personal claims rhetoric as an ideal type for 
comparison I was able to identify two other firm actions that can be considered as 
expressions of overt delegitimation. 
7.3.3.1 Legal Action and Appeals 
Legal action and appeals can be used by firms to explicitly dissuade certain stakeholders 
from using existing laws by either filing a lawsuit or using a legal appeals process to 
supersede any agency at the local level. For instance, Baltimore County enacted a new 
county zoning rule that would have prevented AES Corporation from building its 
proposed Sparrow Point LNG terminal. In response, AES filed a lawsuit in a federal 
court, arguing that the local zoning ordinance was superseded by the Natural Gas Act that 
gave the FERC the sole authority for approval of the LNG terminal. As Kent Morton, 
project director for AES, described, “the county’s zoning rule is in conflict with federal 
rules because it deals specifically with LNG terminals. The law carves out an exception 
that bans LNG in an otherwise industrial area. It’s strictly a matter of law.” 
Legal actions by stakeholders and legal costs incurred by firms are considered to be 
deterrents for certain firm behaviors. Eesley and Lenox (2006: 772) argue that civil suits 
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“will have an increased chance of the firm yielding to a requested change because of the 
direct risk of financial losses imposed by a credible third party (the judiciary).” Bartley 
and Child (2011) in their study of the anti-sweatshop movement consider lawsuits’ 
secondary damages because of the impact they have on investors and other “evaluators of 
corporate reputation” as they “may be more sensitive to campaigns that include lawsuits 
because they introduce the risk of concentrated damages and undermine perceptions of 
the firm’s legal propriety” (p. 431). 
Also recognized by extant literature is that lawsuits are arenas for “elite participation” 
(den Hond & de Bakker, 2007: 911) where “who is authorized to participate in the legal 
process reflects who has a voice in determining institutional norms” (Hoffman, 1999: 
354). The LNG context of this thesis provides an extension of this elite participation 
perspective. As the example above indicated, legal actions and legal appeals initiated by 
the firms sponsoring LNG terminals were often used to circumvent community 
opposition, especially when they co-opted the local political and government entities. In 
this form, legal actions and appeals can become tactics for overt delegitimation that 
denies certain stakeholders a right to participate in the evaluation process. 
7.3.3.2 Third-party Attacks 
Firms can engage a third party to attack a contesting stakeholder instead of directly 
attacking them. Oftentimes these third parties are interest groups such as industry 
associations that represent the firm’s industry or industry/trade associations that benefit 
from the firm’s economic activities. So there is a clear and visible linkage with the firm 
but the degree of overtness is not as high as negative personal claims rhetoric that the 
firm itself uses. For the LNG industry, there was no clear representative industry 
association because of the diversity in the kind of firms that participated in the import 
terminal proposals, including upstream oil and gas (O&G) giants such as Chevron and 
Conoco; smaller independent O&G firms such as Cheniere Energy; construction and 
engineering firms such as Cianbro; downstream consumers of natural gas such AES 
Corporation; and many entrepreneurial and startup firms. The Center for LNG (CLNG) 
purported itself as the representative industry association but Cheniere Energy, which had 
one of the greatest number of LNG import terminal proposals, left the group in 2006. 
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Explaining this decision, Stan Horton, Cheniere Energy’s chief operating officer, stated, 
“The Center for LNG’s positions on issues affecting the nascent North American LNG 
industry differ in many cases with those held by Cheniere Energy. In an effort to maintain 
a consistent message to our stakeholders, we have terminated our membership in the 
organization.”  
In the context of my study, oftentimes, the third-party attacks against the firm’s detractors 
were carried out by local trade unions that were hoping to gain jobs because of the 
terminal proposals. This tactic did not have the same weight as the firm’s negative 
personal claims because these third-party attacks were often only reported second-hand in 
the local media, when the firm’s spokesperson mentioned the attacks in their rhetoric. 
Thus, a collective identity formation may not only be necessary for the legitimation of an 
emerging sector (Clegg, Rhodes, & Kornberger, 2007; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011) 
but might also be useful in the overt delegitimation of certain detractors. 
7.3.4 Covert Delegitimation 
The negative topical claims explored in my main analysis can be considered as a weak 
form of covert delegitimation because they seek to counter the issues raised by the 
stakeholders. Also, since it is a publicly visible discourse, it is not completely covert. The 
covertness dimension is evident only when we compare negative topical claims with 
negative personal claims, which are far more direct in targeting the stakeholders. The 
covertness of negative topical claims rests on an assumption that they share the same 
intent as negative personal claims, discrediting the opposing stakeholders, but do so in an 
indirect manner. Stronger forms of covert delegitimation tactics are explored by the 
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) literature (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lux, Crook, & 
Woehr, 2011). I consider CPA as delegitimation tactics because they explicitly seek to 
exclude certain stakeholders from the evaluation process. Even though there is much talk 
in popular press about the undue influence that firm’s exercise through CPA, the 
discourse tends to remain at a generic level and very rarely are specific firms mentioned 
and even rarer are mentions of specific circumstances of these firms. I consider CPA 
tactics of specific firms as covert because for most part they are hidden from public 
scrutiny unless an activist or a media outlet decides to dig deeper. For instance, in my 
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dataset there is LNG import terminals related lobbying data for 14 different firms, many 
of whom were sponsoring multiple proposals. However, media articles related to only 3 
projects mentioned in the passing about lobbying by the project or hiring a lobbyist or 
indicated someone to be working as lobbyist for the project. Based on the empirical data 
from the LNG import terminal context, I discuss two main types of these CPAs used as 
covert delegitimation tactics – Lobbying and Political linkages. 
7.3.4.1 Lobbying 
Lobbying is a covert tactic because it is often not immediately apparent, and although 
federal lobbying data are collected by the FEC, these data are often not immediately 
available, and when they are available, are often not easily accessible to the general 
public. The details of the actual issues that are lobbied for are also not easily available. 
For instance, the following are some of the descriptors used in the lobbying data for LNG 
terminals. 
Table 7: Details Provided in Lobbying Data 
Firm (Project) Issue descriptor 
BP (Crown Landing 
Terminal) 
“Construction of a liquefied natural gas terminal in 
southern New Jersey” 
Bradwood Landing “To amend the Natural Gas Act to modify a provision 
relating to the siting, construction, expansion, and 
operation of liquefied natural gas terminals” 
Sound Energy Solutions “All federal issues related to the development of a 
liquefied natural gas terminals” 
Lobbying is a delegitimation tactic because it seeks to undermine the participation of the 
community members in the regulatory evaluation process and “aims to influence public 
policies by gaining politicians’ support for the firm’s favored policy positions” (Choi, Jia, 
& Lu, 2015: 160). However, the impact of lobbying is not always easy to discern except 
in some instances. For instance, Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) find that 
lobbying has some influence in reducing effective tax rates; and Kang's (2016) analysis 
of lobbying to influence energy policies in the 110th US congress indicates that while 
lobbying may only marginally increase the probability of successfully getting a policy 
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through, the returns are very high when they succeed in getting the policy through. Choi 
et al., (2015: 160) attribute the effectiveness of lobbying to two key concepts – a) entry 
points: “policymakers who are sympathetic to the firm’s preferred policy stance” and b) 
veto points: “have the represented policies eventually prevail in the policymaking arena, 
which depends on the constraints that individual policymakers face when attempting to 
make policy changes”. So while firms can actively find policymakers sympathetic to their 
cause and willing to advance the firm’s interests, it might be difficult for these 
policymakers to publicly side with the firm when there is intense community 
contestation. 
7.3.4.2 Political Linkages  
Political linkages between firms and elected officials has been studied in CPA literature 
in many forms including Campaign financing, and revolving door policy. Even though 
campaign financing (monetary contributions towards a political election campaign) is 
easier to discern, it is not a straight forward indication of political linkage. There are 
limits to how much direct or indirect contributions can be made and the contributions by 
one particular firm is likely to be just part of larger set of political contributions, with 
some of the contributions made by opposing interest groups. However, campaign 
financing is still an interesting source for understanding political linkages when we 
consider changes in patterns of a firm’s contributions. For instance, after Calypso LNG 
terminal was proposed by SUEZ of the Florida coast, the local newspaper the Sun-
Sentinel carried a news item on the campaign contribution made by the firm. The first 
line of the article described the situation thus - “the Houston-based company whose plan 
to build a liquefied natural gas terminal and pipeline off the Fort Lauderdale coast is 
sparking opposition has introduced itself to key Florida politicians - with campaign 
contributions”. Julie Vitek, vice president of communications at Suez, admitted that it "is 
one way for us to connect with the elected officials in areas where we have an operating 
presence or hope to have one. It provides us with an opportunity to introduce ourselves, 
build relationships and share information.” Another way in which campaign financing by 
corporations is studied is by lumping it with other types of CPA. For instance, Hadani 
and Schuler (2013: 171) combine direct and indirect monetary contributions with money 
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sent on lobbying efforts to create a measure that they term as “Corporate political 
investments”. They also create a dummy variable termed “Board political service” to 
“represent the existence of directors with prior public service” (page 171). This variable 
can be broadly described as a revolving door policy.  
Revolving doors (Etzion & Davis, 2008) refers to the practice of hiring politically 
connected individuals with prior public service experience and is a much stronger 
indication of political linkages than mere political contributions. It is a revolving door 
because the movement of individuals occur both ways – from corporations to public 
services and from public services to corporations. As a covert delegitimation tactic I only 
consider movement from public services to the corporate world. For instance, Joe 
Desmond, former chairman of the California Energy Commission, joined NorthernStar 
Natural Gas, sponsoring firm of Clearwater LNG terminal in California. Broadwater 
LNG terminal employed the services of former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani's 
company, Giuliani Partners, for security assessments. AES, the sponsoring firm for 
Brewster LNG terminal in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, hired a public-relations firm 
Regan Communications. Regan Communications team included James Borghesani 
(spokesman for a former acting Governor of Massachusetts, Jane Swift) and former 
Suffolk County District Attorney Ralph Martin. These political hires are not exact 
equivalent to lobbying, even though they can potentially lobby for the firm – so called 
“revolving door lobbyist” (Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012: 3731). Political hires can 
either be part of the firm or they can be contracted to provide advice but their activities 
are not publicly disclosed. On the other hand, lobbyist need to be registered as such and 
have to provide some account of their lobbying activities. In this sense revolving door is a 
lot more covert than lobbying when they are merely political hires and not revolving door 
lobbyist. 
As (Hillman et al., 1999) point out “a variety of benefits may accrue to firms that are 
successful in creating a linkage with the government: information, access, influence, 
reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, etc. However, the direct benefits of such 
strategies are difficult to observe”. Nevertheless, it is clearly a tactic meant to circumvent 
any publicly visible evaluation processes and to exclude potentially problematic 
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stakeholders from such an evaluation process. Hence I consider actions oriented towards 
creating political linkages such as political contributions and revolving door policies as 
covert delegitmation tactics. 
7.4 Future Research Directions 
“a signalman may have to handle several trains coming to his 
section simultaneously. To handle any one by itself would be 
straightforward, but here the problem is the control of them as a 
complex whole pattern”.  
- Ashby (1957:218) 
Firms in the LNG industry faced a complex regulatory system. The main part of the 
thesis focused on one particular element of a regulatory system—the federal regulatory 
agency, which has the sole authority to approve the LNG terminal proposals. While the 
federal regulator has the ultimate deciding power over the proposals, other elements of 
the regulatory system working at different levels (state or federal) can impact the firm 
directly or indirectly and to varying degrees. Firms face direct impacts from the executive 
wings of the regulatory system and face indirect impacts from the legislative wings, 
which enact the policy, while the actual implementation is carried out by the executive 
wings of the government. Even when community contestation is unable to stop a firm 
from gaining approval, it can throw other hurdles that can either delay the process or 
make the project less viable even after gaining the approval from the federal regulator. 
The above repertoire of actions can be viewed as stemming from the need to engage 
stakeholders in some instances and exclude them in other instances as the firm teeters and 
totters its way around a system of regulatory processes.  
My future work will attempt to delineate the prominent reaction when a firm faces 
multiple demands from the regulatory system. I will utilize recent works on institutional 
complexity as a starting point for furthering the theoretical implication of this typology. 
However, I deviate from the current emphasis in institutional complexity literature in two 
major ways: a) instead of viewing complexity as occurring from competing institutional 
logics, I shift towards complexity as occurring due to competing institutional 
jurisdictions; b) instead of a merely looking at legitimation tactics, I consider 
complementary delegitmation tactics from firms facing institutional complexity. 
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7.4.1 From Competing Logics to Competing Jurisdictions 
Recent efforts to understand firm behavior in response to institutional complexity has 
almost made competing institutional logics to be synonymous to institutional complexity 
(see for example, Almandoz, 2014; Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016; Greenwood et al., 
2010; Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). For instance, consider the following line from Toubiana 
and Zietsma (2016: 3) in a forthcoming AMJ article – “This is particularly true when 
organizations face competing prescriptions from different institutional logics, a situation 
known as institutional complexity”. Even a call for papers in the journal Strategic 
Organization that was dedicated towards “Strategic Responses to Institutional 
Complexity” (Vermeulen, Zietsma, Greenwood, & Langley, 2014: 79) had four different 
avenues for studying institutional complexities and all of these were connected with 
institutional logics.  
Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) considered institutional logics as “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and 
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize 
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality”. It provides “a link between 
individual agency and cognition and socially constructed institutional practices and rule 
structures”(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 101). Situating the behavior of individuals and 
firms within a broader societal belief system and frame of reference has a somewhat 
natural scholarly allure to it because of its ability to capture social life as we as scholars 
ourselves experience it. However, it is possible to generate interesting theoretical insights 
without necessary equating competing logics with institutional complexity. For instance, 
Hoffman (2011) advances the notion of logic schism to explain the polarization of 
climate change debate around convinced logics and skeptical logics and how it creates a 
“shift from an integrative debate focused on addressing interests, to a distributive battle 
over concessionary agreements with each side pursuing its goals by demonizing the 
other” (page 3). Hoffman (2011: 9) argues that such logic schisms imply that the “two 
sides are not so much competing as they are talking past one another”. Thus competing 
institutional logics in this extreme manifestation are not really a source of complexity for 
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any of the actors involved but rather they are boundaries that “define clear in-group and 
out-group distinctions”. 
On the other hand, institutional complexity can be framed without a decisive and 
unquestioning recourse to conflicting institutional logics. For instance, Chandler (2014) 
considers institutional complexity as “characterized by forces that ebb and flow in 
wavelike patterns as societal expectations evolve, with attention coalescing around 
specific events and then dissipating”. Complexity in such circumstances arises because of 
the need to keep up with evolving societal preferences and not just those that are in 
conflict. Using the context of multinational enterprises, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) 
advance the notion of institutional complexity based on two dimensions: “first, 
institutional environments are fragmented and composed of different domains reflecting 
different types of institutions: regulatory, cognitive, and normative. Second, MNEs 
conduct operations in multiple countries that may vary with respect to their institutional 
environments and, thus, are exposed to multiple sources of authority”. This points 
towards complexity arising from multiplicity in the institutions that place concurrent 
demands on the firms but these institutions need not necessarily operate with the 
underlying institutional logics in a state of conflict. 
The institutional complexity due to the influence of multiple institutions is best captured 
by “the theory of institutional polycentrism, which suggests that institutions originate 
from multiple (poly) rule-setting centers such as governments, associations, and 
communities” (Batjargal, Hitt, Texas, Jiao, & Webb, 2013: 1025). This clearly indicates a 
shift from competing logics to competing jurisdictions. For instance, Luo, Wang, and 
Zhang, (2016) consider the competing demands between provincial and central 
governments in China that create complexity for firms trying to report their CSR 
(corporate social responsibility) activities. Because of the multiple entities involved in the 
regulatory system that I consider in the LNG context, the level of complexity facing the 
firms is much greater than the one considered by Luo et al. (2016). Designing studies 
with two governing institutions may be driven by the needs of econometric analysis but 
as Elinor Ostrom (2010: 2), argued in her Nobel prize acceptance lecture : “due to the 
complexity of broader field settings, one needs to develop more configural approaches to 
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the study of factors that enhance or detract from the emergence and robustness of self-
organized efforts within multilevel, polycentric systems” (emphasis added), Her insight 
will be my guiding principle as I advance this line of work. 
7.4.2 Legitimation AND Delegitimation 
Extant theories in organizational and management research, including research on 
institutional complexity, have an overwhelming focus on legitimacy (Überbacher, 2014). 
Institutional theory predicts the various symbolic and decoupling measures that 
organizations adopt in an attempt to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). Stakeholder theory predicts that firms will yield to pressures from 
powerful and legitimate stakeholders with urgent claims (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). 
Resource dependency theory (RDT) indicates that the power emanating from the control 
of critical resources will force organizations to seek legitimacy from these powerful 
others (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Research on categories indicates that since there are 
“penalties for illegitimate role performance” (Zuckerman, 1999), firms tend to conform 
to the expectations of the category decided by a powerful audience or critic. The 
application of these principles often reduces to treating legitimation as restrictive form of 
the evaluation process whereby firms are allowed only to recognize when to yield, how to 
yield, and whom to yield to. These conceptualizations render firms powerless in 
determining who participates in the legitimation process.  
As Lamont (2012: 205) points out, evaluation is a social and cultural process that 
involves “negotiation about proper criteria and about who is a legitimate judge [often 
involving conflicts and power struggle]” (Bourdieu, 1993). Extant organizational theories 
consider “Who is a legitimate judge” (Lamont, 2012) as a question for which the answer 
is not negotiated but is merely discovered. For example, stakeholder theory (Mitchell et 
al., 1997) considers stakeholder legitimacy and power, and the urgency of claims in order 
to establish the salience of the stakeholders; however, firms are expected to only 
recognize these attributes, and cannot negotiate or question them in any way.  
The typology introduced above expands the horizon beyond legitimation and along two 
dimensions. Firstly, I distinguish between covert and overt forms, and secondly, I 
introduce delegitimation as a contrast to legitimation. For example, negative personal 
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claims involve a publicly visible expression of the negative evaluation by the firm that 
directly questions whether the self-appointed judges are indeed legitimate and thus 
emphasizes the negotiation aspect of social evaluation instead of a taken-for-granted 
aspect. This typology opens up the black box of the legitimation process by bringing the 
spotlight on the bi-directional nature of the evaluation process—firms can be evaluators 
and can also publicly share negative evaluations of the stakeholders. This is especially 
likely in circumstances where firms face institutional complexity due to polycentric 
governance (Ostrom, 2010). Hence, this typology explicitly shies away from assuming 
that stakeholders are legitimate in an absolute sense because of some de facto, 
extraneous, and widely understood social norm.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
8 Conclusion 
The richness of the LNG industry context was both a boon and a bane. It was a boon 
because, as a management and organizational scholar, the number of theoretical threads I 
could unravel from its intricate fabric was worthy of intellectual drooling. It was a bane 
because bringing the topic under control for generating a focused theoretical insight 
would have meant a deliberate alienation of many potentially interesting areas of inquiry. 
In spite of this challenge, I tried to be as inclusive as possible by undertaking an 
integrative pathway that was aided by a set-theoretic (fsQCA) methodological 
orientation. This allowed me to address the primary research question of this thesis: how 
firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to community-level market entry conditions, and 
how do these strategies affect entry outcomes? On the other hand, Chapter 7 was an 
acknowledgment that, in spite of this measured inclusiveness, there are many insights 
from this thesis that will keep me occupied for the next several years as I try to address a 
much broader research question: how do firms try to overcome community contestation in 
their efforts to succeed in their market entry process? Hence, I promote this conclusion 
chapter as not an ending but an appraisal of what I have been able to achieve thus far and 
an assessment of the landscape that lies ahead.  
As this is an exercise in reflection of my scholarly work thus far, I am inclined to borrow 
concepts from researchers studying – “work as a practice”. In their summarization of the 
practice theory, Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1242) advance the notion of 
“relationality of mutual constitution”, which essentially means that “phenomena always 
exist in relation to each other, produced through a process of mutual constitution”. Thus 
the person producing this thesis, the scholarly work that produced this thesis, and the 
resultant artifact that this document represents are all mutually constitutive and one 
cannot be separated from the other. I hesitate to share my assessment of the person 
behind this work but instead I will discuss my assessment of the thesis as an artifact and 
the scholarly work that I aspire to pursue. 
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8.1 The Artifact 
There are three aspects in this thesis that I feel especially excited about because they 
explore areas that have not received a lot of attention from management and 
organizational scholars. In the following subsections I will discuss each of these three 
aspects: a) the notion of “social barriers to entry”; b) social contestation at the community 
level; and c) repertoire of firm responses to community contestation. I am also looking 
forward to the prospects of continuing to engage with these three theoretical 
opportunities. 
8.1.1 Social Barriers to Entry 
Establishing a foothold in a new market requires not only a market entry strategy to 
overcome barriers to entry but also non-market strategies to overcome social barriers to 
entry (see section 6.3 for a related discussion). This study explores one such social barrier 
to entry in the form of contestation from local communities, which can potentially derail 
the firm’s efforts by leading to regulatory delays or unfavorable regulatory decisions. 
While much extant scholarship has focused on the barriers to entry due to industry 
structures (Porter, 1981) and political tactics of incumbents (Fligstein, 1996), little 
attention has been paid to social barriers to entry at the community level.  
Specific locations are not important just for competitive advantages but also for 
operational startup. The location constraint forces firms to engage in a discursive process 
because an exit is costly and the alternatives may not be viable. Since it is a proposal and 
not an operational facility, social contestation occurs mainly on the basis of hypothetical 
reasoning, which opens up an exciting avenue for investigation. Few studies consider the 
lead up to operational startup (Sine & Lee, 2009) and thus ignore the perils in 
establishing a foothold.  
My arguments relating to community as a social barrier reflect the “old” 
institutionalism’s emphasis on community as an institutional influence (Selznick, 1949; 
Warren, 1967). Recently, however, the “new” institutional literature has witnessed calls 
to move away from high-level abstractions and start considering (again) communities as 
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the relevant social context (Jennings, Greenwood, Lounsbury, & Suddaby, 2013; Marquis 
et al., 2007, 2011). 
8.1.2 Local Manifestation of Social Contestation 
Scholars have considered various aspects of social contestation but mainly in a mature 
industry setting. In such macro social settings, contestation centers around socio-cultural 
impacts of certain practices, such as the use of sweatshops (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012); 
repeated events that become the realization of worst-case scenarios and fears (e.g., the 
railway accidents considered by Desai, 2011); deeply embedded moral and cultural 
evaluations of the products and services that translate into industry stigmatization 
(Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012); and changing societal concerns such as 
environmental issues that shape the re-evaluation of firms in certain industries (Elsbach, 
1994; Hoffman, 1999).  
By locating social contestation at the industry level and thus linking it with broader 
societal concerns, scholars have not fully recognized that contestation can also occur 
because of basic human needs and aspirations. As the LNG context of this thesis 
demonstrates, themes that can become a source of contestation include mortal fear (such 
as the threat of a terrorist attack on the LNG facility), living standards and aesthetics 
(often referred to, in a pejorative sense, as NIMBY), recreation (LNG vessels interfering 
with recreational boating), and food sources (fish larvae being sucked into the 
regasification system). Hence, studying local manifestations of social contestations 
highlights the dynamics of contestation centered around every day realities faced by the 
communities as well as the firms entering them. 
8.1.3 The Firm’s Repertoire of Responses 
My main findings indicate that firms draw from a repertoire consisting of three rhetorical 
tactics (i.e., positive claims, negative topical claims, and negative personal claims) to 
design non-market rhetorical strategies, which under certain circumstances contribute to 
regulatory success. This study reorients previous research on rhetoric by switching the 
emphasis from persuasive tactics, such as positive claims, to dissuasive tactics targeting 
not only the issues raised by communities but also the detractors themselves. By showing 
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that none of the four rhetorical strategies leading to regulatory success requires positive 
claims, my findings do not deny the widespread existence of positive rhetoric, but do 
raise questions about its effectiveness. 
This thesis also provides a framework for further enhancing our understanding of the 
repertoire of responses available to firms by considering the overt and covert dimensions 
of these tactics and by considering whether they are intended for legitimation or 
delegitimation. Specifically, my future research will build on this study to understand the 
effectiveness of delegitimation tactics by comparing it with the effectiveness of 
legitimation tactics, which has been largely unquestioned by organizational and 
management scholarship. 
8.2 Working in the Middle 
My inspiration for the term “The Middle” is from the title of an American Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) sitcom. The show’s website describes the main character, Frankie 
Heck (played by Patricia Heaton), as “a loving wife and mother of three, she’s middle 
class in the middle of the country and is rapidly approaching middle age” (emphasis 
added) … “sometimes it seems like everyone is trying to get to the top, or struggling not 
to hit bottom, but we think Frankie and her family will find a lot of love, and a lot of 
laughs, somewhere in The Middle” (original emphasis).15 While I relate at a very 
personal level to the character of Frankie, I also find “scholarly happiness” when I am in 
the middle. This thesis is also a reflection of the middle ground that I seek. Harkening 
back to the article by Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1242) I assess my scholarly work 
on three fronts: “empirical, theoretical, and philosophical—that relate to the what, the 
how, and the why”.  
                                                 
 
15
 http://abc.go.com/shows/the-middle/about-the-show 
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8.2.1 In the Middle of Two Empirical Domains 
“Organizational rationality thus calls for an open-system logic, for 
when the organization is opened to environmental influences, some of 
the factors involved in organizational action become constraints; for 
some meaningful period of time they are not variables but fixed 
conditions to which the organization must adapt. Some of the factors 
become contingencies, which may or may not vary, but are not subject 
to arbitrary control by the organization.” (original emphasis)  
– Thompson, (1967: 24) 
I view conflicts between business and society as an ideal setting to understand the 
“constraints” and “contingencies” that influence the behavior of firms. Constraints 
imposed by societal actors tend to persist in many instances, much like the sustained 
community contestation that I consider, and it is far more difficult for firms to exercise 
“arbitrary control” over non-market actors than over market actors. This conflict zone is 
also a reminder that the open-system logic can be reversed and the firm’s activities can be 
viewed as imposing constraints and contingencies on communities. Arriving at a local 
negotiated order (Fligstein, 2001) between the community and the firm is not necessarily 
a forgone conclusion, and a sustained conflict is a very real possibility. Being in the 
middle of an empirical context that affords such possibilities has already helped me gain 
theoretical insights on multiple fronts. 
8.2.2 Theoretical Middle Ground 
In one of my first PhD courses, I was exposed to the following depiction by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). I was still struggling to make some sense of the words epistemology and 
ontology, when I had to figure my bearings on this map. 
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Figure 9: “Four Paradigms of the Analysis of Social Theory”, from Burrell and 
Morgan (1979: 22) 
I have now come to an understanding that this struggle to place myself within a particular 
quadrant will never end as I seek to integrate theories that have been built on different 
epistemological paradigms. I’ve also come to terms with the two sides of the 
epistemology coin: a) “how one might begin to understand the world” and b) how one 
might “communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings” (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979: 1). The former is an internal struggle to understand how the pursuit of knowledge 
should be approached, and the latter is an external struggle to keep pace with evolving 
tools, standards, and fads of the most appropriate ways of representing and 
communicating this knowledge. In a way I am fortunate that fsQCA is becoming more 
and more acceptable as such a tool for representation because it also helps me deal with 
my first struggle, by deliberately bridging the divide between qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative and quantitative methods have, in more ways than one, become, 
respectively, epitomes of the subjective and objective dimensions in the above figure. It 
is also a tool that is well suited for carrying out theoretical integration as my thesis has 
demonstrated. The typology I developed in Chapter 7 is also very indicative of my 
inclination to connect the dots. I will continue to pursue my work by fully embracing this 
inclination for theoretical integration. 
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8.2.3 Philosophical Middle (er Muddle) 
At various points during my thesis work, I found myself oscillating between the 
community’s side and the firm’s side of the story. I was often tempted to deceive myself 
into believing that taking the side of the community would help me achieve a moral high 
ground. However, what the firms were proposing was not really morally despicable. 
Often, as in the context of LNG import terminals that were proposed in the U.S., issues 
involved in the contestation are extremely complex and at times charged with emotion. 
Certain issues may be so closely linked to the very operation of the industry that 
conforming to the pressure would be equivalent to quitting. There are also unintended 
consequences to mere conforming or appearing to conform to pressures. In the case of 
LNG, multiple other industries rely on the supply of natural gas. Many consumers across 
the U.S. have suffered because of high gas prices. In the Northeastern United States, 
demand was driven by colder winters, and in the southern parts, it was driven by summer 
demands on power generation facilities that were environmentally friendlier than coal 
based power plants. While the touted environmental benefits of natural gas may not have 
been completely accurate, it is much cleaner than alternatives such as coal or petroleum. 
In fact the Sierra Club, one of the largest U.S. environmental NGOs, was a vehement 
supporter of natural gas but changed its position with the shifts in public perceptions.  
I have now come to believe in Hudson and Okhuysen’s (2014: 246) argument that 
“knowledge taboos pose a threat to scholarly inquiry by inhibiting us as researchers 
through unthinking self-policing.” While the authors were referring to studying 
stigmatized aspects of organizational life, it is possible to think of other instances where 
knowledge taboos can inhibit scholars from giving due theoretical consideration to 
certain concepts, especially when they are empirically prevalent. This is not a 
philosophical preaching of what should be driving a scholarly pursuit but it is more of a 
“note to self”. It is my sincere hope that the complexities of the settings I explore will not 
drive me towards sanitizing the morality out of those setting but instead I will strive to 
embrace morality from every perspective, however at odds they may be. This is the 
tightrope walk and “The Middle” that I will continue to pursue in my scholarly works.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: Categorization of the Firm’s Rhetorical Responses to Social 
Contestation 
Note: The articles below are order according to the year of publication. 
Article Specific 
themes 
Type of 
article 
Positive claims Negative topical 
claims 
Negative 
personal 
claims 
(Sutton & 
Callahan 
(1987) 
Chapter 11 
filing for 
Bankruptcy 
Case studies  Defining and 
denying 
responsibility (“top 
management and 
the firm are not, or 
should not be, 
discredited”) 
 
Ashforth 
& Gibbs 
(1990) 
Problematic 
legitimacy  
Theoretical Espousing 
socially 
acceptable 
goals; 
protestation of 
legitimacy (“not 
sufficient to 
merely 
exemplify 
desirable 
qualities: It is 
necessary to 
promote them”) 
Redefining means 
and ends (“frame 
an issue in terms of 
other values that 
are seen as 
legitimate”) 
 
Oliver 
(1991) 
Institutional 
processes 
Theoretical Manipulate “Defiance: dismiss 
(ignoring explicit 
norms and values); 
challenge 
(contesting rules 
and requirements)” 
Defiance: 
“Attacking 
organizations 
strive to 
assault, 
belittle, or 
vehemently 
denounce 
institutionaliz
ed values and 
the external 
constituents 
that express 
them” 
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Article Specific 
themes 
Type of 
article 
Positive claims Negative topical 
claims 
Negative 
personal 
claims 
Marcus 
& 
Goodman 
(1991) 
Crisis  Hypotheses 
testing 
 Defensive signals  
Elsbach 
& Sutton 
(1992) 
Controversia
l and 
possibly 
unlawful 
actions 
Case studies Enhancements 
and entitlings 
(“to highlight 
the positive 
changes … and 
to claim credit 
for these 
changes”) 
Justifications and 
defenses (“of 
innocence to reduce 
negativeness of the 
event and the 
organization”) 
 
Elsbach 
(1994) 
Controversia
l events 
Mixed 
methods 
Acknowledgme
nts linked to 
technical 
characteristics 
Denials “linked to 
institutional 
characteristics”; 
denials “linked to 
technical 
characteristics”; 
acknowledgments 
“linked to 
institutional 
characteristics” 
 
Elsbach, 
Sutton, & 
Principe 
(1998) 
Avert 
undesirable 
responses to 
upcoming 
events  
Case studies Accommodating 
(favors/positive 
self-
characterization
s) 
Bureaucratic Intimidating 
(threats) 
James & 
Wooten 
(2006) 
Discriminati
on lawsuits 
Multifirm 
qualitative 
analytic 
Change efforts Denial; process 
retaliation “firms 
demonstrated 
uncooperative 
behavior and found 
ways to manipulate 
the lawsuit 
proceedings” 
Plaintiff 
retaliation 
(“firms 
harassed or 
threatened 
their 
accusers”) 
Maguire 
& Hardy 
(2009) 
Widespread, 
taken-for-
granted 
practices of 
DDT use 
Case study “Countering 
problematizatio
n of efficacy 
directly, i.e. 
asserting 
effectiveness of 
DDT.” 
Defending the 
cognitive pillar 
(“used science to 
challenge the 
factual basis of the 
problematizations”)
; defend the 
normative pillar 
(extend the defense 
of cognitive pillar; 
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Article Specific 
themes 
Type of 
article 
Positive claims Negative topical 
claims 
Negative 
personal 
claims 
use ethical 
arguments); defend 
the regulative pillar 
(extend the defense 
of cognitive and 
normative pillars; 
no legal basis) 
Desai 
(2011) 
Railway 
accidents 
Hypotheses 
testing 
“assert that 
organizations in 
the field 
perform more 
reliably than 
organizations in 
other fields”; 
“communicate 
gains made or 
planned in the 
industry” 
“place blame for 
accidents or poor 
safety performance 
on actors or forces 
outside of 
organizations in the 
field” 
 
Patriotta 
et al., 
(2011) 
Nuclear 
accident 
Case studies “political actor 
able to 
contribute to 
solving the 
problem of 
energy”; green 
rationale 
“industrial ‘test of 
worth’ to define the 
problem, attribute 
causes, and defend 
itself”; “maintain 
that any assertions 
not based on 
analytical grounds 
lacked credibility” 
 
Lamin & 
Zaheer 
(2012) 
Industrial 
practice 
(international 
sweatshops) 
Hypotheses 
testing 
 Denial (dismissal 
of the allegation); 
defiance (“firm 
challenges the 
assertion that it 
needs to take 
additional action 
and forcefully 
questions its 
portrayal as an 
unsympathetic or 
‘bad’ecompany”) 
 
  
Zavyalov
a et al., 
(2012) 
Wrongdoing
s (product 
recalls by 
U.S. toy 
companies) 
Hypotheses 
testing 
Statements of 
ceremonial 
actions (“do not 
directly address 
the cause of a 
recall but  
Statements of 
technical actions 
(“actions that are 
perceived as 
addressing the 
problem of 
 
 114 
 
Article Specific 
themes 
Type of 
article 
Positive claims Negative topical 
claims 
Negative 
personal 
claims 
instead highlight 
positive 
characteristics 
of a firm”) 
manufacturing and 
selling defective 
toys”) 
McDonne
ll & 
King, 
(2013) 
Consumer 
boycotts 
Hypotheses 
testing 
Prosocial claims 
(“expressions of 
the 
organization’s 
commitment to 
socially 
acceptable 
norms, beliefs, 
and activities”) 
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Appendix B: Summary of Research Utilizing Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) 
Key: AJS (American Journal of Sociology); AMJ (Academy of Management Journal); ASR 
(American Sociological Review); JOMS (Journal of Management Studies); SMJ (Strategic 
Management Journal)  
Note: The articles below are order according to the year of publication. 
Article Jou
rnal 
Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ 
Outcome  QCA’s Purported Utility 
Amenta, 
Carruthe
rs, & 
Zylan 
(1992) 
AJS Political 
mediation 
model of the 
Townsend 
Movement 
during the 
Great 
Depression 
State-wise 
success in 
implement
ation of 
old-age 
pension  
“examines many combinations of potential 
causes and generates the simplest combination 
of them leading to outcomes of interest” … 
“more than one path to public spending and that 
QCA can locate these paths” 
Chung  
(2001) 
JO
MS 
Comparison of 
market-
centered 
theories, 
culturalist 
perspectives, 
and the 
institutional 
approach to 
explain the 
emergence of 
business 
groups in 
Taiwan 
Business 
group 
formation 
“Rather than ‘decompose’ a case into variables, 
the Boolean approach juxtaposes elements of 
cases into causal combinations (or conditions) to 
explicate the outcome” 
Cress & 
Snow 
(2000) 
AJS “systematic 
understanding 
of movement 
outcomes by 
analyzing how 
organizational, 
tactical, 
political, and 
framing 
variables 
interact and 
combine” 
“differenc
es in the 
outcomes 
attained 
by 15 
homeless 
social 
movement 
organizati
ons 
(SMOs) 
active in 
eight U.S. 
“conjunctural in its logic, examining the various 
ways in which specified factors interact and 
combine with one another to yield particular 
outcomes. This increases the prospect of 
discerning diversity and identifying different 
pathways that lead to an outcome of interest and 
thus makes this mode of analysis especially 
applicable to situations with complex patterns of 
interaction among the specified conditions. In 
addition, QCA simplifies analysis by dropping 
irrelevant factors.” 
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Article Jou
rnal 
Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ 
Outcome  QCA’s Purported Utility 
cities” 
Hodson 
& 
Roscign
o (2004) 
AJS “interplay 
between 
organizational 
and job-level 
practices” as 
determinants 
of 
organizational 
success and 
worker dignity 
Organizati
onal 
success 
and 
worker 
dignity 
“QCA considers all observed combinations of 
causal factors and, with its comparative 
algorithmic logic, eliminates redundant and 
superfluous information. A key benefit of QCA 
thus lies in its ability to specify underlying 
configurations of variables relative to all 
observed possibilities”; “conjunctural logic 
makes QCA particularly appropriate for 
analyses that seek to identify and understand 
complex patterns of interaction among causal 
determinants.” 
Vaisey 
(2007) 
AS
R 
“how culture 
and structure 
combine to 
sustain—or 
inhibit—the 
experience of 
community” 
“the 
experience 
of 
gemeinsch
aft, (the 
we-
feeling, 
the sense 
of 
collective 
self, or the 
feeling of 
natural 
belonging)
” 
“does not pit variables against each other; 
instead, it looks at different configurations of the 
independent variables and compares their 
relationships to the outcome.” “Though they 
seem similar, QCA/fsQCA configurations are 
very different from GLM [generalized linear 
model] interaction terms. For instance, an 
‘AXB’ interaction term would take on 
equivalent values if A were high and B were 
low or vice versa. QCA/fsQCA treats these as 
separate types of cases” 
Grant et 
al. 
(2010) 
AS
R 
“how do the 
characteristics 
of facilities 
and their 
surrounding 
communities 
jointly shape 
pollution 
outcomes?” 
Chemical 
plants’ 
health-
threatenin
g 
emissions 
“treat cases as combinations of attributes and 
use Boolean algebra to derive simplified 
expressions of combinations associated with an 
out come”; “Even the inclusion of interaction 
terms in regression does not model causal 
complexity in the same way as FSA”... “Unlike 
variable based methods that are founded on the 
notion of unifinality and seek to estimate a 
single recipe for all cases under examination, 
QCA methods explicitly take the idea of 
equifinality into account, allowing different 
subsets of cases to produce the same outcome.” 
Fiss 
(2011) 
AM
J 
Miles & Snow 
typology of 
organizational 
strategic 
Organizati
onal 
performan
ce 
“The basic intuition underlying QCA is that 
cases are best understood as configurations of 
attributes resembling overall types and that a 
comparison of cases can allow a researcher to 
strip away attributes that are unrelated to the 
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Article Jou
rnal 
Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ 
Outcome  QCA’s Purported Utility 
configurations outcome in question”; “unlike, for example, 
regression analysis— fuzzy set QCA does not 
rest on an assumption that data are drawn from a 
given probability distribution”… “calibration 
reduces sample dependence, as set membership 
is defined relative to substantive knowledge 
rather than the sample mean, thus further 
reducing the importance of sample 
representativeness”  
Crilly et 
al. 
(2012) 
AM
J 
“firms facing 
identical 
[stakeholder] 
pressures 
decouple 
policy from 
practice in 
different ways 
and for 
different 
reasons” 
Decouplin
g/impleme
ntation 
“This view of causality is distinct from that in 
variable oriented research, which identifies 
general patterns of association and seeks causes 
that apply in all contexts”; “the method lends 
itself to the use of smaller data sets for the 
purpose of theory elaboration”; “By identifying 
how effects combine to produce outcomes, 
fsQCA is particularly appropriate for advancing 
multilevel theory”; “fsQCA allows for 
asymmetry between the drivers of decoupling 
and the drivers of implementation” 
Wright 
& 
Boudet 
(2012) 
AJS Emergence (or 
not) of social 
movements 
based on 
community 
context 
Mobilizati
on or 
nonmobili
zation 
against 
controvers
ial 
proposals 
for large 
energy 
infrastruct
ure 
projects 
“examines set-theoretic relationships, generates 
causal recipes (or combinations of conditions 
that correspond with the phenomenon), and 
reduces these recipes to their simplest form”  
Bell et 
al. 
(2014) 
AM
J 
“stock market 
responses to 
different 
constellations 
of firm-level 
corporate 
governance 
mechanisms 
by focusing on 
foreign initial 
public 
offerings 
Price 
premium 
“intended not to isolate the net, independent 
effects of single explanatory factors on a 
particular outcome, but rather to identify the 
combinations of factors that bring about the 
particular outcome”; “quite effective in 
evaluating both the number and complexity of 
alternative paths leading to a desired outcome”; 
“enabled us to explore the nature of equifinality 
in terms of the impact of different 
configurations of firm-level characteristics and 
mechanisms jointly with institutional factors on 
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Article Jou
rnal 
Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ 
Outcome  QCA’s Purported Utility 
(IPOs)” the overall process of legitimation” 
Bartley 
& Child 
(2014) 
AS
R 
Conditions 
related to 
structural 
power and 
cultural 
vulnerability 
that make 
certain firms 
attractive 
targets for 
activism 
Firms 
targeted 
by the 
anti-
sweatshop 
movement 
“helps identify configurations and allows for 
probabilistic tests of causal sufficiency” 
Garcia-
Castro 
& 
Francoe
ur 
(2014) 
SMJ “explore 
theoretically 
and 
empirically 
some of the 
complementar
ities, costs and 
contingencies 
likely to arise 
in stakeholder 
management” 
High 
performan
ce/very 
high 
performan
ce 
“Set-theory uses set-subset connections rather 
than correlations between the variables in order 
to establish empirical links between the 
conditions... While correlations are based on the 
covariance of the variables studied, set-subset 
connections are based on the degree of 
membership in sets and subsets. If set X is 
contained in set Y, then X is sufficient for Y. By 
contrast, if set Y is contained in set X, then X is 
necessary for Y.” 
Misangy
i & 
Acharya 
(2014) 
AM
J 
Combinations 
of governance 
mechanisms 
High (and 
not-high) 
profitabilit
y 
“fsQCA takes the perspective that cases are 
constituted by combinations of theoretically 
relevant attributes (i.e., governance 
mechanisms), that the relationships between 
these attributes and the outcome of interest (i.e., 
firm profits) can be understood through the 
examination of subset relations, and thus that the 
attributes and the outcome are ‘best understood 
in terms of set membership’” 
Greckha
mer 
(2015) 
SMJ “Executive 
compensation 
and its relation 
to that of rank 
and file 
employees” 
High CEO 
compensat
ion, high 
worker 
pay, and 
high pay 
dispersion 
“it enables disentangling complex 
interdependencies among countries’ institutional 
dimensions underlying organizational 
outcomes”. “Captures the three elements of 
causal complexity—conjunction, equifinality, 
and asymmetry. Conjunction means that 
attributes may not impact outcomes in isolation 
from one another. Equifinality implies that 
alternative attribute combinations may be linked 
to an outcome. Asymmetry means that the 
causes for occurrence of an outcome are not 
necessarily the inverse of the causes of its 
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Article Jou
rnal 
Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ 
Outcome  QCA’s Purported Utility 
absence and therefore each requires separate 
theoretical and empirical consideration; it also 
implies that the presence versus absence of 
attributes may play different roles in the 
occurrence of outcomes.” 
Joshi, 
Son, & 
Roh 
(2015) 
AM
J 
“sex 
differences in 
rewards and 
performance” 
Men 
(women) 
receive 
higher 
performan
ce 
evaluation
s than 
women 
(men) 
“Unlike other statistical procedures that rely on 
significance testing or aim at explaining 
variance in an outcome of interest, QCA 
identifies which specific set of causal attributes 
is common across all cases of an outcome” 
Judge et 
al. 
(2015) 
JO
MS 
“how 
imprinting 
forces interact 
with strategic 
choice factors 
to address 
organizational 
capacity for 
change as a 
firm moves 
from private 
to public firm 
status” 
“organizat
ional 
capacity 
for 
change” 
“The main advantage of fsQCA is that it enables 
the discovery of one or more configurations of 
cases as combinations of causal conditions, 
whereby each case is assigned a group-
membership score in every causal condition”; 
“while traditional variance methods require a 
normal probability distribution of variables, 
fsQCA makes no such assumption. This makes 
it more suitable for smaller samples such as the 
one investigated in this study. Since fsQCA does 
not assume any kind of probability distribution, 
outliers are not as much of a concern as in 
regression analysis” 
Vergne 
& 
Depeyre
(2015) 
AM
J 
Firm 
adaptation 
explored using 
the competing 
perspectives 
of cognition 
and dynamic 
capabilities 
Adaptatio
n (non-
adaptation
) 
“FsQCA relies on logical minimization to 
identify necessary and sufficient conditions that 
predict the occurrence and non-occurrence of an 
outcome (here, adaptation and non-adaptation)”; 
“fsQCA seeks commonalities and differences 
across cases sharing the same outcome”; “allow 
us to identify separately the antecedents of 
adaptation and of non-adaptation”; “enables an 
integration of two related literatures by 
examining complementarities among their core 
variables, all within a causal framework that 
does not neglect the qualitative insights obtained 
from the case studies” 
Camp
bell, 
Sirmo
AM
J 
Investor 
perceptions of 
merger and 
Investor 
reactions 
“One of the core characteristics of fuzzy set 
theory is that it allows for configurational 
classifications and judgments based on the 
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Article Jou
rnal 
Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ 
Outcome  QCA’s Purported Utility 
n, & 
Schijv
en 
(2016) 
acquisitions 
announcements 
simultaneous consideration of multiple 
interdependent factors, in line with our 
knowledge of how humans process 
information”; “On the analytical front, these 
tools provide a unique middle ground between 
qualitative and quantitative methods” 
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Appendix C: Summaries of Cases Used in Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA) 
The following table provides a snapshot of the 41 cases of LNG proposals used in the fsQCA 
analysis. Subsequently, I provide a brief descriptive narrative of each case. As these descriptive 
narratives indicate, each individual case has many different factors that can potential combine in 
different and complex ways to determine regulatory success (or failure). This is exactly the kind 
of circumstance where fsQCA is most useful and tries to combine the best of both the qualitative 
and quantitative worlds. Traditional comparative case qualitative research relies on the 
researcher’s ability to select the most theoretically relevant case studies for comparison. The 
utility of fsQCA is that it algorithmically partials out the cases that are related to the causal 
combinations of interest, from all other cases, which can probably be explained by other causal 
combinations but are not related to the current theoretical focus. Hence, the number of cases that 
finally make it to the causal recipes in the Findings section is much fewer than the universe 
described in this appendix. However, by considering the entire set of 41 cases, fsQCA explicitly 
incorporates the possibilities for other solution pathways and thus provides an equivalent of the 
control logic of econometric method but at the entire case level (as a bundle of all attributes) and 
not for individual variables. 
Key: DEIS (Draft Environmental Impact Statement); FEIS (Final Environmental Impact 
Statement); BCF/d (Billion Cubic Feet per day) 
Ref Project Announce Applied DEIS FEIS Approval Size 
BCF
/d 
Distanc
e to 
city/ 
town 
(miles) 
Communit
y 
Deep 
water 
Port 
1 Beacon 19-Jan-05 19-Jan-
05 
3-Mar-
06 
3-Nov-
06 
 1.50 56.00 Cameron, 
LA 
Yes 
2 Bienville 2-May-05 12-Jan-
06 
28-Jun-
07 
22-
Mar-
10 
29-Oct-
10 
1.40 63.00 Mobile, AL Yes 
3 Brad-
wood 
23-Feb-05 15-Jun-
06 
17-Aug-
07 
5-Jun-
08 
18-Sep-
08 
1.00 18.00 Clatsop, 
OR 
No 
4 Broad-
water 
9-Nov-04 17-Feb-
06 
17-Nov-
06 
11-
Jan-08 
20-Mar-
08 
1.00 9.00 Suffolk, NY No 
5 Cabrillo 14-Aug-
03 
3-Sep-
03 
29-Oct-
04 
15-
Mar-
07 
 1.50 21.50 Ventura, 
CA 
Yes 
6 Calais 29-Aug-
05 
6-Jan-
10 
   1.50 6.00 Washingto
n, ME 
No 
7 Calhoun 13-Oct-04 18-
Mar-05 
30-Jun-
06 
8-Aug-
07 
8-Aug-07 1.00 5.00 Calhoun, 
TX 
No 
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Ref Project Announce Applied DEIS FEIS Approval Size 
BCF
/d 
Distanc
e to 
city/ 
town 
(miles) 
Communit
y 
Deep 
water 
Port 
8 Calypso 17-Dec-05 13-Oct-
06 
6-Nov-
07 
18-Jul-
08 
 0.80 10.00 Broward, 
FL 
Yes 
9 Camero
n 
12-Jul-01 30-
May-02 
28-
Mar-03 
14-
Aug-
03 
10-Sep-
03 
1.50 13.00 Calcasieu, 
LA 
No 
10 Casotte 
Landing 
17-Nov-
04 
6-Oct-
05 
20-
May-06 
26-
Dec-
06 
15-Feb-
07 
1.30 3.60 Jackson, 
MS 
No 
11 Clear-
water 
18-Mar-
03 
28-Jan-
04 
   1.40 12.60 Ventura, 
CA 
Yes 
12 Compass 29-Mar-
04 
29-
Mar-04 
11-Feb-
05 
14-
Apr-06 
 1.00 11.00 Mobile, AL Yes 
13 Corpus 
Christi 
3-Mar-03 23-Dec-
03 
18-Nov-
04 
4-
Mar-
05 
13-Apr-
05 
2.60 10.60 Nueces, TX No 
14 Creole 
Trail 
23-Nov-
04 
23-
May-05 
15-Dec-
05 
5-
May-
06 
15-Jun-
06 
3.30 0.00 Cameron, 
LA 
No 
15 Crown 
Landing 
3-Dec-03 29-Sep-
04 
18-Feb-
05 
28-
Apr-06 
20-Jun-
06 
1.20 3.50 Gloucester, 
NJ 
No 
16 Down-
east LNG 
11-Jul-05 23-Dec-
06 
15-
May-09 
  0.50 3.00 Washingto
n, ME 
No 
17 Freeport 18-Jun-01 7-Apr-
03 
6-Nov-
03 
25-
May-
04 
26-Sep-
06 
1.50 3.20 Brazoria, 
TX 
No 
18 Golden 
Pass 
17-Jun-03 16-Sep-
04 
3-Mar-
05 
3-Jun-
05 
30-Jun-
05 
2.00 8.70 Jefferson, 
TX 
No 
19 Gulf 
Gateway 
20-Dec-02 20-Dec-
02 
2-Oct-
03 
5-Dec-
03 
16-Jan-
04 
0.50 116.00 Orleans, LA Yes 
20 Gulf 
Landing 
29-Jul-03 3-Nov-
03 
18-Jun-
04 
3-Dec-
04 
29-Apr-
05 
1.00 38.00 Cameron, 
LA 
Yes 
21 Ingleside 30-Jan-04 2-Nov-
04 
24-Feb-
05 
10-
Jun-05 
21-Jul-05 1.00 17.40 Nueces, TX No 
22 Jordan 
Cove 
23-Aug-
04 
13-Sep-
07 
2-Sep-
08 
1-
May-
09 
17-Dec-
09 
1.00 4.00 Coos, OR No 
23 Liberty 9-Apr-08 28-Sep-
10 
   2.40 15.00 Monmouth
, NJ 
Yes 
24 LNG 
Clean 
Energy 
20-Oct-04 8-Nov-
05 
8-Nov-
05 
24-
Nov-
06 
15-Feb-
07 
1.30 4.10 Jackson, 
MS 
No 
25 Main 
Pass 
19-Jun-03 27-Feb-
04 
10-Jun-
05 
9-
Mar-
06 
3-Jan-07 1.00 37.00 Plaquemin
es, LA 
Yes 
26 Neptune 14-Feb-05 15-Feb-
05 
31-
May-06 
27-
Oct-06 
26-Mar-
07 
0.75 10.00 Essex, MA Yes 
27 North-
east 
Gateway 
4-Jun-04 13-Jun-
05 
16-
May-06 
24-
Oct-06 
7-Feb-07 0.80 13.00 Essex, MA Yes 
28 Ocean-
way 
18-Jan-06 18-Aug-
06 
   1.20 21.00 Los 
Angeles, 
CA 
Yes 
29 Oregon 3-Jan-07 10-Oct-    1.00 1.10 Clatsop, No 
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Ref Project Announce Applied DEIS FEIS Approval Size 
BCF
/d 
Distanc
e to 
city/ 
town 
(miles) 
Communit
y 
Deep 
water 
Port 
LNG 08 OR 
30 Pearl 
Crossing 
25-May-
04 
25-
May-04 
18-Apr-
05 
  1.00 40.00 Cameron, 
LA 
Yes 
31 Port 
Ambrose 
28-Sep-12 28-Sep-
12 
   0.40 31.10 Monmouth
, NJ 
Yes 
32 Port 
Arthur 
16-Apr-04 15-
Mar-05 
29-Aug-
05 
28-
Apr-06 
15-Jun-
06 
1.50 5.86 Jefferson, 
TX 
No 
33 Port 
Dolphin 
2-Apr-07 29-
Mar-07 
17-Apr-
08 
13-Jul-
09 
19-Apr-
10 
1.20 28.00 Hillsboroug
h, FL 
Yes 
34 Port 
Pelican 
15-May-
01 
25-Nov-
02 
29-
May-03 
22-
Aug-
03 
20-Jan-
04 
1.60 36.00 Vermilion, 
LA 
Yes 
35 Quoddy 
Bay 
8-Jun-04 26-Dec-
06 
   2.00 0.50 Washingto
n, ME 
No 
36 Sabine 
Pass 
6-Dec-01 22-Dec-
03 
12-Aug-
04 
12-
Nov-
04 
15-Dec-
04 
2.60 10.40 Cameron, 
LA 
No 
37 Safe 
Harbor 
26-Jan-06 29-
Mar-07 
   2.00 13.50 Nassau, NY Yes 
38 SES 9-Oct-02 2-Feb-
04 
7-Oct-
05 
  0.70 2.00 Los 
Angeles, 
CA 
No 
39 Sparrow
s 
14-Jan-06 23-Jan-
07 
25-Apr-
08 
5-Dec-
08 
15-Jan-
09 
1.50 1.00 Baltimore, 
MD 
No 
40 Vista 
DelSol 
25-Jul-03 8-Sep-
04 
17-Dec-
04 
15-
Apr-05 
15-Jun-
05 
1.00 10.00 Nueces, TX No 
41 Weavers 10-Apr-02 30-Dec-
03 
30-Jul-
04 
20-
May-
05 
30-Jun-
05 
0.80 2.20 Bristol, MA No 
 
The picture below maps the distribution of the terminals. The numbers correspond to the 
reference in the table above. The green numbers reached the approval stage and those in 
red didn’t. The explosion sign marks proposals that faced sustained community 
contestation. 
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Descriptive Narratives 
Beacon (Beacon Port Clean Energy): In announcing this project, ConocoPhillips touted its many 
benefits and its own capabilities, stating, “This state-of-the-art facility will offload LNG from 
carriers, store and regasify the LNG, then make the natural gas available through a system of 
pipelines for delivery to consumers in Louisiana and beyond. This terminal is part of a larger 
effort by ConocoPhillips to meet growing demand for natural gas around the world. The company 
is developing or has proposed other U.S. regasification facilities in Freeport, Texas, and offshore 
Alabama. ConocoPhillips has an active liquefaction facility in Kenai, Alaska, as well as others at 
various stages of development around the world, including Australia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia and 
Venezuela.” Beacon did not face any community contestation but was abandoned because 
Conoco had already signed up for capacity in Freeport and Golden Pass LNG projects, which 
were in the same Gulf of Mexico region. 
Bienville (Bienville Offshore Energy Terminal): TORP Technology decided to introduce the 
HiLoad Technology into the LNG import terminals for the first time in the world through this 
terminal proposal. Lars Odeskaug, CEO of TORP, described it as “semi-floating L-shaped 
loading terminal that can dock onto any ship in a similar way as a forklift picks up a pallet” … 
“We’re in 525 feet of water and the features on our seawater intakes have been designed to 
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minimize the impact on the environment. We have designed our seawater filters such that we 
don’t actually suck in marine life.” This technology was superior to open-rack vaporizers used by 
other offshore terminal proposals in the Gulf of Mexico that faced community opposition because 
of their impact on fisheries. However, the technology was also inferior to the closed-loop systems 
that used ambient air instead of seawater for converting LNG to its natural state. As a part of the 
regulatory process, the National Marine Fisheries Service warned that this technology could still 
be potentially harmful. The Alabama Governor also expressed concerns. TORP decided to 
modify its design to incorporate these concerns even though doing so meant the process would be 
delayed. 
Bradwood (Bradwood Landing Project): Bradwood was the fourth LNG proposal along the 
Columbia River in Oregon. CEO William “Si” Garrett, of NorthernStar Natural Gas LLC (the 
sponsoring firm), indicated that “Bradwood’s remoteness makes it safer and other benefits to the 
site include that it is already zoned for marine industrial and is near the shipping channel.” 
Similar to other proposals along the Columbia River, Bradwood started facing community 
contestation very early, and the intense contestation was sustained throughout the length of the 
proposal. Being so far upstream meant that the location was remote but it also meant that the 
LNG tankers would need to make a longer journey along the river, passing through potentially 
vulnerable areas such as the Lewis and Clark National Wildlife Refuge. It also meant the river 
had to be dredged to allow this journey to happen. As one are resident, Robert Pile, put it, “if it 
goes ahead the natural setting of the lower Columbia would change radically and for all practical 
purposes forever.” Fisheries, especially the salmon habitat, became a big concern, leading 
NorthernStar to promise a $59 million remediation fund. It recruited the Lower Columbia Fish 
Recovery Board and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to work with them and identified 
150 acres on Svensen Island that it would purchase to implement the remediation. As Gary 
Coppedge, vice president for permitting and development, indicated, “funds go ‘above and 
beyond’ the company’s legal requirements to mitigate the impacts of the project.”  
Broadwater (Broadwater Energy): This proposal was a joint venture between Shell and 
TransCanada. As Hal Kvisle, TransCanada’s CEO, acknowledged, “we were jumping into a 
frying pan when we chose this site, but we believe it is the closest possible location to the New 
York and Connecticut markets. New York is at the end of the pipeline network, making the giant 
market one of the most difficult areas to provide with adequate gas volumes.” Even though it was 
designated an onshore terminal, the actual structure would be in the middle of a water body 
between New York and Connecticut, called the Long Island Sound. As one of the project 
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spokesperson, Froydis Cameron, described it, “Viewed from nine miles away on a clear day it is 
hardly visible, and is blocked by the tip of your thumbnail if you hold it up against your line of 
vision. Besides, it is designed to look like a ship. Ships are nothing new in New York—the city 
with an amazing maritime heritage. LNG ships coming into the [Long Island] Sound would 
simply join the countless others already plying the trades.” The project remained anything but 
inconspicuous and the companies were really jumping into the fire rather than the frying pan. 
When Broadwater offered $15 million in annual payments (in lieu of paying taxes), Philip 
Cardinale, the Town of Riverhead supervisor, called it “hush money” and “payment in lieu of 
safety.” The town voted on a resolution opposing the project because of “insurmountable 
problems relating to safety and security” and “permitting an industrial use in Long Island Sound, 
a public resource, by a private for-profit entity is bad public policy.” John Hritcko, Broadwater’s 
regional planning director, was quick to launch a counterattack, stating, “I am a little surprised he 
is using that terminology. We haven’t been clandestine or underhanded.”…“We are committed to 
a process of determining the future of Broadwater based upon facts, not conjecture or unfounded 
assumptions.” When Richard Amper, executive director of the Long Island Pine Barrens Society, 
described it as “the biggest threat to safety and environment since the Shoreham nuclear power 
plant 25 years ago,” Broadwater response was, “You have to look at this on a factual basis with 
knowledgeable people who understand safety and security and who understand these systems, 
and not to go out and make these sensationalized claims that it’s going to be doom and gloom and 
harm for the folks on the shoreline.” As the contestation intensified, Broadwater also intensified 
its use of dissuasive rhetoric. 
Cabrillo (Cabrillo Port/ Cabrillo Deepwater Port): Proposed by BHP Billiton in order to become 
an entry point for its liquefaction projects in Australia, Cabrillo was supposed to provide “a 
unique and environmentally friendly alternative to meeting the energy and environmental 
demands of California” because “Natural gas is a more efficient and cleaner burning fuel than 
coal or oil, and offshore location minimizes social and environmental impacts while providing a 
safer and less intrusive locale for its operations.” Tim Riley, an attorney in the city of Oxnard, 
California, set up a website (http://timrileylaw.com/LNG.htm) dedicated to fighting this project 
and even produced a video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2E0U9q1yFGk ) highlighting the 
many risks of an LNG terminal. Riley predicted very early on that “The solid opposition in 
Oxnard that has fought against LNG in the past is stronger than ever and has been reinforced and 
fortified by new members of our community” and “the Malibu community, whose affluence and 
influence go without saying, will join our extended coastal communities.” Sure enough, Malibu 
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Mayor Andy Stern got the council to budget $50,000 to pay the legal costs in fighting the project. 
Pierce Brosnan had an opposition letter signed by Barbra Streisand, Cindy Crawford, Martin 
Sheen, Tom Hanks, Sting, and Charlize Theron. That letter said, “Once built, the terminal will be 
the length of three football fields, 14 storeys high and will receive, store and process LNG, a 
highly flammable substance, from huge LNG tankers that arrive at least two to three times a week 
from various foreign countries.” However, Chip Goodyear, CEO of Goodyear, thought 
“environmentalists are living in ‘dreamland’ if they think conservation will meet the state’s 
growing energy needs.” Kathi Hann, BHP spokesperson, also countered, “We’re not in anybody’s 
backyard. We’re in the middle of the ocean.”… “We chose this spot because it has a coastal 
pipeline connection already existing that we can hook into.” Cabrillo had its supporters such as 
Oxnard Chamber of Commerce and it even enlisted Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard to 
lobby with Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger. However, because of intense local opposition, both the 
California Coastal Commission and the California State Lands Commission voted against the 
project forcing Gov. Schwarzenegger to reject the proposal. Finally, the MARAD (the Maritime 
Administration, the federal regulator) also disapproved the proposal—the only offshore proposal 
that was actually disapproved (not withdrawn). 
Calais (Calais LNG Project): Calais was initially promoted by BP Consulting (not related to 
British Petroleum), a private firm formed by Maine State Rep. Ian Emery and Former 
Passamaquoddy tribal Councilor Fred Moore. Cianbro Corporation (one of the largest 
construction companies in the U.S.) and the Passamaquoddy tribal government for the Indian 
Township reservation would be part owners of the LNG terminal. Moore remarked that, “we’re 
talking about full participation by a Native American tribe because BP Consulting is examining 
the need for economic development opportunities for native American communities and how that 
need can be interfaced or meshed with industry.” This did not preempt community opposition 
against Calais, especially from the local NGO, Save Passamaquoddy Bay, whose spokesman, Bob 
Godfrey, described it as the “the absolute worst of the three projects” (referring to the two LNG 
projects proposed before Calais in Washington County, Maine). The proposal ran into initial 
trouble when Cianbro withdrew its backing but Ian Emery revitalized the project by bringing in 
Art Gelber, head of Texas-based energy consulting and advisory firm Gelber & Associates. While 
community opposition persisted, especially with respect to the navigability of the LNG vessels 
through the St Lawrence Canal, Calais ran into trouble getting project financing. For a short 
while, they had the backing of Goldman Power (a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Group Inc.) but 
that fell through after the 2008 financial crisis. Apparently Goldman Sachs had already spent $24 
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million on the proposal before its exit. Finally, in 2012, the FERC disapproved the project stating, 
“your continued inability to secure either financing or a site for the project is evidence that you 
are not currently in a position to proceed with this project.” This was one of the two onshore 
projects (along with Quoddy) that were actually dismissed. 
Calhoun (Calhoun LNG): It was proposed by Gulf Coast LNG Partners, a privately held firm, 
and Haddington Ventures, next to an industrialized zone. There were multiple industrial facilities 
nearby that could be potential customers for natural gas and was also very close to a major natural 
gas pipeline corridor. It faced only isolated incidents of community opposition. 
Calypso (Calypso Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port): Proposed by SUEZ Energy North 
America (SENA), this offshore terminal was supposed to have “marine offloading buoy and 
anchoring system that will reside approximately 150 feet below the ocean surface when not in 
use. It will connect to an undersea pipeline operated by another SENA subsidiary, Calypso U.S.” 
Zin Smati, President and CEO of SENA, promoted that the project thus: “The overwhelming 
feedback we have received from Florida customers is that they need additional, LNG-based gas 
supplies and they need them as soon as possible. It is our intention to meet our customers’ needs 
and be the first supplier of natural gas directly into the southeastern Florida market derived from 
LNG… We believe our Calypso project is consistent with Governor Bush’s call for fuel 
diversification as outlined in his comprehensive 2006 Florida Energy Act.” Apart from the typical 
issues of safety, environmental concerns, fossil fuel, and fisheries that other offshore projects 
faced, Calypso also faced some local flavors of these concerns. Pedro Monteiro, Sierra Club 
Broward Group conservation chair, said, “Judging by the number of oil rigs destroyed or adrift 
due to Katrina, the industry does not appear to be able to make their structures stand up to the 
increasing number of hurricanes. I have concerns about how Suez will bring the gas to shore, and 
how they will ensure that the pipeline will not break free and sweep the seafloor.” There was 
mounting pressure on Florida Gov. Charlie Crist to reject the project with residents urging him in 
town hall meetings, stating, “We want him to know we don’t want something in our community 
which is potentially dangerous, subject to terrorist attack, potentially going to damage not only 
our beaches and waters but our homes. If there is an explosion we will be annihilated.” After 
Gov. Crist expressed his concerns, Calypso withdrew from the project. 
Cameron (Cameron LNG/Hackberry LNG Terminal): This was initially proposed by Dynegy as 
Hackberry LNG, but because of its financial troubles, it sold the proposed project to Sempra 
Energy just after the project had received its Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). 
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Sempra renamed the project as Cameron. When the project was announced, Steve Bergstrom, 
president and chief operating officer of Dynegy Inc., highlighted its many advantages: “The 
existing Hackberry site was operated as an LPG terminal by Trident and acquired by Dynegy in 
1995. The terminal is strategically positioned with access to the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic 
Basin and will have the ability to connect to a number of natural gas pipelines that reach most 
major natural gas markets in the United States. Dynegy will add one LNG tank and vaporization 
facilities to the Hackberry site. Siting the new terminal and gasification plant at the Hackberry 
site with key infrastructure already in place, including a jetty, dock and ship berthing structure, is 
a tremendous advantage.” Cameron didn’t face any community contestation. Cameron became 
the first offshore LNG terminal to be approved by the FERC in the new millennium. The decision 
famously became known as the “Hackberry decision.” 
CasotteLanding (Casotte Landing LNG Project/Bayou Casotte Energy): When ChevronTexaco 
announced this project next to its Pascagoula Refinery, it was joined by Mississippi Gov. Haley 
Barbour, who claimed, “ChevronTexaco has a history of continued investment in Mississippi and 
is a recognized leader in the production of cleaner diesel and gasoline fuels. These projects 
address a growing demand for energy in the U.S. and would position Mississippi as a leader in 
the supply of clean and reliable energy to the region.” CasotteLanding didn’t face much 
community contestation. 
Clearwater (Crystal Clearwater Port project/ Clearwater Port): This project was initial proposed 
by Crystal Energy LLC with a logic that its president William O. Perkins III elaborated as 
“California currently imports about 90 percent of the natural gas it consumes. Demand 
projections call for a 20 percent increase this decade. Yet, even as demand is increasing, other 
Western States that once provided California with inexpensive natural gas are now using more of 
the supply for their own needs, leaving the state with a severe shortage. By locating the facility 11 
miles offshore on an existing platform, public safety and environmental impacts will be reduced 
to the simple installation of a state-of-the-art natural gas pipeline.” For a short while, there was 
participation in the project from Woodside Energy, Australia’s largest publicly traded 
independent O&G company, before it decided to pursue its own offshore LNG terminal proposal 
(Oceanway). After Woodside’s exit, NorthernStar Natural Gas Inc. took over the project from 
Crystal. A little north from Clearwater location, NorthernStar was already developing the 
Bradwood but justified its decision thus, “We will be able to leverage our knowledge and 
experience as we develop our projects to expedite the permitting process and to increase the 
likelihood of success for each successive project.” Shortly after taking over, NorthernStar hired 
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former Ventura County Deputy District Attorney, Jeff Gorell, and former chairman of the 
California Energy Commission, Joe Desmond. Clearwater faced a similar type of opposition as 
the nearby Cabrillo project but continued pressing forward even after Cabrillo was disapproved, 
with Desmond claiming that, “Unlike BHP we’re making use of existing infrastructure, which is 
consistent with the Coastal Act. More importantly the company would use ‘ambient air 
vaporizers’ [closed-loop] to bring the cooled fuel’s temperature up for regasification. That 
process uses 80 percent energy.” Pacific Environment, a local NGO, published a report, 
“Collision Course: How Imported Liquefied Natural Gas Will Undermine Clean Energy in 
California,” which called into question the very premise of Clearwater, including increased 
demand and lower emissions. The project didn’t even make it to the DEIS stage as the company 
stopped its efforts. 
Compass (Compass Port LNG project): When ConocoPhillips started working on this project, it 
had recently faced defeat from the town of Harpswell, in Maine, where its JV project with 
TransCanada had been voted out by the residents. So one of the first things Compass did was to 
commission Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants to conduct safety studies of accidental LNG 
releases in offshore terminals and Dauphin Island Sea Lab to conduct studies of impact on sea life 
because of seawater intake in open-rack technology based offshore terminals. Because LNG is at 
–260° F, when the seawater comes in contact with the container holding LNG, there is a heat 
exchange and LNG becomes natural gas but the seawater suddenly drops in temperature. This 
water is then pumped back to sea. Just a few months after Conoco commissioned the studies, in 
September of 2004, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) started raising 
concerns that “If the organisms are not killed by the temperature drop, they will not survive being 
banged around by the pump machinery or the harsh chemicals used to keep the inside of the pipes 
clean… the risk of wiping out entire species of commercially important fish in the Gulf, such as 
red drum and red snapper, is too much to allow the once-through system.” NOAA’s report on the 
negative impact led to community contestation that eventually got the Alabama Gov. Bob Riley 
to also denounce the project. Conoco withdrew the proposal stating, “It is clear that Governor 
Riley still has environmental concerns despite the independent scientific studies predicting 
minimal impact.”  
CorpusChristi (Corpus Christi LNG): This project was a partnership between Cheniere Energy 
Inc. and BPU LLC, an affiliate of Sherwin Alumina, to build the terminal next to an existing 
Sherwin facility, which would also be a consumer of the natural gas from the terminal. The 
project faced no community opposition. 
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CreoleTrail (Creole Trail LNG): CreoleTrail was another onshore project of Cheniere in the 
South that did not face any opposition. During its announcement, Steve Trahan, president of the 
Cameron Parish Police Jury (equivalent of county council in Louisiana), said, “Cheniere Energy 
is welcome in Louisiana and especially in Cameron Parish. Their openness with our residents, 
pro-active commitment to becoming a good citizen in the community and their credibility in 
delivering on their promises to work with us as they developed the Sabine Pass LNG terminal has 
earned our support for any other project they choose to develop.” 
CrownLanding (Crown Landing LNG): CrownLanding, sponsored by British Petroleum (BP), 
faced lower local opposition compared with other onshore projects, and it had overwhelming 
support from the New Jersey state government. Its problem was across the border—from the state 
of Delaware. This proposal led to a spat between the two state governments because of a 17th 
century boundary, which New Jersey claimed was “superceded by a 1905 interstate compact 
signed by Delaware and New Jersey that gives New Jersey control over facilities on its side of the 
river.” Delaware’s claim was “a Supreme Court decision dating from 1935 upholding Delaware’s 
control over that particular patch of the river, though New Jersey has control over other parts of 
the Delaware River.” The escalation between the two states reached such a point that Delaware 
House Majority Leader Wayne Smith introduced a bill, urging the Delaware Governor “to call 
upon the Delaware National Guard to protect the territorial integrity of the State of Delaware and 
to block and/or remove any encroachments upon our boundary.” The Governor of New Jersey 
responded (jokingly perhaps) that “the capital of Delaware, Dover, is within firing range of the 
USS New Jersey, which has been de-commissioned and is now used as a floating museum on the 
New Jersey shore.” Thankfully, the two states resolved the issue in the court of law. While the 
case dragged on in the Supreme Court for nearly four years, BP secured federal regulatory 
approval for the project. Even though the courts finally ruled equal jurisdiction between the two 
states, the federal approval remained intact. 
Downeast (Downeast LNG): In 2005, Downeast became the second proposal to appear in 
Washington County, Maine. At the end of my data collection period (December 31, 2013), 
Downeast remained an active proposal but hadn’t moved past the DEIS stage because of 
sustained community opposition. The project was promoted by Dean Girdis, with financial 
backing from Kestrel Energy Partners LLC, an oil and gas private equity investment firm. At the 
beginning of the project, Girdis enthusiastically proclaimed, “The burden is on the developer. It’s 
for us to go out there and talk to people and try to answer their questions and address their 
concerns and keep them informed of what the project is. In the absence of that, human reaction is 
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understandable.” Downeast tried various tactics to assuage community fears. They brought in 
experts to explain the dynamics of the flammability of LNG and the technical features of the 
terminal that would make it safe. They demonstrated computer simulations and brought in local 
ship pilots to counter concerns that the LNG vessels couldn’t navigate Passamaquoddy Bay. 
However, the project faced intense and sustained contestation from the local NGO Save 
Passamaquoddy Bay and, at the same time, the project also had to deal with a financial crunch. 
The initial funding of $7.5 million provided by Kestrel was fast running out with all the studies 
and outreach programs that the project needed to conduct. That didn’t prevent Dean Girdis from 
offering $3.5 million in annual benefits (once built) to the Town of Robbinston. Some of the 
components of this offer were “DowneastLNG would pay the entire portion of its property tax 
obligation, estimated to be 92 percent of the town’s budget. (Currently around $300,000, the 
budget would soar to about $1.3 million because of the higher total valuation for the town.) The 
company would establish a town community development fund for $100,000 annually during the 
plant’s construction phase and $1.2 million a year during its operation. The company would 
contribute $500,000 annually to a previously announced Washington County economic trust 
fund. Homeowners with abutting properties would have a choice of three compensation plans, 
including a one-time $25,000 “impact fee.” By 2011, Kestrel had already spent $17.5 million and 
was still trying to find a way to make it to the FEIS stage. 
Freeport (Freeport LNG): Freeport was one of the first LNG proposals of Cheniere and faced a 
few incidents of community contestation but not at sustained levels. Initially, Crest Investment 
was involved in the project. Crest Investments had two co-chairmen. One was Jamal Daniel, who 
was appointed by Crest to serve as advisor to the Board of Cheniere. The other co-chair was Neil 
Bush, sibling of President George W Bush and Governor Jeb Bush. Because of Neil Bush, there 
is an interesting conspiracy theory promoted by CounterPunch.16 Cheniere had filed a lawsuit 
against Crest because it had obtained rights for the Quintana Island location where Cheniere was 
planning to propose the Freeport project. The lawsuit was settled out of court and shortly after 
Cheniere and Crest became partners. CounterPunch claims that it has an internal Freeport memo 
that designates Crest to “handle the political permitting side.” Apart from this alleged internal 
memo, everything else is a veritable fact! By 2004, a private investor Michael S. Smith had also 
                                                 
 
16
 http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/03/08/neil-bush-and-crest-investments/ 
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purchased equity in the project and had become the CEO of Freeport LNG Development, LP., 
and then Dow Chemicals picked up equity stake along with supply of natural gas to one of its 
local plants. 
GoldenPass (Golden Pass LNG): When ExxonMobil announced this project, it was accompanied 
by Texas Governor Rick Perry who stated: “This project will provide jobs and other economic 
benefits to Sabine Pass and Southeast Texas, and bring long-term supplies of natural gas for our 
industries, power plants and homes. We support ExxonMobil’s efforts to bring this important 
project to Texas.” The project did face small levels of community contestation mainly based on 
safety and aesthetics concerns. Port Arthur Mayor Oscar Ortiz said he “wouldn’t support 
disannexing more than 900 acres for the ExxonMobil facility unless concerns over pollution and 
local labor are resolved.” Jefferson County was an out of compliance region for the Clean Air Act 
purposes. However, the local council voted 9–1 for providing land to Exxon, with Mayor Ortiz 
being the sole dissent. A few months later, Mayor Ortiz had also changed his stance. When some 
of the local residents started putting up signs opposing the terminal, he stated, “if ExxonMobil 
moves forward with the project, the city could add $600 million to $800 million to its tax base. 
It’s something that the city couldn’t pass up even if it wanted to. There’s always a chance of an 
accident, but these people have got to understand, they’ve been living in a city that has got more 
refineries in it than any other city in Southeast Texas and we haven’t had that kind of a 
catastrophe yet and hopefully we never will.” A local resident, Shirley McGuire, described the 
DEIS by summing it all up: “The draft environmental impact statement is very thick and it covers 
people very little.” 
GulfGateway (Gulf Gateway project/Energy Bridge offshore LNG Port): El Paso initially 
invested in this project as a means to implement a new technology it had developed called Energy 
Bridge. In traditional LNG import terminals, the regasification occurred on the terminal but 
Energy Bridge’s compatible ships would have this ability onboard. When the Energy Bridge ship 
arrives near the terminal, a buoy would be employed that would be pulled into a receiving cone 
and connect with the ship. Then the regasified LNG in the form of natural gas would be directly 
pumped into a subsea pipeline that would take it into the main natural gas pipeline network. This 
project, along with the Energy Bridge technology, was later spun off into a separate company 
called Excelerate Energy, LLC. This project did not face any contestation throughout its lifecycle. 
GulfLanding (Gulf Landing LNG terminal): This offshore project of Shell became a target of 
community contestation because of the impact on fisheries. National Marine Fisheries Service 
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(NMFS) in its report said, “the project’s open-loop heating system, which will use an estimated 
135 million gallons of seawater per day to regasify the LNG, would have a dramatic impact on 
certain fish stocks. This single LNG terminal could cause mortality to billions of fish eggs and 
larvae annually. The proposed action described is unsatisfactory from an environmental and 
public welfare standpoint.” However, Shell countered this claim, stating, “the Coast Guard has 
advised us that numbers cited in their FEIS for impacts on red drum [are] incorrectly overstated 
and will be adjusted. This adjustment will clearly demonstrate that there are no significant 
impacts on essential fish habitat. The percentage quoted by several organizations is only a 
comparison to the amount of red drum landed by recreational fishermen and not to the overall red 
drum population. Red drum landed by recreational fisherman—12.7-million pounds in 2002—
likely represents a small fraction of the overall red drum population.” Shell also asserted that 
changing over to closed-loop system would cost $43 million annually and it was too expensive. 
Shell promised it would engage scientists from Louisiana or Texas universities to study the 
impact once the terminal was built. Relatedly, it made multiple charitable donations—“$4 million 
to America’s Wetland, Louisiana’s nonprofit public relations campaign in support of the state’s 
coastal restoration efforts”; “spent more than $5 million on its Marine Habitat Grant program, 
which finances a variety of research and education programs aimed at the Gulf, in association 
with the National Fish & Wildlife Foundation.” 
Ingleside (Ingleside Energy Center): This Occidental Petroleum’s proposal was located within 
its own petrochemical facility where it would “warm the LNG back into a gaseous state with 
waste heat from the chemical complex and then to feed the vaporized gas to its chemical unit’s 
440 MW cogeneration unit, as well as to fuel the chemical plants themselves.” It did not face any 
community contestation. 
JordonCove (Jordon Cove LNG): Initially this project was proposed by a consortium of 
investors, who formed a company specifically for this purpose, called Energy Projects 
Development LLC. A year after its announcement, it was taken over by Fort Chicago Energy 
Partners, a Canadian income fund. Jordon Cove faced very high levels of sustained community 
contestation. This was the first of the three terminals proposed along the Columbia River in 
Oregon. While safety fears and the impact on the Columbia River because of the LNG ships were 
the main concerns, other concerns also formed the undercurrent of fear. One big fear was that the 
locals would not have a say at all and this was how a local resident, Jody McCaffree, put it, “It’s 
not right to have non-elected people decide these things when we taxpayers are paying for this. I 
think this is all being done without any public input. I’ve tried to be open-minded about it, but 
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they’re trying to put these [terminals] in all over the country and they’re being turned down right 
and left.” Bob Braddock, project manager, held multiple community meetings where he 
highlighted the many benefits of the proposal including “site already is zoned for industrial and 
marine use, will be largely obscured by dune woodlands and is a mile and a quarter from the 
nearest home”; “Jordan Cove will be a good neighbor to the Bay Area”; “would be the smallest 
LNG import terminal in the country”; “most efficient and environmentally benign natural gas 
fueled power plant in Oregon” and also countered safety concerns by stating, “these [LNG 
terminals] withstood the Kobe earthquake [in Japan].” However, the feeling of being exploited 
continued among the local residents with one of the fears being that most of the gas was meant 
for California or in the words of a resident, “We’re using only 10 percent of this gas and getting 
100 percent of the mess.” In some meetings, demonstrators shouted that they didn’t want to get 
“FERCed” (sounding like a well-known swear word). Jordon Cove remained aggressive in 
countering issues and often times the detractors.  
Liberty (Liberty Natural Gas): A JV between Canadian Superior Energy Inc. and Global LNG 
Inc., called Excalibur Energy (USA) Inc., was set up to manage this project. Canadian Superior’s 
CEO, Craig McKenzie, highlighted its many benefits, including an interesting design feature: 
“Liberty Natural Gas was borne out of over two years of design development and several series of 
stakeholder interviews in the New Jersey and New York areas. Its design is simple and it is 
basically a natural gas pipeline project with an offshore, anchored submerged natural gas-
receiving turret. Impact on all components of the environment and marine life has been carefully 
considered in our design. Near-shore the pipeline will be directionally drilled so that no surface 
sediments are disturbed. Onshore the pipeline will be laid within an existing interstate pipeline 
corridor to Linden, New Jersey. The design capacity is up to 2.4 billion cubic feet per day, which 
is sufficient to safely satisfy all the growing needs in the area such that multiple projects will not 
have to be undertaken.” However, this was not enough to prevent local opposition led by NGO 
Clean Ocean Action, which laid out the many issues with the proposal including: “LNG is foreign 
and will come primarily from sources in Russia and the Middle East. These countries are not the 
friendliest to the US, nor are they consistent”; “Markets all over the world that do not have rich 
domestic sources are vying for LNG and are willing to pay as much as twice as the US, and at 
times even more. The loyalty of the supply is to the dollar”; “can be up to 40% more polluting 
than US gas supplies because of the excessive energy needs that LNG requires during its lifecycle 
through cooling, loading onto tankers, transporting and regasifying. Moreover, the 
industrialization of the ocean with tankers and facilities would have substantial environmental 
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consequences to the marine environment, threatening our fishing and tourism industries and the 
economy.” The project also faced internal troubles with the financial situation of its sponsor firms 
and then moved to a private firm. It was finally abandoned as the private firm backing it decided 
to start a completely different project called Port Ambrose. 
LNGCleanEnergy (LNG Clean Energy/ Project Clean Energy): This project was initially 
proposed by Gulf LNG Energy, LLC, and was later joined by Sociedade Nacional de 
Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol), which had liquefication projects in Angola. The president of 
Gulf LNG Energy was Dee Osborne, who was also the president of Crest Investments, which was 
involved in Freeport LNG project (see the above discussion on Freeport and its connection with 
Neil Bush). LNGCleanEnergy faced very little community contestation. 
MainPass (Main Pass Energy Hub): McMoRan Exploration highlighted the many benefits of 
this project when it announced its proposal: “deepwater access for large LNG tankers and is in 
close proximity to shipping channels”; “will utilize the substantial existing platforms and 
infrastructure at the site, which were designed to withstand a 200-year storm event”; “Safety and 
security aspects of the facility are enhanced by its remote location”; “to include significant cavern 
storage of natural gas using its massive 2-mile diameter salt dome…offers excellent opportunities 
to achieve added value for LNG imports and provides security of supply and peaking capabilities 
for downstream customers.” However, MainPass ran into the same trouble as the other open-rack 
terminals in the gulf (as highlighted in the cases above). However, instead of just pushing through 
with its plans or withdrawing it, MainPass was one of the few terminals that actually made a 
design change midway through the regulatory process (I incorporated this fact specifically for 
MainPass while calibrating the variable “Project design advantages”).  
Neptune (Neptune offshore LNG delivery system): This project proposed by SUEZ Energy 
North America (SENA) was proposed as an offshore complement to its existing operational 
onshore LNG terminal at Everett (near Boston, Massachusetts). This relationship was a huge 
selling point for Neptune and not just because it was sponsored by the firm that had the only 
terminal with continuous operations of LNG imports in the U.S. for nearly four decades. The 
other advantage was that SENA could temporarily shut down the Everett facility anytime it 
wanted by switching over to Neptune. This was a distinct possibility because after 9/11, the coast 
guard did shut access to LNG vessels, fearing that terrorists might attempt to blow them close to 
Boston. Neptune had also decided to use closed-loop vaporization system unlike the controversial 
open-rack used by offshore terminals in the Gulf of Mexico. Neptune’s logic was thus: “the water 
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is colder in New England than in the Gulf of Mexico. We wouldn’t get the same efficiency if we 
used sea water vaporization in the same capacity at the end of the day.”… “The other reason is 
the environmental issues in New England on emissions [are too restrictive]. The [closed loop 
system] keeps everything internal to the vessel and we don’t use steam turbines.” However, the 
community contestation against Neptune had a specific element that was different from other 
offshore terminals. It was located very close to the feeding ground of North Atlantic right whale, 
a highly endangered marine mammal. As Mason Weinrich, executive director and chief scientist 
at the Whale Center of New England in Gloucester, explained, “Over time, if a whale is 
approached and left, again and again, it’s receiving lots of exposure to close-proximity noise that 
may impact an animal’s ability to hear. It’s sort of like going to a loud rock concert again and 
again.” Julie Vitek, SENA spokesperson, countered, “Noise is an issue we take seriously and the 
Neptune project is being designed to minimize it. For example, installation is planned for the 
summer when the North Atlantic right whale—an endangered species—is less prevalent in the 
region. Project’s pipeline route avoids rocky areas, allowing for plowing of the sea floor rather 
than blasting during construction. When the Neptune facility begins operation, the shuttle and 
regasification vessels that serve it would travel a route that avoids transit within the Stellwagen 
Bank National Marine Sanctuary. Also, when leaving or returning to the shipping lanes into 
Boston Harbor, the [ships] will transit at half speed.”  
NortheastGateway (Northeast Gateway Deepwater LNG Port): This project was Excelerate 
Energy’s second LNG terminal after GulfGateway (described above) and proposed to use the 
same Energy Bridge technology. It was expected to connect with Duke Energy’s HubLine system 
that was laid on the ocean floor. Russell Sherman, a Gloucester fisherman, described HubLine 
thus: “The existing gas pipeline, finished last year, was hit with construction problems and 
mishaps. In particular, weather delays meant portions of the pipe lay unburied on the ocean floor 
during the annual lobster migration season. We don’t know about the habitat destruction from the 
pipe, what it all means.” They expected connectors from NortheastGateway to HubLine and the 
terminal itself to also cause similar problems. They also expected it to disturb a 50-year-old toxic 
waste dump that can affect the surrounding marine life. As Gloucester Mayor John Bell put it, 
“We don’t see why we have to sacrifice a 400-year-old fishing industry for the short-term energy 
needs of New England.” Doug Pizzi, a spokesman for Excelerate, was optimistically stating, 
“We’ve met with these groups as often as they’ve wanted to and still try to keep an open dialogue 
with them, in an attempt to make sure that we minimize the impact on what is obviously a very 
important cultural and economic asset.” As the community contestation intensified and no 
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resolution was being reached, Rob Bryngelson, Excelerate’s chief operating officer, commented 
that they have “been largely rebuffed, especially by fishermen, in repeated attempts to meet. We 
have met with everyone who would meet with us and listened to everyone’s concerns.” 
NortheastGateway also announced a $6.3 million mitigation package to be handled through an 
NGO for helping impacted fishermen. It was also going to deploy two marine mammal acoustic 
detection systems at a cost of $16 million to protect the Gerry E. Studds Stellwagen Bank 
National Marine Sanctuary. 
OceanWay (OceanWay LNG): OceanWay was started by Woodside, Australia’s largest 
independent O&G firm, after it exited the ClearWater project. However, it faced the same kind of 
opposition that ClearWater did but not at the same level of intensity. The City of Malibu passed a 
resolution officially opposing the terminal. Steve Larson, Woodside Natural Gas President and 
former executive director of the California Public Utilities Commission, continued to emphasize 
the positives: “OceanWay will: Protect the environment by meeting all federal and state air and 
water quality standards. Preserve ocean views because OceanWay will not require the 
construction of any onshore storage facilities or permanent offshore surface structures. Commit to 
community safety by locating the project 28 miles offshore, far removed from population centers 
and existing shipping lanes. Use proven technology, relying primarily on ocean air for 
regasification and a buoy system similar to one that performed reliably and safely during 
Hurricane Katrina. Provide a secure and reliable energy source for California, capable of 
supplying 15 percent of California’s annual natural gas demand and adding valuable peak supply 
during events like heat waves. Create jobs by committing to US staffing and flagging of the 
regasification ships.” OceanWay decided to cut the size and scope of its project but could never 
submit a redesigned version even to reach a DEIS stage before it was withdrawn. 
OregonLNG (Oregon LNG): This project was essentially a rejuvenation of the Skipanon LNG 
project that didn’t enter the regulatory cycle because of Calpine’s financial troubles. So former 
Calpine executives, Peter Hansen and Mohammed Alrai, took over from where the earlier project 
had left, with the help of Leucadia National Corp., which created a subsidiary called LNG 
Development Co. in order to transfer Calpine’s 94-acre lease with the Port of Astoria that 
Leucadia had obtained during Calpine’s bankruptcy. Hansen highlighted some of the competitive 
advantages over projects proposed upstream along the Columbia River: “We don’t need to bring 
the tankers under the bridge, past Astoria and 30 miles up the river. We’re located exactly where 
a facility like this should be located—at the mouth of the river. The need for other LNG projects 
to take their tankers past downtown Astoria is the ‘800-pound gorilla in the room’”… 
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“[OregonLNG] also has the proper zoning to build a facility at the Skipanon site, unlike the 
Bradwood Landing project, which is located 20 miles east of Astoria on the Columbia River.” 
When Hansen conducted a site-tour of the location for local residents, Lori Durheim who had 
fought against the original Calpine proposal gave Hansen a taste of things to come by saying, 
“We’re going to have a good fight again.” Fear of intentional attacks on the terminal or accidental 
leaks drove much of the intense and sustained community contestation. Residents also feared that 
the local hospitals and fire departments were ill-equipped to face the eventualities. As one 
resident put it, “As long as these out-of-state energy speculators know that their permitting 
process will proceed smoothly right up to the moment of obtaining the building permit, there is 
no motivation to negotiate with the local fire, police and sheriff departments concerning who pays 
for what.” In spite of the community contestation, Oregon LNG remained active until the end of 
my data collection period even though there were many local obstacles from residents as well as 
Clatsop County commission, which was trying to prevent the access pipeline from going through. 
PearlCrossing (Pearl Crossing LNG): This project was an ExxonMobile offshore terminal that 
faced similar opposition to the other terminals using open-loop technology in Gulf of Mexico 
region. Exxon spokesman Bob Davis response was, “In the design of our project, we’ve 
introduced a number of factors to drastically reduce the impact to fish and other marine life such 
as crabs and shrimps. In our view, the impact would be minimal.”… “Their [detractors] 
interpretation and the mathematics they are applying to the number are extremely exaggerated. 
They’ve taken the worst-case scenario and are not including the best side.” … “There are a lot of 
misperceptions and they carry on.” Exxon withdrew the proposal as its other onshore proposals 
(GoldenPass and VistaDelSol) advanced in the regulatory process. 
Port Ambrose (Port Ambrose LNG): This project was a second attempt at getting an LNG 
terminal through the regulatory process by Liberty Natural Gas and its CEO Roger Whelan after 
the failed Liberty project (see above). Since the project entered the regulatory process in 
September of 2012, it had not made much progress. However, the local anti-fracking groups were 
concerned that the project was guised as an import terminal but was intended to be converted to 
an export facility at a later date. An export terminal would mean that fracking activities would 
pick up in the nearby areas as there was now an outlet for exporting the natural gas extracted 
through the fracking process. 
Port Arthur (Port Arthur LNG): Sempra Energy proposed this terminal on a parcel of land it had 
owned since 1985 and followed its success with Cameron LNG (the first terminal approved by 
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the FERC in the new millennium). Darcel Hulse, president of Sempra Energy LNG, highlighted 
the many benefits of the project: “Our Port Arthur LNG project is ideally situated to meet the 
needs of those suppliers, and it has positive support from the local community”… “the project 
would employ 1,000 or more construction workers at its peak with an average of 600 throughout 
the project’s development stage. When the terminal is operational, it would employ 60 to 70 
people full-time.” The project faced no community contestation. 
PortDolphin (Port Dolphin Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port): This offshore terminal was 
proposed by Hoegh LNG, which had decades of experience building floating storage and 
regasification units (FSRUs), a combination of both LNG carriers and floating terminals. 
Community contestation was aimed more at the connecting pipelines than the actual terminal 
itself because the pipeline routes were originally supposed to cross two marine aquatic reserves 
and would also affect the beach nourishment system that brought the white sands to the local 
beaches. PortDolphin publicly apologized to the local county officials for not consulting and 
“miscommunication.” Port Dolphin spokesman, Harry Costello, said, “We want to be a good 
neighbor. We will do a better job in communicating.” They also revised the undersea pipeline 
route to address all the concerns. 
PortPelican (Port Pelican LNG): ChevronTexaco’s PortPelican was the first offshore terminal 
proposed in the U.S. It was able to get through the permitting process without any community 
contestation because the whole controversy of open-loop vaporization system hadn’t yet emerged 
at that time. 
QuoddyBay (Quoddy Bay LNG terminal): It was the first of the three LNG terminal proposals in 
Washington County, Maine. It faced a very intense and sustained community contestation. At one 
point, its private promoter, Brian Smith, commented during an open house: “So far today, I’ve 
been told to shut up and called a liar. It’s tough to sit here.” QuoddyBay couldn’t secure a lease 
for the land where it was planning its terminal and became only one of three LNG terminals and 
one of two offshore terminals to be explicitly disapproved. 
SabinePass (Sabine Pass LNG): This was another of Cheniere’s terminals in Texas. Announcing 
this proposal, Charles Reimer, president and CEO of Cheniere, said, “All the work we have done 
continues to support our conclusion that Texas is well situated to develop LNG receiving 
terminals because of its extensive infrastructure for transportation and the large industrial demand 
in the state.” SabinePass did not face any community contestation. 
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SafeHarbor (Safe Harbor LNG): SafeHarbor was proposed by a private firm Atlantic Sea Island 
Group. Chairman Howard Bovers commented right after its launch that, “I don’t mind 
environmental opposition to projects at all. But unfortunately, what we often have today is what I 
would consider to be mindless environmental opposition, in which people are against anything 
and everything. I thought we might be able to eliminate that by having a process offshore.” The 
firm also indicated that a “50-acre island would be created in 70-foot-deep water, using dredged 
sand and rock and would be barely visible from the Long Beach boardwalk.” However, a local 
activist, Adrienne Esposito, described this man-made island thus: “the more we learn, the more it 
sounds like the island of Dr. Moreau.” While SafeHarbor sought to project itself as an alternative 
for the highly contested Broadwater terminal and did manage to convince some of Broadwater’s 
opponents, it could not convince everyone and faced moderate amounts of community 
contestation. After more than four years of hard work and spending more than $10 million, 
SafeHarbor was withdrawn without even reaching the DEIS stage. 
SES (Sound Energy Solutions): SES was proposed by the energy division of the Japanese 
conglomerate, Mitsubishi, and at a later stage (after the DEIS) ConocoPhillips became involved. 
SES started its proposal work by actively courting local residents, NGOs, and officials. Thomas 
E. Giles, SES senior managing director, explained in one such meeting in 2002: “This whole 
industry was developed around the threat of something happening. These facilities are not very 
good terrorist targets. You won’t get much bang for your buck, if you’re trying to wreak havoc. 
LNG does not explode and in its liquefied form, it burns slowly—yet cleanly—with a low flame. 
The liquefied gas is stored at low pressure, unlike such fuels as liquid propane. There are not 
many things that could penetrate one of these tanks.” However, this explanation still didn’t 
prevent community contestation to such an extent that California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) became involved. The project became an arena for the jurisdictional battle between the 
CPUC and the FERC for the right to determine the approval of the project. SES took up the 
FERC side and directly attacked the CPUC. After a legal battle between the FERC and the 
CPUC, the FERC authority was firmly established. Sustained community contestation put an 
enormous amount of pressure on the Harbor Commission for the Long Beach port that was 
supposed to lease land meant for the project. The Harbor Commission kept delaying its own 
assessments and studies in spite of legal challenges. The FERC suspended the process because of 
inactivity and SES finally had to withdraw the application. 
Sparrows (Sparrows Point LNG): This project was proposed by AES Corp., one of the largest 
power companies in the U.S., at a former shipyard in Baltimore County. Sparrows faced sustained 
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and intense community contestation because of multiple issues, including the dredging of the 
shipping channel, “the potential effects of a leak, about terrorist attacks on the tankers or terminal, 
about dwindling property values and about interference to recreational boating and fishing from 
the tankers.” While the residents felt it was too close to a populated area, Sparrows insisted that, 
“by industry standards, the Sparrows Point site is considered ‘remote.’” County officials sought 
to disrupt the project by throwing multiple hurdles, including changes in zoning laws, which AES 
fought in court. Kent Morton, project director for AES, also publicly attacked the county council 
by stating: “the county has misinterpreted the project at a basic level. They just refuse to 
acknowledge that this project is bringing any environmental benefits.”  
VistadelSol (Vista del Sol LNG terminal): VistadelSol was launched by ExxonMobil right after 
its launch of GoldenPass proposal. In this case as well, Texas Governor Rick Perry was present at 
the announcement ceremony and reiterated: “Texas and the United States need secure supplies of 
natural gas to attract industries, assure development and to continue the strong economic growth 
we're experiencing in our state and throughout the nation. This project will bring jobs and other 
economic benefits to San Patricio County and the greater Corpus Christi area, and will provide 
long-term supplies of natural gas for our industries, power plants, and homes. We support 
ExxonMobil’s efforts to bring another important LNG project to Texas.” The project did not face 
any community contestation. 
Weavers (Weaver’s Cove LNG): Weaver’s was initial proposed by Poten and Partners, an energy 
consulting firm, and was later joined by Amerada Hess, one of the largest O&G companies in the 
U.S. From the beginning, the project was headed by Gordon Shearer, who became the CEO of 
Hess LNG after Amerada Hess got involved. Shearer had made his career in LNG and was in 
charge of the LNG facility at Everett, which was the only continuously running import terminal in 
the U.S. since 1970s. However, Shearer met his match in the mayor of the city of Fall River, 
Edward M. Lambert Jr., who built a coalition of opposition from local residents, activists, city 
officials, and federal politicians, including Senator John Kerry. Weaver’s faced intense and 
sustained contestation. In spite of the high levels of community opposition, the FERC approved 
the project. Excerpts from the FERC approval notice are shown below 
In performing this review, we have taken a number of extraordinary steps 
to assure detailed consideration of safety and security issues regarding both 
the proposed LNG import terminal and related LNG vessel operations. 
Recognizing the public concern, the U.S. Coast Guard in coordination with 
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the Commission initiated a series of workshops with local law enforcement 
agencies and port stakeholders to develop the procedures and resources 
required to manage the safety and security of LNG vessels while moving 
through Narragansett Bay and unloading LNG at the dock. An initial vessel 
transit security plan is summarized in the final environmental impact 
statement (FEIS). This process was the most extensive effort ever 
performed prior to Commission authorization of an LNG import project, 
and will serve as a blueprint for evaluating future proposals. 
In response to comments from local agencies about the security and 
emergency management cost that could be imposed on state and local 
agencies, we are adopting the FEIS’ recommendation that Weaver’s Cove 
be required to prepare a comprehensive plan identifying the mechanisms 
for funding all project-specific security and emergency management costs 
incurred by state and local agencies. We are also requiring Weaver’s Cove 
to file an initial emergency response plan and identify emergency 
evacuation routes prior to construction, to develop emergency response 
plans with local officials throughout the construction period, and to report 
progress at 6-month intervals as recommended in the FEIS. We are also 
requiring additional safety measures by requiring Weaver’s Cove to 
incorporate into the final design of the terminal improved features for 
cryogenic valves, instrumentation, equipment isolation, hazard detection 
and control systems. 
With these conditions and others discussed herein, we find that the 
proposed new LNG terminal will promote the public interest by increasing 
the availability of natural gas supplies in the New England market and that 
the Mill River laterals are required by the public convenience and necessity 
to connect the proposed LNG facilities to the interstate pipeline system.  
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Appendix D: Coding of Firm’s Rhetorical Responses  
A detailed protocol was prepared for manual coding of the rhetoric-related causal conditions. The 
coding protocol was updated multiple times during the initial iterations and it was applied 
repeatedly to a set of claim segments until the protocol was largely stabilized. Any further 
updating that occurred to the protocol was restricted to particular word markers that could 
potentially indicate which of the three rhetorical tactics was used. After the completion of coding, 
these markers were rechecked for false negatives — segments that might not have been coded for 
a particular type but should have been. The final coding protocol with instructions was given to a 
graduate research assistant, who coded 100 randomly selected claim segments to generate an 
inter-coder reliability rating. Initial interrater reliability was only satisfactory, with a Cohen’s 
kappa of 0.76. After discussions with the coder, I realized that many of the differences occurred 
because of lack of deep knowledge of context. For instance, in one case the coder thought the 
firm was referring to a city as a stakeholder but the actual reference was to a rival proposal in 
another city. The revised Cohen’s kappa after correcting for only those instances involving 
knowledge of the context was 0.85, a very satisfactory level. 
Summary of Instructions 
Rhetorical Categories 
You will be coding three main categories of rhetoric. Positive claims is a type of self-promotional 
rhetoric used by firms to draw attention towards the positives of the firm and the LNG terminal. 
Negative topical claims are used to counter issues raised by stakeholders. The broad purpose of 
these claims is one or both of the following – a) question the validity of the issue raised by the 
stakeholder; and b) provide an alternative take on the issue. Negative Personal claims are directly 
aimed at the stakeholder. The object of these claims is not to undermine the issue but to directly 
undermine the stakeholder. 
Coding strategy 
1. Please code the segments in order, from top to bottom and do not sort the table.  
2. Read the segment of the text carefully and identify who is representing the firm, what is 
the topic/issue/theme, and who is the stakeholder (if present). 
3. Code each segment using the following guidance. 
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Coding guidelines 
1. Positive claims will clearly bring out positive attributes of the firm, the particular 
proposed project, or LNG in general. It can also be a combination of the three. Typical 
themes used by the firm for highlighting the positives are: 
a. Economic and industrial benefits: Jobs, tax revenues, higher supply of natural 
gas, alternative supply to traditional sources, and lower natural gas prices. 
b. Environmental: Touting the safety and reliability of the terminal. Indicating the 
environmental benefits of natural gas as a cleaner burning fuel with lesser 
emissions when compared with traditional fossil fuels. 
c. Geographic: Locational advantages of a particular terminal in terms of access to 
natural gas pipeline infrastructure, re-use of a brownfield site (previous industrial 
use), and distance from populated area. 
d. Technological/Technical Benefits: These would typical be used in conjunction 
with the other positive attributes. So the firm will not just share the factual 
information about the tech used but also the benefits from that tech. 
Examples of Positive Claims: 
Themes Example 
Economic and industrial benefits Henry pointed out that t”he LNG plant would be a 
financial boon to the town, whose annual budget is 
$200,000”. “The Freeport LNG terminal, if it becomes 
operational, would provide the town with fees of more 
than five times that amount”, Henry said. 
Environmental “Safe Harbor Energy is designed with security, safety 
and environmental features a priority, including 
meeting a 200-year storm design standard, self-
sufficient systems for water supply, wastewater 
management, energy, fire and safety, and using ‘best 
available technology’ consistent with the requirements 
of the Deepwater Port Act.” 
Geographic “The fact that it happens to be only 1.2 miles from a 
[natural gas] hub line, has deepwater access, would 
only need a 300-foot jetty and very little dredging, 
made us think was a very neat site that we needed to 
bring to the attention of state officials,” he added. 
Technological/Technical 
Benefits 
Rob Bryngelson, Excelerate vice president, said “a 
version of the company’s ‘Energy Bridge’ technology 
has been used safely for years in the North Sea to 
unload petroleum from oil tankers”. “The Excelerate 
mooring systems can withstand severe storms, and 
unloading operations can be shut down within 15 
minutes in an emergency”, Bryngelson said. 
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2. Negative personal claims will have a clear target for the rhetoric, a particular 
stakeholder. It will be typical of the form X is Y, where X is a stakeholder and Y is 
something negative about the stakeholder. So the grammatical structure will typically 
have stakeholder as the subject and something negative about the stakeholder as the 
object of a sentence. In some instances these two aspects may be split between sentences 
but you will have a pronoun linking the two. The following sub-types of negative 
personal claims can be recognized: 
a. Discredit 
i. Accused of wrongdoing or not playing by rules  
ii. Attack motive or stance  
iii. Accused of misinformation, misrepresentation or distorting facts  
iv. Opponent is considered ignorant 
v. Question competence or ability  
vi. Accused of not carrying out their obligation, role or duty  
vii. Undermine position, authority or status 
b. Dismiss 
i. Marginalize opponents; downplay their importance; or circumvent them 
in the process  
ii. Accused of behaving inconsistently with their status, identity or authority 
iii. Dismiss, trivialize or belittle them 
Examples of Negative Personal Claims: 
Types of disapproval Example 
Attack motive or stance 
“Organizations critical of the approval of the Gulf Landing 
LNG terminal apparently fail to recognize the strict and 
enforceable conditions of environmental performance 
imposed to protect marine life,” the statement said. 
Opponent is considered 
ignorant  
BHP’s Chip Goodyear says “environmentalists are living in 
‘dreamland’ if they think conservation will meet the state’s 
growing energy needs”. “You can say that, but it doesn’t 
really work,” he says.  
Marginalize opponents; 
downplay their importance; 
or circumvent them in the 
process 
“Fishing Families for Harpswell represents a very small 
group of fishermen,” Micciche said Friday. “The majority of 
fishermen I’ve spoken to are in favor of this project.” 
Accuse opponents of 
behaving inconsistently 
with their status, identity, 
or authority 
“We’re disappointed that this would be something being 
sponsored by the selectmen. The film that selectmen plan to 
show about the dangers of liquefied natural gas terminals is 
a scaremongering-type film that’s not based in reality,” said 
a top official for the company that wants to build such a 
project near Hull. “I don’t think it’s based in science or 
anything else,” said Aaron Samson, the managing director of 
 147 
 
Types of disapproval Example 
LNG projects for energy company AES Corp.  
 
3. Negative topical claims are difficult to recognize if the issues are implicit because of the 
context. In instances where the stakeholder issue and the alternative suggested by the firm 
is clear, it is easier to recognize that segment as a negative topical claim. There are some 
marker words and phrases that are helpful in recognizing that the firm’s representative is 
trying to counter an issue. 
a. A negation or polarity switch: not true; don’t think; don’t agree; don’t believe; 
don’t see; does not/doesn’t; no reason 
b. Contrasting conjunctions: But; although; though; however; whereas; unless; if 
only; even if; even though; rather than; while; contrary. These conjunctions need 
to contrast the implicit/explicit stakeholder issue with what the firm is 
forwarding. 
c. Certain marker words are not in the actual statement of the firm rep but in the 
way the media report qualifies the statement. Examples: Denied; disagreed; 
countered; questioned; rejected; downplayed; dismissed; insists; argued; retorted; 
pointed; unfazed; despite; puzzled; refuted, etc. Some of these can also be within 
the statement. For instance, take the word ‘question’ and its derivatives. The 
media can characterize it as ‘Firm rep questioned the validity of the issue’ or the 
firm rep may be quoted as saying ‘We question the validity of the issue.’ 
d. Certain marker words are completely dismissive of the issue, in a similar vein as 
the ‘Dismiss’ sub-category for Negative Personal claims above (point 3b). 
Typical words used: inaccurate; incorrect; misstated; misrepresented; irrelevant; 
false. etc. Be careful to distinguish what the subject is. Consider the general 
structure — X is incorrect. If X is an issue then it is a negative topical claim but 
if X is a person then it is negative personal claim. 
e. Some words project the firm’s belief or opinion. Look for marker words/phrases 
such as: In our opinion; we believe. 
Examples of Negative Topical Claims: 
Types of identifying 
markers 
Examples (emphasis added to point the markers) 
A negation or polarity 
switch 
“We don’t agree that it is industrialization, nor is there 
any indication that having this facility will lead to having 
other such facilities in this region,” he said. 
Contrasting conjunctions “Contrary to many of the claims made in public meetings 
and correspondence, our studies indicate that the off-shore 
dredging we have proposed will not harm the health of the 
Chesapeake Bay in either the long or short term. In effect, 
AES is proposing to clean up an existing environmental 
condition—one that we did not cause—without the need for 
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government funding.” 
Media report descriptive Bradwood Landing spokesman Chuck Deister disagreed 
with the group’s premise, saying “now is the time to 
introduce LNG to the region, because renewable energy 
sources are gaining traction but can’t yet supply all of 
society’s needs”. 
Dismissive Hritcko said “some of the ‘facts’ Blumenthal and Johnson 
recited were ‘absolutely false,’ including Blumenthal’s 
contention that every town along the coast would have to 
spend money for new boats so fire departments could be 
ready for emergencies”. 
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Appendix E: Inductive categorization of negative personal claim sub-types 
Since negative personal claims is a relatively novel concept, I employed an inductive 
method to categorize the sub-types. Once I recognized the rhetorical segment as containing a 
negative personal claim, using the coding protocol detailed above, I also recorded the first order 
categories for the type of negative personal claim. Each instance of the rhetoric segment was 
coded in a matrix form (rows for the rhetoric segment and columns for the first order type). The 
screenshot below illustrates how data was coded. 
 
I then used the hierarchical cluster analysis provided by SPSS to derive linkages between 
the first order categories and club them into second order categories. The Dendrogram plot was 
used to identify linkages between disapproval types. The second order categories are based on 
proximity scores (x-axis), which is an indicator of an underlying latent dimension that is driving 
these first order categories to occur together in a rhetorical segment. I further categorized the 
second order negative personal claim by potential motivations of the firm to employ them. This 
resulted in the following categorization of the sub-types 
a. Discredit 
i. Intentions Targeted 
1. Accused of wrongdoing or not playing by rules  
2. Attack motive or stance  
Figure 10: Illustration of first order coding of negative personal claims 
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3. Accused of misinformation, misrepresentation or distorting facts  
ii. Capability/ability target 
1. Opponent is considered ignorant 
2. Question competence or ability  
3. Accused of not carrying out their obligation, role or duty  
iii. Undermine  
1. Undermine position, authority or status 
b. Dismiss 
i. Marginalize  
2. Marginalize opponents; downplay their importance; or 
circumvent them in the process  
ii. Inconsistency 
3. Accused of behaving inconsistently with their status, identity or 
authority 
iii. Trivialize 
4. Dismiss, trivialize or belittle them 
This categorization enabled me to reassess the coding of negative personal claims in order to 
improve the construct validity. 
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Appendix F: Coding of Community Contestation  
I measure contestation by aggregating unique incidents as reported by the media. An incident 
reported by the media was identified as a contestation event if they it three criteria: reflected a 
negative social evaluation of the firm or its proposal, provided a clearly identifiable date for the 
incident, and identified a specific community member (e.g., a resident or an elected official 
residing in the same county or a local NGO). Using the associated rhetoric of the stakeholders 
and the media characterization, I identified the following types of contestation events: Protest 
Rally; Petition/Campaign (letter writing, membership, or signature campaign); Community 
Meetings; Stakeholder’s Regulatory Actions (meeting federal officials, formal intervenor status); 
Official Forum (Regulator- or Company-sponsored forum); Radio/TV/Online/Ad Campaign; 
Legal; Release of Report or Study sponsored by stakeholders; Legislative/Executive/Political 
action (Legislature Proceedings, Task Force, Resolution, Vote, Referendum, Bill, Hearings); 
Press Conference (as a collective); and Press Statement (Press Release, Individual Interviews).  
Examples of Contestation Events: 
Types of events Media reporting of the incident 
Protest Rally “The Mothers March Against LNG (liquefied natural gas), to 
protest the possible arrival of LNG terminals on the Columbia 
River, took place Sunday afternoon in a heavy downpour, which 
didn't dampen the enthusiasm of the participants one bit. A large 
crowd of children and adults carrying NO LNG placards passed 
out NO LNG fliers as they marched from the Blue Scorcher Cafe 
to the Bradwood Landing office on the corner Ninth and 
Commercial streets to issue a proclamation and to put up an 
‘eviction’ notice on the door.” 
Official Forum “Dundalk-area residents - less than pleased by a global power 
company's plan to build a liquefied natural gas plant at Sparrows 
Point - were openly hostile last night during an open house 
meeting with company officials. ‘This thing is more dangerous 
than you all are painting,’ Dundalk resident Jerome Hancock said 
of the terminal proposed for a former shipyard site.” 
Petition/Campaign “Notice of the opposition group's formation was distributed 
through e-mail by the staff of the Hull Life-saving Museum. Lory 
Newmyer, the museum's executive director, said Save Outer 
Brewster consists of museum staff members but is not technically 
affiliated with the institution. Museum officials said yesterday that 
the response to the petition has been positive. Newmyer said 
several hundred have signed it since it began circulating a week 
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ago.” 
Legislative/Executiv
e/Political 
“Lauderdale-by-the-Sea Mayor Roseann Minnet said she will 
submit a resolution opposing the gas plant at the town's May 27 
commission meeting, saying, ‘if there's an accident, the entire 
town could be obliterated.’” 
Radio/TV/Online/A
d Campaign 
“Save The Bay is poised to begin a high-profile campaign to rally 
Rhode Islanders against a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal 
proposed for Mount Hope Bay. The $12,000-effort will feature 
advertisements on radio, in Newport and Jamestown newspapers 
and on billboards on Routes 195 and 24.” 
 
Less than 20% of the events were press conferences or statements on their own but in most 
instances the press conferences and statements occurred in conjunction with another event. I 
decided to aggregate the contestation events across multiple categories for the following reasons:  
A. These incidents represent issues for firms to the extent that the press reports them, and 
measuring how much media coverage each incident receives provides a way to make 
them comparable.  
B. Media reports are valid indicators in this context because the facility is not yet built; it is 
only proposed. So protests and boycotts will not cause any operational disruption since 
the proposal hasn’t reached the operational stage. For the purpose of this study, it is the 
rhetoric associated with the protest that becomes important. 
C. Previous research has also shown that media reporting is the crucial factor even in cases 
where the firm’s ongoing operations are targeted. For instance, King (2008:395) 
considers boycott events and finds that “corporate targets of boycotts were more likely to 
concede when the boycott received a great deal of media attention”. 
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